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ABSTRACT
The Algerian public enterprise which, since 1965, had benefitted 
from considerable political and financial support of policy makers came 
under closer scrutiny and, indeed, severe criticism in the late 1970fs. 
In 1980 the central authorities decided to reorganise these public 
firms. This reorganisation was part of a wider reform programme aimed 
at restructuring the administration and management of the public sector 
as a whole. The reforms stressed the need for greater 
decentralisation in decision making and a greater degree of financial 
autonomy for the public enterprises. The public enterprises were 
broken up into smaller, more specialised units in order to allow a 
more rational use of resources and to reduce the widespread 
inefficiency and waste in the public sector. In addition to these 
structural changes the finances of the public enterprises were 
overhauled. A number of measures to strengthen their financial 
autonomy were proposed. These included the deregulation of prices, 
the reactivation of the role of credit, the introduction of self- 
financing for minor investments.
The aim of this thesis is twofold: first, to provide a critical
review of the problems which the reform programme was introduced to 
solve; and then to examine the reform measures and how they have been 
designed and carried out in practice. The study has been divided into 
three main parts.
Part One is the background of the study. It presents a general 
picture of the Algerian economic development context and the impact it 
has had on the origins and evolution of the public enterprises. It 
also examines the main structural features of Algerian industry, the 
internal organisation of enterprises and their place in the planning
system.
The seven Chapters forming Part Two present the main elements of 
the crisis which was shaking the public sector in the pre-reform 
period. Chapter Three investigates the various distortions associated 
with the inefficient organisation of Algerian industry and the internal 
structure of the enterprises. Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven deal 
with the problems involved in the planning and control of various 
aspects of the enterprises* operations: investment, imports,
production, wages and incentives. The argument set out in these 
Chapters is that in the pre-reform period the central authorities 
lacked an appropriate economic and financial framework for regulating 
the behaviour of enterprise managers, and for integrating macro and 
micro-economic interests. They demonstrate that the centralised 
system of planning and control was responsible for the serious 
conflicts of interest which to an increasing extent emerged between the 
state and the enterprises; and that these conflicts were at the root 
of the economic and financial distortions. Chapter Eight can be 
considered as a conclusion to Part Two. If provides empirical 
evidence about the financial problems of the public enterprises and 
summarises the various interpretations put forward by the main interest 
groups within the larger public sector to explain the fundamental 
causes of these problems.
Part Three deals with the details of the reform package itself and 
how it has been implemented in practice. Chapter Nine reviews the 
structural changes brought about and analyses their implications for 
both the central planner and the enterprises. This Chapter concludes 
that the reorganisation of the public enterprises has brought to the 
fore several theoretical and practical problems, which if not 
appropriately tackled, will cause the reforms to fail. Chapters Ten
and Eleven treat the functional aspects of the reform. Chapter Ten 
examines in detail the financial rehabilitation scheme for the public 
enterprises and the measures adopted to increase the financial autonomy 
of the new firms. Chapter Eleven concludes that despite these 
decentralisation measures, the powers of the enterprises in the 
planning system are still very restricted. Their operations are still 
carried out within the framework of a centralised planning system which 
controls the bulk of their decisions and resources.
Finally, the conclusion attempts to explain the inconsistencies of 
the reform measures and puts forward a number of hypotheses about the 
ways in which these inconsistencies may be resolved in the future.
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PART ONE
THE ALGERIAN DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ORIGINS 
AND EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC ENTERPRISE
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1 THE problem
Despite the key position the public enterprise occupies in the 
Algerian economy, until recently very little was actually known about 
the way it was organised and run and how its operations were 
articulated with those of the central administration. Formally, 
public enterprise activities are incorporated into a centralised system 
of planning and control. However, research designed to improve 
understanding of the public enterprise and the functioning of planning 
as a whole has until very recently been almost non-existent in Algeria. 
Academic economists involved in research and teaching have also made 
little contribution to the study of the micro-economics and management 
of the public enterprise. The absence of systematic studies on public 
enterprises in Algeria is due to a number of factors.
It may, first, be attributed to the priority which the Algerian 
strategy of socio-economic development gave to a policy of centrally- 
controlled, rapid industrialisation and economic growth. Under this 
strategy, the public enterprises were considered mainly as instruments 
for implementing the strategy and, consequently, their operations were 
subordinated to the national economic plan. In their concern to 
achieve rapid industrialisation through a system of priority planning 
the central planners paid little attention to the problem of bringing 
about a rational allocation of resouorces; nor indeed to micro- 
economic processes and adjustments. The implication of this is that 
most economic research dealt extensively with the Algerian model of 
national economic development and the industrialisation strategy in its 
various aspects (choice of technology, dependency, production,
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distribution . ). The public enterprises were not considered an 
interesting area for research and investigation and, until recently, 
little attention has been paid to the problems and costs involved in 
managing an enterprise.
Another reason for this lack of attention lies in the fact that in 
Algeria the early socialist theorists and nationalists saw the 
nationalisation of production facilities as a way to achieve greater 
equity and macro-economic objectives. They did not, however, devote 
any serious consideration to the problems of managing the enterprise 
once nationalised. Rather, they assumed that society would be 
transformed into a giant organisation for cooperative production in 
which everyone would work in accordance with the national plan.
Finally, the problem of access to data in public enterprises is 
another contributing factor. Much of the information concerning 
public enterprise operations was confidential; this was a major 
hindrance to the development of a body of knowledge about their 
functioning.
However, with the shift in economic policy and the economic 
reforms introduced in the early 1980’s the ’black box’ has been opened 
and serious discussion of the problems of the public enterprises is now 
on the agenda. As a result some information, patchy and fragmentary, 
it is true, has been made available to researchers and the public. 
The present thesis is a modest contribution to this debate.
This study is devoted entirely to the public enterprise. 
However, since the public enterprise in Algeria operates so firmly 
within the framework of a centralised planning system which determines 
to a significant degree its objectives, operations and the resources 
available to it, analysis of its performance and the actual behaviour 
of its management must necessarily take into consideration its
3
interactions with various levels of the planning hierarchy. This 
issue lies at the root of the familiar but complex problem of central 
control of public enterprises.
The thesis deals with the management systems in public sector 
enterprises and their evolution over the period since independence. 
More specifically it propounds the argument that the crude 
administrative methods of planning and control used in the 1970!s have 
become inappropriate for managing and directing a rapidly growing and 
complex economy. They have created serious conflicts between the 
state and the enterprises and have produced severe macro and micro- 
economic imbalances. The restructuring of the public enterprises 
carried out in the early 1980fs was essentially a reaction against the 
distortions created by the existing system and a comprehensive effort 
to remove them. The reform operation can be seen as an attempt by the 
central authorities to resolve two fundamental problems. The first is 
the increasing efficiency of the Algerian economy since the early 
1970’s. The second, which is closely related, is to reverse the spread 
of organisational pluralism, which has manifested itself in the 
expanding role of the public enterprises and the sectoral ministries 
with a consequent loss in centralised direction and control. Both 
factors have produced an increasingly sub-optimal structure.
Before entering into the subject matter of the thesis a number of 
methodological points need to be made. These relate to the concept of 
public enterprise, the approach to be followed in the study, the 
sources of data and the conceptual framework within which this study in 
applied economics will be carried out.
4
2 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
2.1 The Concept of the Public Enterprise
As used in this study, the term public enterprise1 refers to an 
organisation whose primary function is the production and sale of goods 
and/or services, and which is fully owned by the government or other 
government-controlled agencies. Joint-venture undertakings with 
foreign capital fall outside the scope of this study. The study will 
be concerned exclusively with national public industrial enterprises 
which encompass all the major large-scale industries. The term 
National* covers only those enterprises which are attached to a 
sectoral ministry; local industries are, therefore, omitted. The 
term industrial1 refers specifically to enterprises under the 
administrative authority of the three industrial ministries: light
industries, heavy industries, and energy and petrochemical industries. 
The discussion generally excludes enterprises belonging to other 
sectors of the economy.
2.2 The Approach
The study is divided into three parts. The First Part provides a 
historical survey of the development of the public enterprises in 
Algeria and sets out the complex institutional framework within which 
the enterprises operate which will be a central element in later 
analyses of the enterprises’ operations. The Second Part of the study 
treats the problems faced by the enterprises between 1965 when Colonel 
Boumedienne came to power and 1980, the year of the reform. The Third 
Part analyses the reforms as they have been developed and implemented 
between 1980 and the present time. A short concluding section 
presents an interim judgement on the still evolving reform programme.
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2.3 Sources of Data
The study has employed both secondary and primary sources of data. 
The secondary sources included: available literature and statistical
handbooks, journals, official newspapers, some unpublished documents of 
unclassified nature, seminar papers and conference communications held 
at various universities, published theses, government reports, 
legislation (te. decrees, circulars) and internal instructions of 
ministries. These sources formed the main data base for Parts One and 
Two. In writing Part Three, which deals with the reform measures and 
their implementation, the author employed, In addition to the above 
sources, data he collected from various interviews conducted in the 
summer of 1984 and 1985. Two months of extensive interviewing was 
concentrated primarily at the level of the enterprise (National Steel 
Enterprise) and the bodies that supervise them: the sponsoring
ministry (Light Industries), the central planning office (Ministry of 
Planning), banks (National Bank of Algeria). Some discussions were 
also arranged with academics. The primary objective of the interviews 
was to assess the response of various interest groups to the reform 
measures, how they perceived them and how they felt about the chances 
of their implementation in practice.
Interviews with enterprise managers were normally conducted at a 
very senior level. The aim here was to see whether the reform 
measures introduced had had any significant impact on their management 
and planning methods.
2.4 The Conceptual Framework
This section sets out some of the conceptual tools which will be 
employed in the analysis of the working of the control system in 
Algeria and its problems observed. The problem of government control 
over the operations of public enterprises has been approached from a
6
variety of angles. Two approaches are of particular relevance to this 
study. These relate to the objectives assigned to the enterprises and 
the extent and methods of control. Each approach throws the light on 
a particular aspect of the control issue.
2.4.1 The linkage between objectives and control mechanisms
Among the most important aspects of the public enterprises1 
activities is the choice of objectives to pursue. In Algeria public 
enterprises are called upon to pursue a mix of objectives, both 
commercial and non-commercial. These can include such diverse goals 
as profitability, redistributing income, subsidising certain priority 
groups, sectors and regions, earning foreign exchange, generating 
employment and strengthening the power base of the ruling class. 
Having such a plethora of objectives can be equivalent to having no 
objective, and management is often left free to pursue its own 
interests or constantly shifting its objectives in an incoherent mix. 
A major cause of the problems with public enterprises1 operations is, 
therefore, the absence of clearly defined, consistent, and precisely 
communicated objectives for the managers of enterprise. This void is 
likely to dampen managerial incentives and to have adverse effect on 
the efficiency of the internal operations of the enterprise; it may 
also result in actions being taken by managers of public enterprises 
which are contrary to national interests.
While the problem of multiple objectives is certainly real, it is 
also very frequently mis-stated. As Leonid Hurwicz has pointed out, 
the real difficulty is not one of multiple objectives but of ’plural 
principals1, ie. the involvement of individuals or groups with different 
aims (1). The problem is who in the government should determine their 
objectives. The simplest private firm faces a conflict between
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reducing inputs and costs while increasing output and revenues. 
Various programming techniques are available for handling more complex 
cases and for establishing weights (prices) to allocate resources so as 
to maximise objective functions involving multiple objectives. The 
real difficulty begins when individual preferences differ. For a 
private enterprise, this is a comparatively minor issue since the 
shareholders are likely to have similar trade-offs that can be captured 
in the objective of profit. But similar agreements on the weights of 
the various conflicting objectives are much more difficult to achieve 
in the public sector. Thus, the Ministry of Finance may be primarily 
‘interested in profitability, the Ministry of Labour in employment, the 
politicians in low prices, and so on. The problem of multiple 
objectives boils down in the final analysis to one of plural principals 
which in turn is a measurement problem (2). It is the difficulty of 
giving quantitative expression to objectives that makes the problem of 
control more complex.
Aharoni faces this problem explicitly by asking whether the public 
enterprise is ’an agent without a principal1 (3). He argues that the 
traditional theories are mistaken in viewing government as the 
shareholding, goal-setting principal and the enterprise as the 
executing agent. In his view, the real principal is the public at 
large, for whom a variety of agents act, including various political 
parties, government ministries, and public enterprises. Each agent’s 
view of the public interest is influenced by its own individual and 
group interests, thus diminishing its ability to establish trade-offs 
on behalf of the public. It is not surprising that public enterprise 
managers sometimes view themselves as having at least as much of a 
claim on the goal-fixing function as their erstwhile bureaucratic and 
political superiors. Under these circumstances, measurement of
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managerial performance cannot be gauged because of many conflicting and 
ill-defined objectives.
To overcome this problem, Aharoni suggests a pragmatic solution in 
the form of an independent ’goal audit* to provide a periodic public 
forum for public scrutiny of the decisions and actions of various 
agents.
2.4.2 The methods and extent of cQnfnoi
The question of who should determine the objectives of the public 
enterprise is only one component of the system of control of public 
enterprises. Assuming that this problem is solved and a proxy 
principal established for the enterprise, there arises the question as 
to how other decisions should be divided between the government and the 
enterprise. The optimum pattern of control, if there is such a thing, 
will vary across activities, across countries and across organisations.
The objective of any control system is to increase management 
efficiency and concurrently to ensure compliance with the central 
planners’ objectives.
Two types of control systems can be identified. In the first, a 
number of financial targets are agreed with and assigned to the 
management of the enterprise. It is then left entirely to the 
managers to decide on the ways these targets can be achieved. 
Controls by the central authorities are exercised ex post, and 
managerial performance is evaluated and rewarded in accordance with 
those objectives. This is then a completely dgQgnfcali§ed SYStgffi with 
minimum costs of operation. Obviously, under this model, public 
enterprise managements have large decision-making powers and 
responsibilities. The main weakness of this system, however, is that 
these powers may not be used in the best interest of the community as 
defined by the government.
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At the opposite extreme, a control system might exist in which 
management must justify every decision, by presenting information on 
the choices it has made and the alternatives which are available. 
This appraisal procedure is conducted after the decision-maker has made 
his choice, but before it is carried out. Obviously, under this 
centralised system, the decision-making authority of enterprises is, 
very restricted. When there is no parametric management system (i-e* 
prices, and other market categories) the enterprises cannot be allowed 
a wide range of delegated powers since the top policy makers have then 
no instruments to influence their decisions. Here, the risks of 
enterprises pursuing their own interests are minimal, assuming, of 
course, that the management has the information required and is willing 
to present it to the central planners.
The centralised system presents a number of characteristics which 
are relevant to the purpose of the present study. First, the costs 
associated with the operation of the system itself, ie the costs of 
monitoring managers1 behaviour so as to achieve the goals of the 
national plan may be very high, since effectively there is a 
duplication of decision-making with the enterprise acting essentially 
as a preliminary organiser of information. Considerable resources 
will generally be needed to monitor decisions, collect and transmit 
information and examine alternatives. Secondly, delays in the 
implementation of decisions, which the control system might cause, also 
impose costs and may result in conflicts of interest between the 
enterprises and the central control agencies.
Other problems involved in such an attempt at detailed control may 
arise: there is the possibility of the distortion of information, the
basic element in the system, by the enterprises; the various control 
agencies themselves may not have a precise and clear idea of the
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objectives pursued by the top policy makers; these agencies may not 
have the time, the information and the necessary managerial skills to 
deal with the complex problems involved in controlling and coordinating 
a rapidly growing industry.
Finally, when the range of powers of an enterprise is limited or 
unstable, a certain type of management termed the Administration’ of 
production arises, and undermines the basis of economic calculation in 
the enterprise which is, in turn, responsible for much of the 
inefficiency of the public enterprise operations (4). This thesis is 
supported by many cases of enterprise managers complaining of continual 
intervention from above. Moreover, the absence of managerial 
incentives is often attributed to over rigid controls which constrain 
the ability of managers to exercise their creative talents and adapt 
the enterprises’ operations to market conditions. This type of 
control system will be referred to very frequently in this thesis under 
the label ’administrative system of planning and control*.
The conceptual tools briefly developed above will be applied in 
the discussion which follows of the problems confronting the Algerian 
public enterprises in actual practice and the efforts made in the 
controversial reform measures of the 1980’s to resolve them.
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CHAPTER T O
THE ORGANISATION OF ALGERIAN PUBLIC SECTOR INDUSTRY
The objective of this Chapter is to give a brief summary of the 
contemporary industrial scene in Algeria. It sets the stage for a 
further discussion of the problems and reforms of public sector 
enterprises in subsequent Chapters. It starts with a brief review of 
the circumstances which have led to the emergence of the public 
enterprise in Algeria. It then examines the main structural features 
of Algerian industry and the place the public enterprise occupies in 
this structure. It concludes with a brief description of the formal 
organisational structure of the public enterprise.
1 THE GENESIS OF THE PUBLIC ENTERPRISE
The genesis of public enterprise and the processes through which 
major segments of it have emerged in a country have a material impact 
on the nature of its performance. To understand the process of 
formation and development of the public sector one needs to understand 
something of the social and political environment in which it 
developed.
1.1 The Colonial Inheritance
State involvement in the economic life of independent Algeria is 
in part a reaction against several structural legacies of colonial 
subjugation. In the colonial regime, the entire economy of Algeria 
was subordinated to the metropolitan authority, France, and all 
economic activities were so designed as to support the development of 
the metropolis. Almost all exports went to France which in turn 
supplied the bulk of Algeria’s imports. These were composed mainly of
13
agricultural products (cereals, wines, citrus fruits, tobacco and 
garden products). Heavy industry was practically absent and 
manufacturing mainly concerned with the processing of primary 
commodities. Local capital remained attached to agriculture and 
French capital was interested only in mining, banks and commerce. 
Practically all economic activity and productive enterprises were in 
the hands of the French colonists and there was virtually no local 
entrepreneurship.
Moreover, there was an imbalance in regional development with very 
heavy concentration on the coastal belt. Integration between 
different sectors of the economy was also weak. For example, in 1954 
the industrial sector absorbed only 25 per cent of the value of the 
local agricultural production and a mere eight per cent of the value of 
industrial production was directed towards agriculture. The shaping 
of the structure of the Algerian economy to serve the interests of the 
metropolis was accompanied by the polarisation of political, social and 
economic power.
When, in 1962, after a long and bitter struggle, Algeria achieved 
its independence, the country faced enormous political, economic and 
social problems. The balance sheet of the war was disastrous: over a
million Algerians died; over two million people in rural areas were 
uprooted from their homes by the French army as part of its 
pacification programmes and resettled in concentration camps. During 
the six months before independence some 90 per cent of the European 
settlers representing almost all the administrators, technicians, 
teachers, doctors and skilled workers left the country. Factories and 
shops were closed down and farms were abandoned. This exodus and the 
massive flight of the private capital from the country paralysed the 
economy and intensified the already chronic problems of
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underdevelopment and underemployment.
The problems inherited from the colonial era had a profound impact 
on the country’s political and economic orientation after independence. 
There was a general agreement among the nationalists after independence 
- particularly after 1965 - as to the need for extensive state 
involvement in the economic life through direct control of the means of 
production. The choice of the public enterprise as the main agent of 
development was regarded by the Algerian leaders as the only solution 
not only to the problem of reconstruction and restructuring the 
country’s economy according to Algeriafs needs, but also as a means to 
achieve its national unity. Some observers felt that the new state 
had little choice in this respect. The strong sentiment against 
foreign business, the weakness of the local bourgeoisie together with 
the populist nature of the anti-colonial struggle left Algeria with 
only one possible agent of development: the state.
1 «2 Thg EmgcgeQce Qf ModSEB IndustEY gnd fchg Rglg of fhg State in
Independent Algepia
The processes through which public enterprises came into being in 
Algeria are part of the wider process of formation of the new 
independent nation-state. They reflected the different ideas of 
various social groups within the state-party apparatus concerning the 
role to be played by this state in the development effort. By and 
large, this process can be broken down into three distinct historical 
phases: (1962-1965), (1966-1971) and (1971-1980).
1.2.1 The gaEly fQEms gf in£gEY§QtiQD I1962rl965)
If the emergence of the public enterprise is recent in Algeria 
and goes back to the early years of independence, socialist and 
collectivist ideas are, however, deeply rooted in the pre-independence
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period. In fact, the ideologies of nationalism and the state as an 
agent of change go back to the colonial era. During the war of 
independence the more activist elements among the nationalists had 
begun to formulate their ideas about the economic development to be 
adopted by an independent Algerian state. These were articulated in 
the Tripoli Programme drawn up at the end of May 1961 (1).
The Programme, drafted by the most influential left wing members 
of the FLN party, gave priority to the development of the agricultural 
sector. This was to be achieved by radical land reform measures, the 
limitation of private property and the collectivisation of the land. 
According to this document, a reorganisation of the agricultural sector 
would increase the purchasing power of the Algerian population and 
create the necessary conditions for an industrialisation that was not 
oriented towards overseas markets. It favoured the nationalisation of 
large businesses in all sectors and the adoption of socialism as an 
ideology and system. In fact, the extension and development of the 
public sector was identified with the construction of socialism. The 
programme emphasised the independence of the country economically as 
well as politically; the umbilical cord with France was to be neatly 
and decisively severed, and economic sovereignty in the form of 
Algerian control over Algerian resources and economic life was to be 
asserted as an integral part of political independence.
This strong paternalistic streak of etatism found many expressions 
after independence. It was apparent in the preference for the one 
party system. In the economic field the case was made for using the 
public rather than private enterprise as the main agent for 
development. Foreign private enterprise was more or less ruled out by 
nationalist sentiment. Indigenous private enterprise was regarded as 
too weak to tackle the problem of reconstruction. Besides, private
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enterprise was dependent upon profits, and the many projects might not 
yield immediate profits.
The Algiers Charter, a series of texts adopted by the first 
Congress of the FLN party in the Spring of 1964, went much further in 
detail and elaboration than the Tripoli Programme. It firmly rejected 
the capitalist path of development in favour of a socialist approach 
which is defined not only in terms of the nationalisation of the means 
of production but as a system of worker sel£rmanag§ment (2).
In practice, the early collectivisation measures started under Ben 
Bella’s government when in the Summer and Autumn of 1962 many thousands 
of workers took over the management of farms and factories abandoned by 
the European settlers in order to keep these units in production and to 
protect their jobs. The management of these units was entrusted to 
the comit&| ggstion, or management committees. This action marked 
the birth of self-management in Algeria. The position of workers’ 
committees was later legalised by the famous March Decrees issued in 
1963 which laid down the principles governing the organisation and 
functioning of the nationalised farms and factories. This new form of 
management was extended to all local and French-owned land nationalised 
in subsequent years.
By the beginning of 1964 the self-managed sector controlled some 
2.3 million hectares representing about a third of the total cultivated 
area. This comprised the large bulk of the modern sector (ie the most 
fertile land in the country) which supplied a large proportion of 
Algeria’s agricultural exports and on which some 150,000 permanent 
workers and 50,000 seasonal workers were employed. By 1964 between 
314 and 345 industrial factories had also passed under the control 
of self-management committees. These were predominantly small units 
employing together between 9,500 and 15,500 salaried workers and
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representing no more than 10 per cent of the total work force in 
industry (3). Many of the larger and more important foreign 
industrial enterprises continued their operations as before. However, 
the Algerian government acquired during this period the French holdings 
in certain industrial firms: in the oil company SN REPAL, the Algiers
oil refinery, CAMEL, Caral-Renauld, Sabab-Berliet «■.. etc.
It is important to note that despite the central authorities1 
attachment to the system of workers1 management during this period, 
other forms of organising activity were not rejected and were even 
encouraged. In fact, the first steps towards the creation of an 
economic system dominated by state socialism were taken under the Ben 
Bella regime. Indeed, a series of new state enterprises were created 
between 1962 and 1965 to resume production and invest in new 
activities: SONATRACH (petroleum and gas), SNS (steel), SN SEMPAC
(cereal processing), SNTA (tobacco and matches), ONACO (imports of food 
productions), SNNGA (department stores), AIR ALGERIE (airways), ... etc.
This contradictory position can be explained by the absence of a 
clear and unified vision among the nationalists as to how this 
Socialist pattern of development* would be achieved in practice. In 
fact, state intervention in the economic sphere during this period was 
influenced more by short term considerations and circumstantial factors 
than by a clear a coherent long term economic doctrine. The 
government’s approach to economic matters was influenced by one primary 
factor: its survival. The authority of the President, Ben Bella, was
weak. Challenged by different opposition groups, he was forced to 
make concessions first to one faction and then to another. 
Undoubtedly, state intervention was also seriously limited by the 
meagerness of the financial resources available to the government and 
the massive flight of capital out of the country during this period.
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In practice, the self-management experiment was a complete failure 
and did not last long (4). The main reason for this was the conflict 
between the notion of self-management and the strategy of the central 
government. In fact, the majority of the workers in the self-managed 
sector did not fully understand the nationalisation decrees, and 
effective power within the self-management committees was exercised by 
the director designated by the relevant sponsoring Ministry. The 
workers became simply state employees. The management committees were 
also dependent on state agencies for credit and for marketing their 
production and this removed almost totally any possibility of 
independent action. Moreover, the only support for this system of 
economic organisation came from the relatively small group of 
intellectuals and trade unionists, and their position was weak within 
the party. To many observers the failure of the self-management 
experiment was due mainly to the penetration of the bourgeoisie into 
the state apparatus. They quickly established their control over the 
state machinery, brought the self-management sector firmly under state 
control and were committed to building a powerful centrally-controlled 
public sector (5).
1.2.2 Thg higk pQiQt of etatigm L12.66-19111
In June 1965 Algeria's first Chief of Staff, Ahmed Benbella, was 
overthrown. Power was assumed by a Council of the Revolution, headed 
by the then Colonel Houari Boumedienne. It is commonly agreed that 
the 1965 coup marked the triumph of the petty bourgeois group within 
the state-party apparatus. These comprised high-ranking army 
officers, the more prosperous peasantry, and elements of the emerging 
bureaucratic elite who strongly supported the idea of building a 
powerful public sector under close state control.
The prime justification for this coup d’etat was that the
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inefficiencies of unplanned 'socialism of emotion* were leading the 
country to economic ruin. Speaking only a few months after the coup, 
Boumedienne declared that "socialism is not this incoherent collection 
of improvised measures and personal reactions that for three years gave 
the people only an erroneous idea of socialism. Socialism is a long 
and laborious process of construction that requires the elaboration and 
application of a comprehensive plan" (6).
At first the new regime sought to encourage private investment and 
invited the local private sector to participate in the construction of 
a modern and integrated national economy. The country's economy was 
still weak and more investment was required (Investment Code, 1966). 
However, the fundamental principle of the new investment code was that 
the state retained control over all vital sectors of the economy and 
local private capital was restricted to those branches defined by the 
government.
The strategy of the new regime over this period was to rest on 
three main policy measures: nationalisation of foreign interests,
letgkisatioHL and industrialisation.
Regaining control over national resources was a central part of 
the economic programme adopted by the new leadership. The government 
set out to reduce the dominant position occupied by foreign enterprises 
in the country's economy. Nationalisation of foreign-owned business 
and industry took place starting with the banks and insurance companies 
in 1966 and 1967. But before this nine foreign mining firms were 
nationalised in 1966 and their assets transferred to a national state 
enterprise called SONAREM. In May and June 1968, 45 subsidiaries 
of foreign manufacturing companies (Cablaff, ITT, Neyeric, Carnaud, 
Altairac, Eternit, Unilever, Lesieur, Lafarge ...=etc) employing over 
7,500 workers were nationalised. By 1970, of the 700 to 800 French-
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owned industrial firms which existed in 1963, less than 100 survived. 
This wave of nationalisations moved slowly into the oil and gas 
complexes in 1968 and 1969 and culminated with the takeover of the 
remaining of French oil interests in 1971. With this action, the 
major sources of rent-producing natural resources were under Algerian 
control. The end result was that foreign-owned firms operating freely 
on Algerian soil ceased to exist by the end of 1974, and the ones that 
remained were mainly joint venture enterprises in which the Algerian 
government had a major shareholding. Through these large-scale 
nationalisations all key sectors of the Algerian economy had been 
brought under state control.
Extensive etatisation, and its corollary, centralisation, was the 
other strand of the strategy adopted by the group which came to power 
in 1965. The new leaders recognised the essential fragility, indeed 
the non-existence of the state apparatus, and consciously chose as a 
first priority the strengthening of bureaucratic structures. Past 
programmes based on a fdecentralistf or participatory ethic were not 
supported, or were eliminated, in the interests of building a powerful 
central apparatus. One very significant manifestation of this policy 
was the creation of a large number of state-owned enterprises to run 
the nationalised property and to control the ’commanding heights of the 
economy’. The administration of all nationalised property was, as 
from 1966, entrusted to a network of major national state enterprises, 
called Societe's Nationales in the industrial sector and Offices 
Nationales elswhere, and only exceptionally to local enteprises.
The self-managed sector in agriculture was first ignored, then 
allowed to stagnate, and then revised into a mixture of centrally- 
controlled state farms and generally unregulated cooperatives. 
Similar developments occurred in industry where the assets of the self­
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managed factories were slowly merged with the newly created state-owned 
enterprises. In effect, these large public firms were to form in 
subsequent years the economic basis of the state and to become 
essentially instruments for the execution of its policies.
Although the ideal of the supremacy of the state and the 
subservience of the individual to the state was in line with the values 
held during the War of Liberation and thus sustained by tradition, the 
bureaucratic strain was also reinforced by the military background of 
the group which came to power in 1965. This led them to favour a 
tight, hierarchical system of control steered from the top instead of a 
laissez-faire economy. It may be worthwhile noting that the Soviet 
model of a closely ordered, disciplined, and planned society was not 
without influence on Algerian politicians and policy makers. It was 
viewed by many Algerians as a useful pattern for development that could 
be emulated by other developing countries. Finally, the ideologies of 
nationalism and the state as an agent of change, through comprehensive 
planning and integrated state enterprise, were brought together in the 
theory of a uniquely Algerian solution to economic development. By 
letting the state take the lead in planned development and preventing a 
small group from enriching itself at the expense of the majority of the 
population, it was hoped that Algeria would escape the class struggle.
Etatisation'and regaining control over national resources were 
only part of the economic programme adopted by the 1965 leadership. 
With a newly found political stability and growing revenues from oil 
and gas exports, the Algerian government embarked on an ambitious 
industrialisation programme. Rapid industrialisation, integration and 
introversion became the main aims of the Algerian development strategy 
which was quickly recognised internationally as one of the most 
powerful attempts to break with the classic form of economic
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dependence. The official position is that industrialisation was ’’the 
sole remedy to the problems of underdevelopment” and the only strategy 
’’capable of promoting economic and social development in poor 
countries" (7).
Clearly, this strategy rejects the theory of international 
division of labour on the basis of comparative advantage. The 
dichotomy that it implied between industrial and agricultural countries 
meant, to the minds of Algerian leaders, the acceptance of a colonial 
status. In fact, industrialisation was largely viewed at that time as 
a condition of national manhood: national sovereignty had to be
strengthened by economic sovereignty.
The Algerian industrialisation strategy formulated between 1966 
and 1967 was influenced by the theoretical work of economists such as A 
0 Hirschmann, E Gannage and notably Destanne de Bemis. In outline, it 
seeks to ensure that national resources are utilised within the country 
in order to reduce progressively the extroversion of the economy. The 
long-term objective is to construct a ’complete’ productive sector 
capable of satisfying the needs of consumption and at the same time 
ensuring the full utilisation of local resources, in particular 
manpower. The main industries thought to achieve this strategy, the 
so-called ’industrialising industries', are iron and steel, 
metallurgical and mechanical industries* and chemicals eg- phosphates, 
energy-related industries and petrochemicals. In practice, the 
strategy was built around two basic priorities: that of capital
accumulation over consumption and industrialisation over the 
development of agriculture.
It is essential to note the significance of the public enterprise 
in this development strategy. The public industrial enterprise was 
viewed as a vehicle of industrialisation and an agent for rapid socio­
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economic development. Indeed, the 1965 leadership thought that a 
viable industrial base could be established only through a substantial 
infusion of public enterprise. Moreover, public enterprises over this 
period had a duty of realising state control over the countryTs natural 
resources.
1.2.3 Thg pgciQd 19ZQ=198Q
This stage in the formation and development of the public sector 
is by far the longest and most stable phase in the life of the Algerian 
public enterprise. This is why a good deal of the discussion that 
follows in the remaining Chapters is to be devoted to it. The period 
is characterised by several distinct features which may usefully be 
summarised here.
First, this period saw the position of the public enterprise 
strengthened by the implementation on a large scale of the 
industrialisation strategy worked out in 1967 and through the 
intensification of the investment effort. One implication of this is 
that large scale nationalisations ceased to be the main source of 
growth of the public sector. Expansion of the nationalised industries 
through the creation of production units de novo had taken over since 
the early 1970fs. These developments brought with them a slight 
modification in the objective function of the public enterprise. The 
primary task assigned to it by the central planners during this period 
was no longer simply the control of nationalised property but the 
development of the strategic branches of the economy to which 
considerable financial funds were allocated in the national plan.
The other feature which marked this period was the adoption of 
comprehensive economic planning as an instrument for regulating 
enterprise activities. Several centralisation measures, planning 
procedures and timetables were legislated over this period. These
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measures will be examined on several occasions in later Chapters. It 
may be sufficient to note here that this period saw the implementation 
of two major development plans: the First Four-Year Plan (1970-1973)>
the Second Four-Year Plan (1974-1977) and the beginning of a Five-Year 
Plan in 1980 (8).
It is also during this period that the first attempts were made to 
democratise the economic system. The introduction of the workers1 
participation scheme in all nationalised industries in 1971 (see 
Section 4 in this Chapter) and the election of a National Assembly 
(Parliament) in 1976 illustrate these attempts.
Finally, this period - especially after 1975 - saw the emergence 
of a number of distortions in the economic system and the management of 
public enterprises which led to the 1980 economic reforms.
2 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN THE ECONOMY
By the early 1980’s, Algeria had built up a large and highly 
diversified public sector which forms the backbone of the country’s 
economy. Table 1 below illustrates the sectoral coverage of the 
public sector. It shows that the public sector is present in all 
areas of economy activity. It covers not only transport, electricity, 
steel, petroleum and minerals but chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
engineering, consumer goods (such as textiles, sugar, and paper), 
ceramics, cement, agro-based industries, trading, construction, small- 
scale industry, beverages, insurance and banking, health, 
telecommunications, irrigation, publishing, and tourism ... etc.
In 1983 the public sector, excluding petroleum and gas, was 
responsible for nearly 56 per cent of the country’s GNP (over 70 per 
cent including the hydrocarbon sector). In fact, with the exception 
of agriculture, trading and services, which are shared with private
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undertakings, the public sector is predominant in all branches of the 
national economy
The public sector is also important in terms of its contribution 
to employment and value-added. It has been estimated that the public 
sector accounted in 1983 for about 70 per cent oj^total recorded 
employment in the country outside agriculture and for 70 per cent of 
the country’s value-added (9).
Table 1 Contribution of the public sector tQ GDP
Economic Sector 1979 1983
Agriculture 24.3 16.4
Industry 73.9 78
Hydrocarbons 81.6 99.8
Public works, construction 73.5 72.4
Transport & communications 79.5 80.7
Trade 34.9 40.9
Services 19.5 22.7
TOTAL 62.6 70.5
TOTAL (excluding hydrocarbons) 35.7 55.7
§QU£ce: Bouzidi, A, ’’L’Industrie Publique §q Algecie”, in la Revue du
CNEAP, no 7i June 1986, Algiers, p 7.
The public sector occupies a central position in the country’s 
industry. It employed more than 75 per cent of the salaried work 
force in industry in 1983. Although varying from one branch of 
industry to another, public sector enterprises controlled, on average, 
over 80 per cent of value added created in this sector in 1981. The 
contribution of public sector enterprises to total industrial output is 
also quite significant. It grew from 55.1 per cent in 1973> to 73.9 
per cent in 1979 and nearly 78 per cent in 1983 (10).
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3 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF ALGERIAN INDUSTRY
In Algeria industrial activities under public ownership are 
entrusted to two types of enterprises depending on the administrative 
body to which they are attached: national or local. As a rule, the
national enterprises, which are commonly called Societes Nationales, 
are subordinated to a central administration, mainly a ministry. A 
local public enterprise in contrast is under the authority of a local 
or regional body (ie. wilaya, commune).
As mentioned previously, the national public industrial 
enterprise, which is the focus of this study, has become the most 
dominant form of industrial organisation in Algeria since 1966. It 
should be noted here that when reference is henceforth made to public 
or state-owned enterprises it will generally mean only the QatiQnal 
public enterprises. More specifically, since the vast bulk of state 
or public-owned enterprises in industry are placed under three 
industrial ministries, the Ministry of Light Industries, Ministry of 
Heavy Industries and Ministry of Energy and Petrochemical Industries, 
the term ’industrial1 is reserved here exclusively for public concerns 
attached to these three ministries.
The national public enterprises are large undertakings which 
operate on a national scale. They have a predominant position in 
several key branches of industry such as iron and steel, mechanical 
engineering, electrical engineering and electronics, non-ferrous 
metals, energy and hydrocarbon processing and petrochemicals. The 
private and locally-controlled public enterprises, in contrast, operate 
as a rule in such relatively less capital-intensive industries as food 
processing, light chemistry, textiles, leather and shoes, wood and 
furniture. These enterprises are more numerous, smaller in size and 
have a limited market coverage.
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3.1 Thg Concentration g£ AlggriiO Public Eotscprisgg
Algerian industry is by any standards highly concentrated. In 
fact, the large bulk of the Algerian industrial activity is controlled 
by only a few large public enterprises. This is clearly illustrated 
in Table 2 which shows the number of industrial enterprises according 
to form of ownership and their respective contributions to total 
employment in industry in 1980. Nineteen national public enterprises 
employed over 73 per cent of the total labour force in industry. The 
locally-managed public enterprises, private and joint venture firms, 
which together represented over 99 per cent of all firms in industry in 
1980, accounted for only 26.42 per cent of total industrial employment.
Table 2 DistribufciQn q£ gmplQymgnt by typg q£ gntgrpnisg in AlggrigQ 
industry in 19Z9
Type of enterprise No of enterprises 
Number Per cent
No of workers 
Number Per cent
1 National public enterprises 
- Under Ministry of Energy 2 113000
- Under Ministry of Light Industry 12
- Under Ministry of Heavy Industry 5 224000 -
Total 19 0.69 337000 73.58
2 Local public enterprises 128 4.64 28000 6.11
3 Joint venture firms 13 0.47 13000 2.84
4 Private firms 2600 94.20 80000 17.47
Grand total 2760 100.00 485000 100.00
SQUfcg: Thierry, S P, "Crigg dy Systems ErQdUSti£ Alggnigo", Institut
de Recherche Economique et de Planification du 
Developpement11, Universite des Sciences Sociales de Grenoble, 
1982, France, p 159.
Another measure of the high concentration of Algerian industry is
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the share of the national public enterprises in total industry sales in 
1980. It can be seen from Table 3 that the national enterprises 
control roughly 65 per cent of total sales in the manufacturing sector. 
Thus, the five national enterprises operating in various segments of 
heavy industry (steel and metal manufacturing, mechanical engineering, 
machine tools, electronics and electrical engineering, metal 
constructions ... etc) are responsible for some 75 per cent of total 
sales in this sector. The building materials industry is virtually 
under the control of one single national public enterprise; its 
contribution to the total sales of this branch is over 66 per cent. 
The food processing industry is also dominated by two large public 
firms which account for 86.65 per cent of the total sales of this 
branch. A few national enterprises dominate the leather and shoe, 
wood and furniture markets with a market share of approximately 58 per 
cent. Even in the textile industry in which the private sector is 
more active and has a dominant position, about 32 per cent of the total 
sales of this branch is controlled by one single national public 
enterprise.
As far as the hydrocarbon sector is concerned, the two giant state 
companies, SONATRACH and SONELGAZ^,assume monopoly positions in the 
energy and energy-related markets (petroleum, petrochemicals, gas and 
electicity).
Although the trend towards higher levels of enterprise 
concentration can initially be attributed to the large scale 
nationalisations of the second half of the 1960Ts, this process took on 
a new form as from the early 1970fs as a result of the extensive 
investment effort and the priority given to rapid industrialisation. 
Thus, within the public industrial sector under the jurisdiction of the 
three industrial ministries, the degree of enterprise concentration is
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very high. Table 4 shows a distinct change in the pattern of 
concentration between 1970 and 1980.
Table 3 ContribytiQO gf natiQOal public enterprises to total sales in 
maoyfacfcnciDg industn: 1198Q1
Branch of Public Sector Private Total Share of
national
________________ enterprises
National Others 
enterprises
Heavy industries 6000.00 2000.00 8000.00 75.00
Building materials 2366.76 678.90 460.55 3560.22 66.44
Food industry 7079.45 34.67 1056.17 8170.20 86.65
Textiles 1485.68 207.08 2837.19 4529.94 32.80
Leather & shoes 698.90 0.79 488.00 1187.69 58.85
Light chemistry 1157.99 37.96 901.02 2096.97 55.22
Wood, cork & paper 1340.78 168.17 741.57 2250.53 59.60
Total 14129.56 1127.58 8484.50 29795.55 65.94
Souccg: Liabes, D, "Capital Priye at Patrons d'Industrie an Algeria",
Centre de Recherche en Economie Applique'e (CREA), 1983, 
Algiers, p 425.
Table 4 Sizg distribution of public industrial enterprises
Class size Enterprises (per cent) Employees (per cent)
1970 1980 1970 1980
Less than 500 12.50 — 1.15 —
501 - 1000 16.66 — 3.42 —
1001 - 3000 29.16 5.26 14.18 0.36
3001 - 5000 12.50 10.53 13.05 2.28
5001 - 10000 25.00 21.05 52.22 8.32
10001 - 15000 4.16 21.05 16.12 14.53
15001 - 20000 - 5.26 — 4.30
Over 20000 - 36.15 - 71.93
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Data on the number and size of public enterprises in 1970 are
extracted from "Lllndustcie en 197Q", Ministere de 
lfIndustrie et de lfEnergie, Vol 2, no 2, Mars 1971. Data 
relating to 1980-81 are quoted by Bouzidi, A, in "Questions 
Actuelles sur la Elanifioation Aigarienne”, enap/enal 
publications, 1984, Algiers, pp 113-117.
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While the percentage of national enterprises employing more than 
10000 workers represented only a very small proportion of total 
employment (4.16 per cent) in state-owned industry in 1970, this figure 
rose sharply to about 62 per cent in the early 1980Ts. A similar 
picture emerges from the employment figures. The percentage of 
enterprises employing fewer than 5000 workers fell drastically to only 
2.64 per cent around 1980. Moreover, while enterprises employing more 
than 15000 workers were unknown in 1970, this category of firms came to 
dominate Algerian industry, accounting for more than 76 per cent of 
total national public industrial enterprises in 1980 (11).
Table 5 Thg number of Qperating units pec entepprise in 19Z9
Enterprises Number of operating units Number of employees
1 In light industry:
SNMC 56 26000
SNLB 27 8854
SN SEMPAC 93 20420
S0GEDIA 25 10495
SNEMA 22 4662
SNTA 19 4522
S0NITEX 38 20961
S0NIPEC 22 7737
SNIC 18 7907
SONIC 8 5016
SNAT 3 1401
SNERI 3 3234
2 In heavy industry:
S0NELEC 11 11609
SNS 24 27068
S0NAREM 47 13433
SN METAL 17 15000
S0NAC0ME 44 26898
3 In energy and petrochemical industries:
S0NELGAZ 48 14800
S0NATRACH 100000
Sguccg: Revolution et travail, no 420, January 1981 and Rapport de la
CN0 sur l'Etat d<Application de la GSE, June 1980.
A further indication of the degree of concentration of Algerian 
enterprises relates to the number of the operating units or plants they 
control. The growth in concentration may be due to increased multi­
plant activity. Table 5 shows that the number of the production units 
per enterprise is relatively high in Algerian industry. In light 
industry, for instance, the average number of plants per enterprise was 
28 in 1979. In heavy industry, the average number of operating units 
per enterprise was about 29 in the same year (12). Multi-plant 
activity is also dominant in the hydrocarbon sector.
Finally, it should be noted that the degree of concentration of 
Algerian industry is high by international standards. Table 6 below 
shows the degree of enterprise concentration in Algeria in comparison 
to its counterparts in the centrally-planned economies of Eastern 
Europe where the structural features are reported to be relatively 
exaggerated (13). It can be seen from the Table that the Algerian 
public enterprises are much more concentrated than their counterparts
Table 6 Size disfcribytion q£ §tat£=£WQed enterprises in Qgntrallyr 
planned ecQnoroies q£ Eastern European countries and Algeria
Class size
1001-5000 5001-10000 over 10000
percentage of enterprises employing number of workers
Algeria 10.5 26.3 63.2
Czechoslovakia 55.5 16.7 12.6
Bulgaria 39.2 4.3 3.8
GDR 29.8 8.2 2.5
Hungary 47.9 20.0 14.5
Poland 47.2 11.9 3.2
Romania 51.9 8.8 5.5
Soviet Union 37.0 11.1 1.2
SQurge: Data relating to Eastern European Countries are extracted
from Zielinski, J G, "Planifieatien et Qestien ay Niyeay de 
la Braoche Industrielle en EyrGPe de l'Est11, in la Revue de 
lfEst, July 1970. Data relating to Algeria: the same source
as in Table 5.
in Eastern Europe. The number of public enterprises employing over 
10000 workers represented just over 63 per cent of total national 
industrial enterprises in Algeria in 1980 against 14.5 per cent in 
Hungary, 12.6 per cent in Czechoslovakia and 1.2 in 1966 (14).
3.2 Eornis Qf EDtecprise CQQcgQtcatioQ
In the period prior to the 1980 reform, public enterprise 
expansion in Algeria took three main forms: . diversification, vertical 
integration and expansion into social-cultural activities.
3.2.1 Diversification
The national public enterprises are large and highly diversified 
firms. Their scope of activity, which is usually laid down in their 
statutes, gives them a large industry coverage. They were made 
responsible for the administration and control of one or more branches 
of industry. They were designed to act as representatives of the 
superior authority, the Ministry, in relation to the operating units 
subordinated to them; but at the same time they were given the task of 
coordinating the branch's relations with other organisations outside 
the enterprise. In this sense, the national enterprise may be defined 
as "an organisational category representing an economic entity half way 
between the micro and macroeconomy, or the equivalent of an economic 
sector in certain national accounts" (15).
One important consequence of the multi-sectoral coverage of the 
Algerian public enterprise is its potential for diversification. If 
diversification is taken to mean the expansion of enterprise interests 
into new production areas not vertically related to its existing 
operations, then it can easily be shown that Algerian public firms are 
highly diversified. They are, in fact, conglomerate undertakings 
involved in the production of thousands and sometimes millions of
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products in several industries. , It was estimated, for example, that 
the state textile company, SONITEX, produced around 10 million items 
in 1978 and was planning to produce over 80 million by the mid- 
1980!s (16).
The datain Annexe 1 set out the major branches of Algerian 
industry in 1979 and give a brief outline of the major product groups 
manufactured by each individual public enterprise. It can be seen 
from the Annexe, for instance, that the national enterprise for 
mechanical construction, SONACOME, is involved in serving the following 
six distinct markets:
1 Means of transportion: production of coaches, lorries, industrial
vehicles, motorcycles, bicycles.
2 Agricultural machinery: tractors (wheels, crawlers), harvesters,
seeders, sprayers.
3 Equipment for construction and public works: shovels, crane
bodies, caterpillars*.
4 Machine tools.
5 Water engineering and irrigation productions: pipes, pumps,
gates, joints, taps.
6 Household appliances: mainly cutlery.
In light industry the national agro-based enterprise, SOGEDIA, is 
a multi-product firm operating in three separate activity areas:
1 Processing and marketing sugar
2 Production and distribution of vegetable oils, fats and a large 
variety of soaps
3 Processing and canning of fruits and vegetables.
Thus, what constitutes the scope of activity of one single 
division1 within SONACOME, say, for instance, the one responsible for 
the manufacture of means of transportation, forms what may be the
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equivalent of a whole branch of industry in a developed country in 
which several specialised or competing firms are operating. By the 
same token, the canning of fruits and vegetables which is entrusted to 
one ’Division1 within SOGEDIA may correspond in another country to an 
industry grouping involving numerous small firms. These two examples 
are not isolated cases. A glance at the Annexe will show that this 
form of enterprise expansion is common to all national public firms. 
It should be emphasised that the point which is being made here is not 
to suggest that Algerian public firms are larger in absolute terms when 
compared with their counterparts in other countries, but that their 
relative market share is much greater in Algeria. It is indeed quite 
rare to find a whole branch of industry in the hands of one single firm 
in a developed country.
It is true that this combining of several branches of industry 
under the authority of a single firm was a reflection of the 
underdeveloped state of Algerian industry in the 1960’s. But, as we 
shall see in Chapter Three, these conglomerate firms became in their 
turn obsolescent as industry very rapidly grew more complex in the 
1970’s. This form of industrial organisation generated several 
economic and management problems.
3.2.2 Vgctica! integration
Algerian public industrial enterprises are also highly 
vertically-integrated undertakings. The concept of vertical 
integration is used here to describe the extent to which successive 
stages involved in the production of a particular product or service 
are carried out within a firm. Vertical integration is also used to 
describe the action of a firm in acquiring or constructing facilities 
for carrying out a productive stage which is either upstream or 
downstream from its primary activity. Backward and forward vertical
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integration refers to the acquisition of upstream or downstream stages 
respectively.
In Algerian public enterprises, vertical integration occurred at 
two levels simultaneously: the enterprise and the operating unit. At
the enterprise level, most public firms expanded backwards by acquiring 
and establishing their own sources of supply. They were also given 
state monopoly over the imports of a wide range of products (usually 
similar or related to their main product lines) intended not only for 
their own use but also for the use of other public and private sector 
firms. Thus public enterprises were made responsible for the 
distribution of these imported goods all over the country. Another 
form of backward vertical integration very common in Algerian industry 
is the acquisition by the production enterprises of their own 
engineering and project construction facilities to carry out their 
large investment programmes. Public enterprises have also extended 
their range of operations by integrating forward into marketing and 
distribution. Indeed, the large bulk of public enterprises extended 
their marketing interests down to retail business.
Vertical integration at the operating unit or factory level takes 
the form of creating large, self-sufficient and integrated plants or 
combines. In response to the rigidity of the domestic supply system, 
but also for reasons of economies of scale, public enterprises from 
1970 onwards tended to introduce larger plants. High concentration at 
the factory level meant that more and more successive stages involved 
in the production of a particular product were performed within the 
confines of an industrial complex. For instance, in the metal 
processing industry, machine tools, textiles, electronics, 
petrochemicals, the large, self-sufficient combine has become the basic 
unit in the organisation of industry. Each factory acquired its own
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foundry, forgings and casting facilities.
3.2.3 EjCEsnsign intQ social fUQctlQQS
In addition to their usual business activities, the tasks of the 
public enterprises extended to include the provision of a number of 
social and cultural services to their workers. These included the 
establishment of worker training centres, health care and sporting 
services, transport and holidays for workers children, housing, 
nurseries, consumer cooperatives etc. The direct provision of such 
goods and services by public enterprises can be explained by the 
interpenetration of the role of the state and that of the enterprise. 
It is also due to the severe shortages in the supply of these services 
through the official channels.
3.3 Causg§ of Enterprise Concentration
The reasons for the high degree of concentration of Algerian 
public enterprises are deeply rooted in the process by which the public 
sector as a whole was formed and expanded. They are intimately 
related to the rationale of the public enterprises, the process by 
which they came into existence, and the severe constraints and 
obstacles they had to face as they grew bigger and more complex as a 
result of diversification, vertical integration and various forms of 
mergers. Concentration was also the result of several other 
interrelated factors. ' ~
First, there was the grouping together of various plants and 
workshops after their nationalisation in the 1960's and early 1970's. 
Then there was the conscious policy of liquidating and annexing the 
allegedly inefficient industrial units which were formerly run under 
the system of autogestion, or self-management, to which the 1965 
leadership was openly hostile. The assets of these factories were
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brought under the control of larger public undertakings. This process 
of mergers and acquisitions continued until 1974 (17).
Further still, the concentration process was not limited to the 
self-managed plants but extended to involve the grouping of several 
large state concerns operating in similar markets (or using similar 
production processes) into larger conglomerates. Thus, in 1972, for 
instance, a number of merger operations took place in the light 
industry sector in which the number of national public firms was 
brought down from 18 to only 11 (18). Table 7 below gives a clear 
picture of the structural changes which took place in light industry 
between 1967 and 1979. It shows that the increase in concentration is 
due to the grouping together of several production units. For 
example, the accumulated number of production units brought under the 
control of the 12 public enterprises attached to the Ministry of Light 
Industry between 1966 and 1979, as a result of the large-scale 
nationalisations and various merger operations, represented nearly 73 
per cent of the total number of operating units in this sector in 1979.
The growth of public enterprises through various forms of mergers 
continued until 1974, but this source of increased concentration seems 
to have been replaced by the creation of production units de novo which 
coincided with the launch of the First Four-Year Plan in 1970 and the 
start of a huge investment programme. Public industrial enterprises 
were assigned high growth rates and the ambitious investment targets 
were embodied in a national drive for rapid, large-scale 
industrialisation.
But why this bias towards the emergence of large size enterprises? 
Part of the anser to this question lies in the significant 
institutional changes which occurred in 1965 and the subsequent shift
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Table 7 Structural chgQggs in light industries betwegn 1962 and 1919
Number of 
operating units
Prior to 
1967
1968-
1969
1970-
1971
1974-
1975
1978-
1979
Total
At beginning of period - 178 255 278 357 -
Newly created units 37 6 24 56 25 148
Units taken over into 
the sector 141 71 25 29 9 275
Units transferred to 
Other sectors 0 0 15 1 12 28
Renovated units 0 0 11 5 2 18
Total at end of period 178 255 278 357 377 -
Spufc^: Ministere des Industries Legeres, nL§s Industries Legeres en
19Z9", Mars 1980, Algiers, p 13.
in the countryfs social and economic policy. It was the result of the 
rise of an interventionist state and the centralising tendencies 
underlying the social philosophy of the new political leaders. In 
fact, the theme of restoring and reinforcing the role of the state was 
central to the thinking of the new leadership. The creation and 
development of larger multi-sectoral public enterprises to carry out 
state aims under a close control of the sectoral ministries was viewed 
as a necessary foundation stone of the structure of political power: 
namely, its right to form and interpret the social interest. This is 
in fact why the Algerian system of economic management was to rest on 
the large public firm as the fundamental form of industrial 
organisation. The motive force for the concentration of Algerian 
industry stems, therefore, from the greater convenience afforded by 
concentrated industrial structures for the administration of the 
centrally-regulated economy. The fact that a public enterprise was 
responsible for one branch of industry made the enforcement of priority
decisions by the central planning office vastly simpler. The 
allocation of central investment resources, which became firmly 
established since 1970, to particular enterprises meant an automatic 
allocation to particular branches of industry. In the same manner, 
the organisation of public sector industry into a few large concerns 
made the job of the sectoral ministries, the banks and other central 
control agencies much easier.
Mergers have also been motivated by other drives such as the 
rationalisation of management, in particular through reduction of 
operating expenses and the more efficient use of scarce managerial and 
technical talent. The bias in favour of large monopoly structures can 
further be explained by the central authorities’ desire to use public 
enterprises as an instrument to fight, and resist competition from, a 
significant private sector in textiles, leather and shoes, and food 
processing industries. Very often, the drive for mergers is not 
openly admitted. For instance, the administration merges an ailing 
public enterprise with an expanding, more dynamic one to avoid paying 
out subsidies.
Sometimes this bias in favour of large-scale operations stems 
simply from a conviction among Algerian politicians and policy makers, 
especially in the early stages of development of the public sector, 
that the bigness of an organisation was correlated with its success. 
In 1968, Boumedienne, then head of the Council of the Revolution, 
justified the move towards the large public firm in the following 
terms: "We are for self-management, but a viable self-management that 
yields a profit; that results in an efficient organisation of work and 
an increase in production. To liberate the workers is a revolutionary 
principle ... but to produce is also a necessity" (19).
Vertical integration, which is one important aspect of enterprise
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concentration, can be explained by the management’s search for greater 
security. In fact, the incentive to integrate backward was influenced 
by the structure of the Algerian market, which for all types of goods 
and services, and for infrastructure facilities, transport, qualified 
personnel and social overhead facilities, public works and construction 
facilities, research and engineering capacity, equipment and machinery, 
intermediate inputs, was simply unable to meet the needs of a huge 
investment programme. The imbalance between the capacity of the 
domestic supply system and the requirements of heavy spending in new 
investment projects has created a permanent state of shortage of all 
types of inputs and construction facilities. Faced with these 
rigidities in the supply system, most public enterprises have responded 
by establishing their own sources of supply of materials and spare 
parts, by developing their own engineering and project construction 
facilities, and became involved in the training and provision of social 
and cultural facilities to their workers and employees.
Another factor favouring concentration was the belief that large 
firms are usually better suited to engage in international trade. 
They can be used as a countervailing power in dealing with foreign 
suppliers in international markets. The expansion of enterprise 
interests into marketing and distribution was justified by managements 
on the grounds that this would make it possible to combat black market 
speculative practices in the goods which are in short supply in the 
local market. It was also claimed that integrating production and 
distribution within the same organisation would allow a closer 
coordination of the two functions; which would eventually lead to a 
reduction in distribution, costs since there would be no middle-men 
involved.
Finally, the incentive to integrate at the factory level, that is
the construction of larger plants, is conditioned by managements 
search for security and for reasons of large-scale economies. In 
fact, faced with a hostile environment and the absence of local 
subcontracting, most public enterprises tended to introduce large, 
fully-integrated industrial combines. The cost advantages of 
integrating processes are most obvious in some branches of industry 
such as the production of iron and steel, machine tools, 
petrochemicals, textiles, where important savings can be achieved in 
quick succession one after the other. In addition to these technical 
links, there may also be other costs of using the market and thus a 
potential cost reduction available as a result of integration. These 
may include the costs of negotiation and concluding separate contracts 
for each transaction; and the costs resulting from delays in delivery 
or low quality products.
4 THE PLACE OF THE PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
INDUSTRY
As Wiles points out ”an enterprise is a congeries of people” (20). 
In the case of Algeria the congeries is primarily interacting with a 
number of central agencies which control its operations. 'Control* 
here refers primarily to control by central administration of the 
objectives, resources, operations and results of the state enterprises. 
In this sense, the theory of the firm in a centrally-regulated economy 
concerns itself not so much with the interaction between enterprises or 
with their customers but with that of the planners and the planned. 
It then follows that a key component in any explanation of the 
behaviour and performance of the Algerian public enterprise must 
contain an analysis of the compatibility of the motives and drives of 
those responsible for seeing that the plan is carried out and the
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planned, i.e- the interaction of the producing units with the rest of 
the decision-makers such as the central planning office, the 
ministries, the banks etc. The following section outlines important 
aspects of the planning system, and the hierarchy of control in the 
pre-reform period.
One important feature of the Algerian economic system since 1970 
has been the adoption of central planning as an instrument for managing 
the national economy. The First Four-Year Plan (1970-1973) made it 
clearly that "The plan is the fundamental law which governs the 
totality of the economic and social activity of the country over the 
period 197-1973” (21). The Second Four-Year Plan (1974—1977) and the 
National Charter (1976) made similar statements and reiterated the 
country’s commitment to central planning as the sole instrument for 
achieving rapid and harmonious social and economic development.
The System of Socialist Management introduced in all nationalised 
industries in 1971 defined the role of the Socialist* enterprise in 
similar terms: ”The socialist enterprise is the principal agent for
the execution of planned development targets. Being responsible for 
the administration of one or more branches of activity, it is the basic 
unit in the planning system which participates, within the framework of 
the main tasks assigned to it in its foundation statute in the 
(country’s) economic, social and cultural development” (22). The 1976 
National Charter stipulated that "L’entreprise publique constitue en 
realite' l’e'lement fondamental de 1’execution du Plan” (23).
In practice, the public enterprise has become since 1970 part of a 
macro-planning system characterised by complex decision-making rules 
and structures. The processes involved in the elaboration, 
coordination and implementation of the plan made it extremely difficult 
to distinguish the functions, duties and finance of the public
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enterprise from those of the central administration. In running its 
operations, the public enterprise comes into contact with two types of 
central agencies: the sectoral ministries and functional bodies.
4.1 Th§ Sectoral on Technical Minisfcnig§
Closely modelled on the French system of tutelle, or ministerial 
guidance, the technical ministries are an important part of the 
administrative apparatus. As mentioned previously, each national 
public industrial enterprise is administratively attached to one 
sectoral ministry. Operational regulation of enterprise production is 
primarily a responsibility of the relevant ministry. In addition to 
its traditional discretionary powers and the right to hire and fire top 
and intermediate executives, it has a formal function to orientate, 
coordinate and control the activities of enterprises in accordance with 
the objectives of the national economic plan (24).
The extensive powers enjoyed by the sponsoring ministry in its 
relationships with the enterprises under its authority are particularly 
manifest in planning. According to Ordonnanee no 75-76 (November 
1975), the relevant sponsoring department is empowered to ’give 
guidance’, through its various central directorates, to enterprises in 
the elaboration of their plans. It ’specifies1 the contents of the 
sectoral objectives to each enterprise, ’approves’ these plans with a 
view to them being adopted by the government, and determines ’the 
measures to be taken and the means of carrying out these plans* (25). 
As will be examined in later Chapters (Le. 4, 5, 6 7), public 
enterprises are also required by law to seek central approval in 
decisions covering the bulk of their operations.
The legislation establishes clearly that the sponsoring ministry 
is not an exogenous controller of enterprise activities, but a genuine 
decision-making entity that participates actively in the decision-
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making process. In practice, the control exercised by the sponsoring 
ministry has proved ineffective for two main reaons: the number of
personnel with high qualifications and managerial skills is severely 
limited in comparison to both the size and scope of activity of the 
enterprises under their authority and the number of qualified personnel 
in these enterprises. Indeed, it is often the case that the 
population of highly-skilled workers (engineers and technicians) and 
managers in public enterprises is much more highly skilled than the 
entire personnel of the ministry. The other reason is the absence of 
an adequate framework for control. This complex issue will be dealt 
with in more detail in later Chapters (especially Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 
7). The above situation has resulted in ministerial staff seeking to 
collaborate with enterprises rather than controlling them. Public 
enterprises are further restricted by the existence of several other 
central agencies which affect in one way or another their operations. 
Despite the formal preeminence of the sponsoring ministry over these 
other central control agencies, Algerian legislation and established 
practice do not disbar the latter from exercising control over public 
enterprises in those matters which fall within their competence. 
Traditionally, the most important of these are the Central Planning 
Office, the Ministry of Finance acting through the banking system, and 
the Ministry of Trade.
4.2 The Central Planning Qffiee Icpqi
The status and formal structure of the central planning office 
(CPO) has evolved over time. After independence, and up to 1970, the 
CPO was no more than a directorate attached to the Ministry of Finance. 
With the launch of the First Four-Year Plan in 1970, the CPO was given 
the status of a Secretariat dfEtat (SEP). In 1979 the CPO was
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elevated to a ministry.
As in any centrally-planned economy, the CPO is responsible for 
formulating the national economic plans and coordinating their 
execution. For it to carry out this function, it should normally 
stand at the top of the economic administration. Very curiously, this 
was not the case in Algeria during the period 1970-1979, which covered 
two major development plans. Right from the outset, the CPOfs 
prerogatives within the state-party apparatus were not clearly defined. 
In fact, the CPO suffered greatly over this period from the inferiority 
of its political and legal status in comparison to that of other 
central administrations (ie the sectoral and functional ministries). 
Consequently, the success of the CPC^s coordination and arbitration 
functions depended very much on the personal and persuasive abilities 
of its top executive and on the authority of the Head of State who was 
involved personally in the elaboration of the national economic plan 
and consequently in the arbitration process. One very important area 
in which public enterprises come into contact with the central planning 
office is the planning and control of enterprise investment.
One consequence of the ambiguity in the definition of the CP0*s 
prerogatives was to exacerbate its traditional rivalry with the 
Ministry of Industry. Because of the utmost priority given to rapid 
industrialisation in the 1970fs and the fragility of the planning 
system, the latter acquired increasing powers at the expense of the 
other central administrations. Experience showed that the sectoral 
ministries rendered opac the relationships between the enterprises and 
the other central administrations. This is so because they were 
extensively involved in mediating these relationships (26). In 
particular, the industrial ministries wielded considerable powers in 
investment decisions which should theoretically lie within the
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authority of the CPO, such as the investment funds to be allocated to 
various enterprises, rates of growth of each branch of industry, choice 
of production techniques, choice of foreign contractors, leading to 
serious intersectoral conflicts.
4.3 The Baoks and Financial Institutions
The banks which act on behalf of the Ministry of Finance have a 
privileged position in their relationships with public enterprises. 
They have a role in all major decisions: investment, imports and
production. The banks, which in Algeria are themselves public sector 
agencies, are assigned two main tasks in their relationships with 
public enterprises.
The first of these is financing. Enterprise financing patterns 
are (since 1970) defined in the annual budget of the Ministry of 
Finance. The 1970 Budget, for instance, introduced the principle of 
financing enterprise operations exclusively through bank credit. It 
put an end to the previous system of budgetary grants. However, the 
impact of these ostensibly liberalising changes in the financing 
patterns was counterbalanced in practice by several other 
centralisation procedures which increased the subordination of public 
enterprises to the banking system. These measure are summarised 
below.
- The centralisation of all enterprise financial resources in one 
single bank account. Each public enterprise is required by law 
to open an account with one of the three ’banques primaires’ or 
primary banks (27). This means that the public enterprise is no 
longer free to choose the source of financing it sees as most 
appropriate for its operations.
- Public enterprises were not allowed to finance their activities 
from their own internal sources. Up to 1976, self-financing was
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prohibited in public sector enterprises and their depreciation 
allowances were confiscated by the Treasury through compulsory 
subscriptions to special Government bonds.
- In order to control the aggregate level of credit in the economy, 
the 1970-1971 regulations introduced the principle of planning the 
financial needs of public enterprises one year in advance. These 
yearly financing plans became part of the annual budget.
Moreover, the Banque Algerienne de Developpement (BAD) and the 
primary banks were given the task of channelling the centralised 
investment funds to public enterprises. The enterpriser investment
activity is controlled by these banks. Not only are the financial
aspects of the investment project scrutinised, but also the adherence 
to the investment limits prescribed by the plan, the kinds and types of 
investments, and their conformity with regulations. These aspects of 
bank control will be discussed in more detail in Chapters Four, Five 
and Six.
4.4 The Ministry of Tradg
The first important area in which public enterprises come into 
contact with the Ministry of Trade is that of procurement. Imports of 
machinery, intermediate inputs and consumer goods are under the formal 
authority of this central administration. The problems related to 
this particular aspect of enterprise activities will be discussed in 
depth in Chapter Four. Public enterprises' autonomy is also 
restricted by the directives of the Ministry of Trade concerning their 
distribution and sales policies. These directives cover a wide range 
of decisions such as pricing policy, the areas to be served by 
enterprises, and general regulations governing domestic .trade.
Finally, public enterprises are also subject to a host of rules
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and regulations issued by other central agencies such as the Ministry 
of Labour which gives directives with regard to labour and wage 
regulations.
The multiplicity of central bodies each in negotiation with the 
public enterprise produced acute problems of inter-sectoral 
coordination in the pre-reform period. In particular, it has given 
rise to organisational frictions and political rivalries between the 
sectoral ministries, which represent the state as an entrepreneur, and 
the central functional agencies which are endowed with regulatory and 
control powers.
5 PUBLIC ENTERPRISE ORGANISATION
The above section dealt with agencies set up outside the 
enterprise and entrusted with functions of planning, coordination and 
control. In this section the focus will be on the internal 
organisation of public enterprises. Up to 1971, the structures of 
public enterprises did not differ greatly from those found in most 
western corporations. Normally, the highest authority in the public 
enterprise was the management board, or the Comite d’Orientation et de 
Controle. The board was predominantly composed of senior state 
officials. In addition to the auditor who is appointed by the 
Ministry of Finance to verify the accounts of the enterprise and handle 
its financial operations, the board comprised representatives of 
several other central agencies (ministries, banks etc). In practice, 
however, all decisions and management responsibilities were vested in 
the chief executive. Appointed by the relevant sponsoring minister,
the chief executive was responsible for the running of the enterprise. 
He was frequently assisted in his task by a group of full-time 
specialist aides.
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The year 1971 was a major turning point in the history of the 
Algerian public enterprise. It witnessed the introduction of an 
important participatory 'package' into the nationalised industries: La
Gestion Socialiste des Entreprises (GSE), the Socialist Management of 
Enterprises scheme. According to this scheme, the productive workforce 
should undertake managerial responsibilities. The official document 
describing the legal and operational framework of the GSE was 
promulgated in November 1971 (Charter and Code for GSE: Ordonnance No
71—74 dated November 16, 1971). From that date a serious effort was 
made to enforce this form of management in all the nationalised 
industries and in all parts of the public sector.
The system of 'socialist management1 of Algerian enterprises was 
designed to achieve both political and managerial objectives. 
Politically, the system attempted to create a form of democratic and 
participative management. It was designed specifically to 
counterbalance the expanded and powerful administrative structure. In 
particular, the 1965 regime was openly criticised by left-wing groups, 
especially the advocates of the former system of self-management, for 
building a state capitalist system in which a small group of 
technocrats held dominant positions. By introducing this new form of 
management into public sector enterprises, the Boumedienne regime was 
therefore seeking to avoid being suffocated by the forces it itself had 
created: a sterile and powerfulbureaucracy. From a managerial
standpoint the GSE scheme was designed to minimise conflicts, improve 
communications, increase member's involvement and to maintain their 
support for the enterprise and its objectives.
5.1 Ibe Mgchgnics q£ tbs System
The Charter and Code of Practice for the socialist management of 
enterprises stipulates that the productive workforce should undertake
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managerial responsibilities. Clearly, the introduction of the new 
mode of management into public sector enterprises attempts to combine 
two contradictory principles of organisation: the principle of unity
of command and workers1 participation.
The system involved the division of all public enterprises to 
which it is applied into two tiers: the enterprise at the national
level and the operating unit at the local level. The main components 
of the system are the Workers1 Assembly, the Joint Management Council 
and the Operating Commissions. The first two of these are supervisory 
bodies. The Commissions are concerned with the day-to-day control of 
the management of the enterprise. Following the two-tier structure of 
the public enterprise, these bodies exist both at the operating unit 
level and at the national level.
The Workers1 Assembly is the basic body in the participative 
scheme. At the operating unit level it is elected for a period of 
three years by the workers; at the enterprise level it is elected by 
the Workers’ Assemblies of the component operating units. According 
to the Charter, the Workers’ Assembly at both levels is a powerful body 
which is to ’’control the activity of the enterprise”. The Charter 
gives to these bodies, in theory at least, considerable consultative 
and co-managerial powers which include both the protection of workers1 
rights and supervision of their compliance with enterprise objectives. 
It determines recruitment standards and training programmes, examines 
and approves the working accounts and annual budget, ’’contributes to 
the definition of the general policy of the enterprise for the year to 
come”, supervises and evaluates the overall management, especially in 
the field of finance, and generally passes judgement on the firm’s 
annual activity. The Assembly may, however, be dissolved or suspended 
by officials of the central administration (the relevant sponsoring
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ministry, the FLN party) for any legitimate reason.
At operating unit level the Workers* Assembly meets four times a 
year while at the enterprise level the Assembly meets only twice a 
year. There is provision, however, for emergency meetings upon the 
request of the government-nominated chief executive of the enterprise 
or the chief executive of the operating unit.
It was recognised that an assembly of up to 25 members might be 
administratively unwieldy. In order to be effective, it must have a 
permanent character1, which is to be achieved by the use of 
commissions, or committees. Their number varies from one enterprise to 
another according to their size and specific needs, but should not 
exceed five. On paper, these commissions have large powers in the 
following five areas: (i) econmic and financial affairs, (ii) social
and cultural affairs, (iii) personnel and training, (iv) discipline, 
and (v) health and safety regulations. They are composed of members 
elected by the Workers’ Assembly with the exception of the hygiene and 
security and disciplinary commissions which must have amongst their 
members some staff specialists designated by the management of the 
enterprise.
The highest authority is the enterprise-level Joint Management 
Council. As its name indicates, it consists of the state-designated 
director-general, the principal managers and two representatives 
appointed by the Workers* Assembly. There are less powerful unit- 
level councils as well. The Council is presided over by the chief 
executive of the hierarchical level concerned, i-e. the general manager 
of the national enterprise at industry level or the director of the 
operating unit at local level. It is important to note that though 
workers' representation is limited to a maximum of two members in the 
Council, there is no specified limit to the number of government-
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nominated executives.
Very broadly, the Council is responsible for the overall 
functioning of the enterprise (or the unit) and meets at least once a 
week or exceptionally on the request of the chief executive more often. 
Figure 1 below illustrates the dual form of control of public 
enterprises: the government-instituted line of control and the
participatory line of control.
5.2 The Operation of the System in Practice
In reality, the degree of implementation of the participative 
system varied from one enterprise to another. Although the early 
cases of implementation of the Charter go back to 1974, the system was 
not fully implemented in all public sector enterprises and there are 
many instances of delays of up to eight years. For example, in the 
giant oil corporation, SONATRACH, the new mode of management has not 
been implemented at all. One of the reasons given for this was the 
difficulty of combining workers1 management with the existing complex 
enterprise structures.
Even in those enterprises in which the participative system was 
introduced on time, the analysis of the functioning of this system 
suggest that it faced many difficulties. These problems will be 
reviewed in more detail in Chapters Three and Seven. It should be 
very briefly mentioned here, however, that on the eve of the 1980 
economic reforms the participative system was criticised on three main 
grounds.
The first of these, and this is the view of managers, is that the 
ultimate objectives sought by the GSE system were misinterpreted in 
practice. In fact, the various workers’ representative bodies were
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perceived by workers mainly as means of voicing their complaints and 
wage demands rather than as an opportunity to increase their 
involvement in the attainment of enterprise objectives (26). 
Moreover, managements claimed that this form of management restricted 
their powers and reduced their room for manoeuvre in the search for 
efficiency and better performance. In fact, what is being argued here 
is that workers1 participation in decision making was incompatible with 
the principle of unity of command. Many managers felt that it was a 
question of production or participation. The participative line of 
control was also regarded by management as an additional burden to an 
already complex and deadly-slow government line of control. It was 
also suggested that the low levels of qualification among the workers’ 
representatives was a serious drawback.
The second criticism of the participative system is that it led to 
a considerable loss of discipline within public enterprises and a 
tendency towards the equalisation of wages and other incentives between 
enterprises and between different skills. This is mainly a 
consequence of what Granick calls ’the microeconomic full-ernployment 
constraint’, that is the absence of the threat of unemployment and the 
political unacceptability of dismissals (29). The most significant 
meaning given to the ’workers’ state*, the key ideological ingredient 
of the socialist management in the 1970’s, was that employees should be 
protected not only against the reality of unemployment, but also 
against the need to change either occupation or place of work under 
threat of unemployment.
Finally, left wing and trade union critics have argued that the 
widespread failure to implement fully the texts was due to the 
reluctance of managers to adhere to the tenets of the programme. In 
their view, managements were anxious to preserve their existing
position of dominance within the system. But while managerial 
resistance is an important part, it is not the whole of the complex 
problem. The over-rigid and over-centralised Algerian bureaucratic 
structures were also to blame: each level demands and receives at
least a review function, which all takes time, thus pushing the 
managers into situations where they must choose quickly from a small 
and predetermined range of alternatives. The Reaction to crisis* 
atmosphere acts as a barrier to any serious consultation with and 
review by the Workers* Assembly. The centralisation of enterprise 
investment, state control over imports and the price-fixing procedures 
have often been cited in Algerian economic literature to illustrate the 
serious external constraints imposed on public sector enterprises and 
the very limited freedom left to the workers’ representative 
bodies (30).
6 CONCLUSION
This Chapter started with a summary of the circumstances which led 
to the emergence of the public sector enterprise in Algeria. It has 
drawn a general picture of the development context and its impact on 
the genesis and evolution of public enterprises. The main concern of 
the Chapter has been to show how the national public enterprise has 
become, since 1966, the dominant form of industrial organisation in 
Algeria. The public enterprises are conglomerate, vertically- 
integrated organisations operating in several markets and enjoying 
considerable monopoly powers in these markets.
In order to exercise some form of control over the policies of 
these giant bodies, the central planners instituted a two-level control 
system. From above public enterprises were integrated into a multi­
channel planning and control system which gives them very little
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freedom in decision making. From below they were subjected to a 
system of workers* control.
The historical and economic background necessary for understanding 
the structural and functional problems of Algerian nationalised 
industries is now established. The analysis of these problems will be 
the subject of Part Two.
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PART TWO
THE STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
CHAPTER THREE
PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION
1 INTRODUCTION
The suggestion that Algerian industrial structure may be partly 
responsible for the country's economic difficulties seemed to have 
gained acceptance in Algeria in the late 1970s with the introduction of 
the reorganisation scheme in 1980. The recent growth in industrial 
concentration and its counterpart, the relative decline in the economic 
significance of the small firm, are trends which must be reversed.
Having benefited from the full support of Algerian policy makers, 
politicians and management specialists for more than fifteen years, the 
large national public enterprise came under severe attack and close 
scrutiny in the late 1970s. This change in attitude towards the big 
multi-function firm did not come about by mere chance. It was the 
outcome of an economic crisis which was shaking the country from the 
beginning of the second half of the 1970s, and which ended up with the 
emergence of a new political leadership and a major shift in policy in 
1979 (1).
The assessment of the development record undertaken in 1978/1979 
showed that the Algerian planning system between 1967-1978 was not 
without its problems and shortcomings (2). These were attributable in the 
main to the knock-on effects of the decision taken in the second half 
of the 1960s to concentrate the development effort so heavily in the 
industrial sector. The results of this policy were as follows:
(a) it inevitably meant a lower investment priority for other sectors, 
particularly agriculture.
(b) at the same time concentration within the industrial sector on so- 
called 'industrialising industries1, (i-e. those which produce
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intermediate products like steel, and petrochemicals for further 
fabrication) had a further unbalancing effect on the economy, 
since their development was not integrated properly with that of 
the secondary manufacturing industries which they were designed to 
support.
(c) the combined effect of (a) and (b) in turn led to the emergence of 
a small number of major industrial corporations which tended to 
reinforce the centralising and bureaucratic tendencies within the 
economy
The experience acquired from working with this form of 
organisation in industry for more than a decade has made possible the 
assembly of a considerable mass of evidence as to their behaviour and 
internal working arrangements of enterprises. An Ad-Hoc Commission 
was set up in 1979 to investigate the "extent to which changes in the 
size and structures of public enterprises could improve their internal 
functioning and efficiency"(3). It concluded that the "reorganisation 
of our economic administration and our enterprises are an essential 
lever for combating the negative aspects and distortions which have 
emerged" (4). It found that the structure of most public enterprises 
was in several respects deficient and proposed a reform package 
according to which major structural changes were later implemented.
The Party's Ad-Hoc Commission found that the following problems and 
distortions were common to public enterprises (5).
Most public enterprises have failed to achieve full capacity 
working.
- Operating costs were too high. This led to excessive unit costs 
and unacceptable financial deficits.
- Public enterprises tended to rely heavily on foreign assistance 
and technology.
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- Public enterprise recruited an excessive number of administrative 
personnel and did not use efficiently the engineers, technicians 
and managerial staff.
- Their large size led to complex organisational and management 
problems such as the inefficient allocation of work and division 
of authority, lack of internal control mechanisms, bureaucratic 
methods of management, slow and inflexible information flows 
etc.
This Chapter will attempt to examine in more detail these 
deficiencies and distortions. Particular attention will be paid to the 
relationship of industrial organisation to planning and management in 
Algeria in the 1970s. This analysis will pave the way for a 
subsequent discussion of the proposed organisational changes and their 
implications. The structural problems to be dealt with here are 
classified into three main headings:
economic and welfare implications 
managerial problems " 
socio-political problems
2 THE ECONOMIC AND WELFARE IMPLICATIONS
It would appear that the advantages of the law of large size or 
economies of scale have been exaggerated by enterprise managers and 
sectoral ministries in the 1970s. ’Gigantism1 in Algerian industry was 
officially condemned by the Third Party Congress in 1979 and was held 
responsible for many of the country’s economic ills. The criticisms of 
the economic and welfare problems of enterprise concentration have 
focused on two distinct but inter-related issues: the absence of
specialisation in Algerian industry and the monopoly power which these 
enterprises acquired over the years.
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2.1 Lack q£ Spgci§li§a£iQn
The most significant objection to the Algerian conglomerate 
enterprises has been the absence of specialisation. It has been shown 
in Chapter Twothat public enterprises were large diversified firms 
responsible for the administration of one (or more) branches of 
industry. They were organised according to the principle of vertical 
integration. A typical public enterprise was composed of a grouping of 
production units, industrial combines, research and design departments 
and a supply (imports) and sales base. Moreover, industrial enterprises 
tended to integrate vertically at the plant level. They produced their 
own tools and parts for the repair of their own equipment to reduce the 
risks of supply and maintenance failures. It may be recalled from 
ChapterTwo that this was one aspect of the absence of inter-firm 
division of labour and subcontracting. This absence of specialisation 
by final product, a pattern found in most industrially developing 
countries, is a sign of backwardness. In the absence of an adequate 
industrial tissue’ in the environment in which the new plants are to 
be located, public enterprises are constrained to create it themselves.
The lack of specialisation led to a dangerous compartmentalisation 
of the various sectors and branches of the economy. Because of their 
autarkik policies and inadequate inter and intra-sectoral division of 
labour (6), public enterprises tended to grow and develop in their own 
way in isolation from the rest of the economy. Obviously this type of 
vertical integration is not compatible with, and is indeed very 
damaging to, the very aims underlying the ’self-sustained1 path of 
development adopted by the central authorities who are seeking to 
promote self-sufficiency through more intensive backward and forward 
industrial linkages. Moreover, the national objective to reduce 
imports through more inter-sectoral coordination was hampered by the
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marked tendency of the public tendency to import highly integrated 
plants and combines from different suppliers. The diversity of 
technical standards in these technologies complicated the situation 
and reduced even further the chances of inter-enterprise cooperation 
and subcontracting (7).
The economic advantages offered by specialisation and 
subcontracting were not exploited. The advocates of specialisation by 
function (production, marketing, investment) and/or by final product 
argued that the activities auxiliary to the main production lines of 
the enterprise be carried out at a lower cost by subcontracting them 
to independent specialised firms. Past experience has shown, for 
instance, that many workshops in Algerian industry were operating well 
below full capacity because the demand for their products and services 
within the enterprise was often below the potential capacity. This 
problem of spare capacity becomes particularly significant when these 
workshops can not be used to manufacture products for users outside the 
enterprise because of differences in technical norms and 
specifications.
The combination of production and distribution operations within 
one single enterprise produced serious problems. It may be recalled 
from Chapter Two that most public enterprises distributed not only their 
own outputs but also the goods acquired from overseas markets 
(imports). Many production enterprises were even involved in retailing 
their products across the country (8). The expansion of public 
enterprises into marketing and distribution in the 1970s was defended 
on several grounds. It was thought that this would lead to a better 
coordination of manufacturing and marketing operations. It was also 
argued that amalgamation of these two activities would eliminate market 
relations and help central authorities to combat the widespread
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speculation on the goods in short supply in the local market. It was 
finally alleged that the distribution costs would be relatively lower 
since the profit mark-ups which would otherwise go to the ’non­
productive1 intermediaries, would be passed on by the producer 
enterprises to the consumer in the form of lower prices (9).
It is not possible to confirm or refute such claims on the basis of 
empirical evidence because of lack of information about this subject. 
It may be sufficient to note here that prior to 1980, production and 
distribution costs were not identified and calculated by enterprises in 
separate accounts. This suggests that the advantages of expanding into 
marketing might seem to have been exaggerated since they were not 
always supported by any proven marketing or economic advantages. Most 
public enterprises expanded systematically into marketing and 
distribution areas regardless of the costs involved. Some economists 
suggested that the move of enterprise managements in this direction was 
the result of their desire to wield more economic power and prestige 
and to retain as much economic rent as possible (10).
This argument is quite plausible given the complex problems of 
inter and intra-sectoral coordination in terms of the product mix 
required, price-quality relations and delivery arrangements and the 
inability of the central administration to bring the retail market 
under control (11). In fact, these two factors together with the 
persistent conditions of shortage of all types of goods and services in 
the domestic market produced an active rivalry between the production 
and trade enterprises for the control of the market of these products.
The economic and technical advantages that can be offered by 
forward integration into marketing and distribution can of course be 
real in those cases where a close coordination and consultation 
between the two functions is required. This is particularly true for
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many segments of heavy industries (eg. products manufactured to order, 
basic intermediate goods; specialised machinery ) and in cases where 
the physical attributes of the products, require shorter distribution 
channels (eg. perishable products).
Two serious problems associated with the amalgamation of 
production and marketing activities under the same organisation have 
arisen. The first is that marketing activities have often proved to be 
very complex tasks for the enterprises. The costs involved in the 
distribution of goods and services in a geographically large country 
are frequently higher than the costs of production. This complexity 
renders invalid the short-sighted view that marketing and distribution 
activities are superfluous technical matters that can be easily sorted 
out once the country's productive base has been laid down (12). One 
consequence of this mistaken view in the pre-reform period was the 
neglect of marketing activities in most public enterprises in favour of 
investment and production operations. There is evidence that marketing 
departments within public enterprises were relatively understaffed. 
Moreover, because of their heavy emphasis on investment operations, 
enterprises did not allocate adequate resources to promote and develop 
their marketing activities, i*e. transport and storage facilities, the 
establishment of distribution shops, market research studies and 
after sales services (13).
The second problem which emerged from the amalgamation of 
production and distribution activities was the overlapping of the 
spheres of competence of the production and trade enterprises. This 
produced organisational frictions and conflicts. The Ministry of 
Trade, for example, could not ensure full control over domestic trade 
and bring about rationalisation schemes partly because of these 
institutional overlappings.
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Criticisms of lack of specialisation in Algerian industry have also 
been raised in relation to the backward expansion of public enterprise 
interests into industrial design and capital investment operations. 
Several industrial enterprises set up their own engineering and project 
construction facilities. These capital investment units were designed 
to prepare and carry out their investment projects and/or to supervise 
the installation operations subcontracted to foreign firms when the 
scale and complexity of these projects were beyond their capabilities. 
However, the combination of production and capital investment 
operations under one firm was not without problems. There has been a 
tendency for most enterprise managements to concentrate much of their 
time and effort on the development of new production capacity rather 
than on using existing plants and machinery efficiently. An official 
report remarked that "the large number of investment projects 
undertaken by (public) enterprises diverted their managements away from 
the problems of production" (14). It has also been argued that public 
enterprises cannot be good at doing so many things at the one and same 
time. Pre-investment studies, industrial design and the construction 
of capital projects are often complicated matters requiring high 
experience and professional skills unlikely to be undertaken 
successfully by small and inefficiently organised departments or 
divisions within the enterprises.
A closely related problem is that the dispersion of these design 
and research units and construction facilities over a large number of 
enterprises stood in the way of developing a national policy concerning 
the transfer of technology. During the debates on enterprise reforms it 
was argued that the concentration of these embryonic research and 
development facilities in larger and specialised units offers not only 
a rational use of the most scarce resource in the country but also a
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means of reducing the country's dependency on imported technology 
through a better organisation of local subcontracting (15).
The last form of diversification of enterprises' operations which 
came under attack in 1979 was the growth in importance of the social 
and cultural functions which they carried out. Public enterprises set 
up their own worker training centres and developed their own housing 
and health care schemes. These also included a wide range of such 
services as transport, distribution cooperatives, creches and 
sponsorship of sporting activities. It was argued by management and 
workers that these facilities were made necessary by the persistent 
shortages and supply failures in the local market. However, the 
advocates of a sharper focusing of enterprise operations noted that 
this type of expansion had several adverse consequences. Firstly, the 
traditional tasks of an enterprise were neglected. While production 
costs could not be brought under control the 'annexed functions' 
tended to grow very rapidly in the 1970s (16). Secondly, it was argued 
that the creation of social activities within public enterprises, the 
importance of which varied with the size of the resources at the 
disposal of the enterprise and with its bargaining power, was not 
conducive to the promotion of social equity among workers. There was 
also the argument that these services were allocated by enterprises on 
the basis of ill-defined and subjective criteria since there was no 
national uniform policy in this area (17). Finally, the high degree of 
diversification of enterprise operations made the task of identifying 
separately the real costs and benefits of each segment of activity very 
challenging and complex.
2.2 Thg MQQQBQly PQwec q£ EQtgi:prl§£§
Criticisms addressed against 'gigantism' in Algerian industry may
70
be easily set in a wider theoretical framework well developed in the 
theory of industrial organisation. The core of this theory deals with 
the analysis of inter-relationships between industrial concentration, 
which is one important dimension of industry structure, and the 
behaviour and performance of the firms associated with this type of 
structure.
Industrial concentration is mainly measured in two ways: 
seller or market concentration: the proportion of an individual 
industry’s output (or other variables, such as sales,
employment etc) controlled by the largest enterprises, in that
industry
overall or aggregate concentration: the proportion of the 
manufacturing sector as a whole that is controlled by the 
largest enterprises in that sector.
The concept of overall concentration is of interest particularly 
from the social policy point of view, since it gives some indication of 
the power structures and the development of power positions in the 
economy. This concept is also relevant to competition policy given the 
inter-relationship between overall and market concentration which has 
been demonstrated in a number of studies concerned with the rise of the 
conglomerate firm as a factor in the economies of many countries. 
Market concentration, on the other hand, is of primary importance in 
competition theory and for the enforcement of competition legislation.
While the existence of a degree of concentration in industry does 
not necessarily imply anti-competitive practices, it does indicate that 
the possibilities exist for certain types of conduct and performance 
which are not usually desirable. Monopolistic and oligopolistic 
practices are more likely where a few large firms account for the major 
share of an industry’s output compared to a situation where even the
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largest firms are relatively unimportant.
Industrial organisation theory suggests that market concentration 
particularly when reinforced by high overall concentration may have two 
effects. The first effect of a monopoly is well known and is a 
relevant to less developed countries as to developed countries. A 
monopoly tends to charge a higher price and produce a lower output than 
would a group of perfect competitors facing the same circumstances. A 
second effect is the 'X-inefficiency1 created by the lack of 
competitive pressure on the monopolists to minimise costs (18). If one 
of the pleasures of a monopoly is the ’quite life’, the monopolist 
might not attain the technologically feasible minimum costs that 
competition might otherwise force him to. By using inefficiently too 
many resource (for his small output) he is depriving the economy of 
additional goods and services. Moreover, high overall concentration 
levels may be a cause for concern since it indicates the extent to 
which a few large organisations may influence major policy decisions in 
a country. Concentrations of economic power are generally 
inconsistent with the democratic process in a country.
These familiar deficiencies may be even more acute in the Algerian 
institutional setting where these structural features are much more 
exaggerated and where traditional market categories such as 
competition, profits, prices ... etc, are viewed with suspicion by 
central planners and politicians who resist approaching economic 
problems from this angle.
It has been demonstrated in Chapter Two that Algerian industry is 
highly concentrated in terms of both overall and seller concentrations. 
The 19 large national enterprises employed more than 73 per cent of 
total labour force in manufacturing industries and accounted for just 
over 80 per cent total value added in industry in 1980. Although market
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concentration is also high, it varies from one branch of activity to 
another. It is extremely high in such capital-intensive industries as 
heavy industry (mechanical engineering, machine tools, steel and metals 
manufacturing, electronics), petrochemicals and hydrocarbon industries 
and mining. All in all, between 80 and 100 per cent value added 
generated in these industries is accounted for by only 7 large public 
enterprises. The presence of private firms and locally- managed 
undertakings is negligable in these activity areas. The national 
enterprises have statutory monopolies in their respective branches.
With the exception of textiles, leather and shoe industries, where 
an active private sector exists, the large national enterprises have a 
predominant position in the so-called flight industries1. On average 
the 12 large national enterprises control about 62 per cent of total 
value added in these industries.
The monopoly power of enterprises is only one aspect of industry 
structure. Several other structural features specific to the Algerian 
economic system must be noted. They all illustrate the barriers to 
competition in the Algerian economy.
1 The barriers to new entry are very high. Industry boundaries 
are administratively fixed for each state-owned enterprise, and 
fixed in its statutes. The enterprise is not, at least in 
theory, allowed to diversify and expand into areas reserved for 
other enterprises. In particular, several branches of industry 
such as mining, oil and gas industries are exclusively reserved 
for the public sector.
2 There is no stock market discipline and, therefore, there are 
no constraints on enterprise managers such as gearing ratios, 
valuation ratios; dividend payments, the danger of takeover bids, 
etc.
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3 The birth, death and merger of enterprises are purely 
administrative acts.
4 The domestic market is highly protected from external 
competitive pressures. State monopoly over imports is delegated 
to the national public enterprises. Imports are, therefore, 
very restricted. The dependence of most industries, including 
those in which an active private sector exists, on imported raw 
materials and spare parts put a damper on the ability of firms to 
engage in price competition. The rationing of imported inputs 
effectively helped cartelise industries. Even an industry with an 
otherwise competitive structure would find its output limited by 
the stringency of import licensing. A resource barrier has thus 
been created.
5 The Algerian market for both producer and consumer goods is 
characterised by a permanent imbalance between supply and demand. 
It can be described as a tellers1 market, a combination of excess 
demand and producers with considerable monopoly powers.
These specific features have important implications for the 
functioning of the public enterprise as they impinge on competition, 
pricing, self-financing, sectoral equilibrium, the general growth of 
the firm and the very meaning of ’entrepreneurship’.
Now that the Algerian industry has been shown to be highly 
concentrated in the hands of a few large state-owned undertakings, how 
can these structural features be related to the economic distortion 
which have produced pressures for reforms?
Unfortunately, there are no empirical studies on the effects of 
the high concentration levels in Algerian industry. Up to 1980 the 
costs involved were overlooked and sometimes even applauded. In 
Algeria, as in many developing countries, the central planners and
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policy makers have been pursuing the goal of maximising the domestic 
value added of existing production processes. *The quiet monopolist1 
may well achieve this. In theory, the welfare implications of a 
monopoly outcome become somewhat ambiguous since the development of the 
'general theory of the second best1. In a world with many 
imperfections and distortions one can no longer be sure of the welfare 
effects of any single distortion. Because, for instance, of the highly 
distorted price system in Algeria it may be hazardous indeed to attempt 
to study seriously the impact of monopoly structures on the price-cost 
margins (19).
These conceptual difficulties, however, do not mean that the 
undesirable effects of monopoly structures have gone unnoticed in 
Algeria. The attacks on monopoly powers were not limited to advocate 
of an active competition policy but came also from proponents of public 
enterprise planners who recognise that unregulated monopolies may lead 
to serious economic distortions. The proponents of a 'guided market 
model* argued that the existence of branch monopolies undermines the 
proper functioning of the market and that monopoly prices distort the 
data for economic calculation and resource allocation (20). The reason 
for this is that enterprises have the power to cross-subsidise 
operations of the subsidiary operating units and also because some of 
their transactions take place within the firm rather than in the 
market. This may reduce pressures on such firms to operate efficiently. 
The implication is that a loss-making activity may be maintained and 
financed through subsidies from profit-making segments of activity 
rather than from financial markets.
J.P. Powels, for instance, has noted that the Algerian industry, 
which is dominated by large diversified public undertakings, suffers 
from lack of competition among the economic units (21). He suggested
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that a 'necessary and sufficient1 dose of competition was needed to 
force enterprises to rationalise their operations and reduce costs. The 
failure of most public enterprises to bring their excessive operating 
costs under control had been masked for many years by the price 
stabilisation policies of the state and the huge subsidies granted to 
them.
There is ample evidence that the public enterprises behave in much 
the same way as the monopolistic firms described in text book 
economics. They reduce output, press for price increases, limit the 
range of their product-mix, neglect quality and overlook after-sales 
services to customers. These problems are the bread and butter of the 
Algerian press. It should be noted, however, that this negative 
behaviour is not merely due to the size of the public enterprise. It 
is the result of the de £ac£o monopoly position of these enterprises 
and the sellers1 market in which they operate.
A third line of argument stresses the fact that public 
enterprises were under no external economic pressures to introduce new 
products and production processes. While several advantages in 
research and development have usually been identified with large firms, 
Algerian public enterprises fall short of what might be expected of 
them given the resources put at their disposal. It may be too zealous 
to expect a great deal of innovative work in the public firms of a 
developing country. However, past experience has shown that public 
enterprises have in a sense neglected their duties in this area by 
relying too much on foreign technology and assistance. There is also 
evidence that an enterprise with a monopoly or market power position 
may choose capital-intensive technologies that are inappropriate for a 
developing country (22). In fact, freed from the cost-minimising 
pressures, the management of a monopolist enterprise may choose 'easy'
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technology of high capital-intensity, thereby freeing itself from the 
difficulties of managing a large number of workers, and also earning 
itself the prestige of managing a ’modern’ automated factory.
It is true that the technological developments have often produced 
significant economies of scale with the result that large firms tend to 
increase even further in size. High concentration might merely 
reflect the growth of firms to a size which permits the most efficient 
scale of production to be achieved with the ensuing lower costs which 
results in turn in lower prices and higher output than would otherwise 
occur. It seems, however, that the argument of large scale economies 
in production was pushed much too far in Algeria. Proponents of 
absolute concentration have often argued that increasing the role of 
the branch-level enterprise was in accord with modern tendencies 
towards industrial concentration, which is strongly evident, for 
example, in capitalist economies. This argument is, however, based on 
a serious misunderstanding. It is true that in capitalist economies 
there are tendencies towards concentration, but they do not involve the 
growth of firms which are already industry monopolists. In capitalist 
economies the arguements are based on the real advantages of economies 
of scale which come about as a result of competitive struggle and are 
not created by an artificial grouping of several plants and production 
units belonging to the same branch of industry, as is the case in 
Algeria.
The benefits of large scale enterprises, if any, will depend to a 
large extent on their form of organisation and the internal management 
and control mechanisms used within them. The next section will examine 
the managerial implications of enterprise concentration.
3 MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ENTERPRISE CONCENTRATION
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3.1 introduction
Proponents of large enterprises bringing with them the attendant 
advantages of diversification and vertical integration too often defend 
their arguments by making three implicit assumptions: first, that the
communications within the -organisations are of high quality and 
certainly better than those between different organisations; next that 
all parts of the the organisation have common and non-conflicting 
interests; finally that where intra-group trading is possible, it does 
take place.
These simplified assumptions seldom hold in practice. It is more 
realistic to start from the assumption that the relative allocative 
efficiency of resource allocation within the firm and across the market 
depends on the organisational form of the large firm and the quality of 
communications between its various parts. The following section will 
attempt to examine the constraints and distortions caused by the 
complex structures of public enterprises and relate them to the 
management weakness and economic distortions which emerged in Algerian 
industry in IQTCPs.
Three basic types of industrial organisations have been identified 
in the literature on Socialist enterprises (23).
1 The public enterprise as a government office. Under this model, 
industrial enteprises are in fact part of the central 
administration and their functions are mainly administrative: to 
control and supervise the subordinate operating units in the 
process of plan implementation. Public enterprises are created to 
help the sectoral ministries to supervise the various branches of the 
economy. These concerns are part of the ministries.
2 The industrial enterprise as a business corporation. Under this
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model the public enterprise becomes the ’true enterprise1 and the 
component sub-units become divisions or operating units. 
Organisational and functional details of this type of organisation 
may be very different indeed. According to circumstances, some of 
them might choose a decentralised type of structure while others 
might choose a highly centralised one. Under this model the 
central planners should deal with branch-wide enterprises only and 
the latter should be left to decide how to organise their internal 
structures. Capital directives and government policy measures 
should be addressed to public enterprises and not the component 
production units.
3 The industrial enterprise as an association of multiple 
independent firms. Under this structure, industrial enterprises 
are associations created by independent firms as their service 
organisations for such purposes as: production and technological
research, designing, advertising, market research, bulk supplies 
and the like. One basic feature of this type of structure is the 
complete lack of administrative pov/er of the enterprise over the 
number of operating units.
The choice of a particular organisational structure reflects the 
central planners' preference to a particular economic system. Public 
enterprises as a part of the central administration are clearly a 
feature of a centralised system under which the central planning body 
tries to manage and supervise directly public enterprises. This model 
is compatible with the extensive use of administrative methods in 
management and control. The choice between the public enterprise as a 
business corporation or association of independent firms reflects also 
the central authorities readiness to rely on the market mechanism. 
Thus, if the central planners decide to entrust the shaping of economic
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relations between the operating units to market mechanism then it 
chooses model 3- If, on the other hand, the central planners want to 
create an organised set of relations, in which - alongside the market - 
there is the possibility of a more direct shaping of the social 
division of labour and factors of technical and economic development, 
then they opt for model 2 (24).
3.2 Th§ Organisation Structure of the Public Enterprise
Formally, the Algerian public industrial enterprise, which is also 
referred to as a Socialist enterprise' since 1971, is internally 
organised according to a two-tier system: the enterprise at the
national level (head office) and the operating unit at the local level. 
The 1971 Socialist Management Charter makes no allowance for any 
intermediate administrative tier. It is therefore, at least in theory, 
the operating unit, and not the enterprise, which is the 'true 
enterprise*, that is, the basic form of economic organisation in public 
sector industry. According to this formal structure the public 
enterprise is very close to model 3 above.
In practice, however, the internal structures of public 
enterprises became very complex and highly differentiated. They 
departed quite considerably from the structure initially envisaged by 
the central authorities. Most Algerian public industrial enterprises 
were, in fact, multi-divisional organisations with diversified holding 
structures and in this sense similar to corporations in Western 
economies. In terms of their functions within the industrial hierarchy 
and the scope of their authority over the component operating units, 
Algerian public enterprises in the 1970s can safely be placed somewhere 
between models 1 and 2.
Unfortunately, there is no systematic information concerning the 
number of the hierarchical administrative tiers in all public firms.
There is, however, evidence which suggests that these grew in number 
very rapidly in the period prior to the 1980 reforms under the 
pressures of continuous expansion of enterprises and the widening of 
their product ranges. The internal structure of the National Steel 
Enterprise (SNS), for example, comprised more than 9 hierarchical 
levels (25).
While it is very difficult to try to construct an organisational 
structure applicable to all public industrial enterprises, Algerian 
public enterprises have several common structural features.
1 Since most public industrial enterprises were large-scale 
organisations covering a highly diversified range of activities and 
functions (production, distribution, imports, investment), they tended 
to structure their operations along centralised, functional lines. 
According to this principle, public enterprises activities were 
organised under several divisions or affiliates. The entire activity 
of the National Steel Enterprise, for instance, was broken down into 
three main operational lines of control called groups or affiliates 
(manufacturing, marketing, engineering and investment operations). In 
SONATRACH, the giant oil enterprise, the entire activity was structured 
into five operational divisions (hydro-carbons, petrochemicals, 
marketing, engineering, investment operations). Figure 1 below shows 
the corporate structure of SONATRACH before the reform. Each of these 
affiliates or groups may be broken down even further into several sub­
units. Thus, the operations of the manufacturing group in the SNS 
comprised seven divisions, with each division being responsible for the 
administration of a given number of production units or industrial 
combines (26). This type of subdivision applies to other operational 
groups (marketing, engineering, investment operations) which may be
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broken down into several smaller and more homogeneous sub-units.
2 In addition to the above mentioned functional lines of control, 
the general manager may be assisted by a number of central staff 
directorates (finance, personnel, planning, general administration, 
external relations., etc). These directorates are intended to assist 
the general manager in directing, coordinating and controlling the 
operations of the various operational sub-units. With their specialist 
skills, they participate in the formulation of policies and procedures 
to provide the necessary standardisation and coordination of the 
activities of the operational lines of management. The number of these 
central directorates- varies form one enterprise to another. It may be 
worthwhile mentioning that as public enterprises grew bigger both in 
absolute size and diversification, the administrative tasks of those 
staff directorates became more complex and consequently had to be 
broken down into several staff sub-units. In the SNS, for instance, 
the central personnel directorate was assisted by five divisions (27). 
This is also true for the other central staff directorates (i-e. 
finance, planning).
The intermediate tiers of management (groups, division, 
affiliates) were also provided with staff departments (Le. finance, 
personnel, planning etc). These were designed to assist the division 
chiefs in operational decision making, but their main task was to 
gather, process and report information to the higher central staff 
lines of control. In theory, these staff managements were under the 
authority of the line managers. In practice, however, pressures were 
exercised by the central staff directorates through the appropriate 
line hierarchy to control the operations of the line managements.
The director-general, the central functional directorates 
together with the group and divisional managers and the staff
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departments attached to them are henceforth referred to as ’general 
management’ or ’head office’.
3 A most important factor which was beginning to have inajor effects 
on the structure of public enterprises was the process of concentration 
that was going on within them. As mentioned in an earlier Chapter, 
most public firms came to own and run scores and sometimes several 
hundreds of operating units. As its name applies, an operating unit is 
the administrative tier closest to actual production. An operating 
unit may be a production unit, a sales unit, or a research and 
development unit. The size and internal structure of an operating unit 
varies considerably from one unit to another. It may employ as few as 
fifty workers (as in many units of food processing and manufacturing 
industries) or as many as several thousands of workers (as in the large 
combines of textiles, metal processing and petrochemical industries). 
The structure of an operating unit is also variable but it may be 
sometimes very complex and may comprise as many as six administrative 
levels (28). As a rule, the operating unit is structured along the 
same lines found in the parent enterprise. It is headed by a unit 
manager appointed by the general manager of the enterprise. He is 
responsible for the running, coordination and control of a number of 
workshops and is assisted by functional and staff departments. In 
contrast to the intermediate and higher tiers of management, the 
operating unit is, at least in theory, a financially autonomous entity 
in the sense that it has its own separate profit and loss accounts.
4 Another characteristic feature of enterprise structures relates to 
the division of decision-making authority between the head office and 
the component operating units. With very few exceptions, the basic 
decisions concerning both the resources (finances, procurement, 
manpower policy) and the activities of the production units (product
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mix, prices) are decided in the head office of the enterprise. The 
head office was considered as a command centre composed of various 
functional specialists which intervened whenever calls were made to it 
by the operating units by giving instructions through the appropriate 
line of control to which the operating unit is subordinated (29). This 
has meant that the various decision centres were not controlled on the 
basis of their profit and loss accounts but on the basis of planned 
budgets. In particular, the general office was extensively involved in 
the day-to-day management of the lower levels of management.
5 A last feature intimately related to enterprise structures is the 
concentration of most, if not all, enterprise headquarters in and 
around Algiers far away from the production units which were scattered 
all over the country.
3.3 Management Weaknesses Associated with this Typg of Structure
Criticisms of this type of organisational structure focused namely 
on the number of hierarchical levels; span of control, relationships 
between line and staff managements, departmentalisation. As public 
enterprises in Algeria expanded and grew in complexity three main 
problem areas emerged.
3.3.1 Centnaligation of decisions
As noted in the introduction to this section, the division of 
authority between the parent enterprise and the operating units 
subordinated to it are part and parcel of the state-enterprise package. 
In fact, public enterprises could have been structured according to a 
federal system in which the operating units and divisions are quasi- 
autonomous entities enjoying large operating powers with the national 
headquarters having only a controlling and supervisory role with little 
opportunity to directly influence the actual running of these local
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units. This would, however, contradict the intention of Algerian 
leaders to employ national enterprises directly to carry out state 
aims. Past experience clearly shows the emergence of division of 
powers within public enterprises which is weighted heavily in favour of 
the centre. There is a large measure of agreement among Algerian 
academics and managers that the building up of large firms causes the 
operating unit not only to lose its economic independence but also to 
lose its independent accounting position which is reduced to an 
imperfect system of internal accounting.
While initially intended to concentrate on long-term policy and 
strategic decision-making (ie. research and development, coordination 
of investment and financial policies) and the provision of services to 
the member units (marketing research studies, bulk buying assignments, 
etc) the general office became extensively involved in the daily 
running of the production units. The report of the Ad-Hoc Commission 
noted that !,The existing management practices in our national 
enterprises are in many cases characterised by the concentration of 
decision-making authority in the hands of the central management11 (30). 
As mentioned previously, most public firms have come to own and run 
numerous production units scattered all over the country and the 
construction of plants of very large size became a characteristic 
feature of the public sector industry in the 1970Ts. Normally this 
process of concentration at the plant level has two implications. On 
the one hand, it forces a strengthening of operational management. The 
general management posts in these large units carry more 
responsibility. In effect, more functional specialisation for the 
larger units enhance the authority and responsibility of the 
operational management. Secondly, in so far as the control and 
coordination carried out by central management is concerned, the effect
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is normally to simplify these tasks, and this again facilitates the 
strengthening of operational management.
Unfortunately, these important points were not recognised and 
put into practice by managers and central authorities. The 
structural changes were not accompanied by improvements in the internal 
management and control mechanisms. The functional division chiefs and 
the central staff directorates were still heavily engaged in the 
affairs of the operating units. This centralised system of 
administration produced massive coordination and management problems. 
It weakened the calibre and responsibility of operational management in 
the large units. It also resulted in delays in decision-making, long 
and complex information channels and lack of feed-back (31). The 
Five-Year Plan (1980-84) noted that ’’The concentration of structures 
resulted in awkward functioning of enterprises and put into jeopardy 
the independence of the operating units and improvements in their 
management ” (32).
Moreover, concentration on strengthening the staffing of higher 
management levels pulled talented management away from operational 
level and led to a relative neglect of management needs at that level. 
The consequent weakness in operational management then appeared to 
require and justify close personal control by higher level authorities. 
The lack of a sense of personal responsibility and initiative* and the 
inadequacy of operational management* was thereby perpetuated. The 
Party’s Ad-Hoc Commission remarked in this respect that ’’the most 
qualified personnel is concentrated in the central directorates of the 
head offices in Algiers. This has meant that a most scarce and 
precious resource is being wasted while the basic operating units have 
been demuded and starved of capable management” (33).
A further limiting consequence of the concentration of decision­
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making is that top management is completely immersed in what should be 
middle management decisions. This may be regarded as a further waste 
of scarce resources since their time and effort could be economically 
more meaningful if they are directed to long-term and strategic 
decision areas. A last deficiency related to the concentration of 
major management decisions in the hand of the higher management in 
Algiers is the increase in the number of business trips to and from 
Algiers of operational managers to attend meetings held in Algiers. 
This obviously diverts plant managers from their tasks of solving 
complex management problems in their units.
3.3.2 Departmental coordination
A second problem facing large scale organisations which has also 
been much in evidence in public sector enterprises is the stress on 
functional management at the expense of the line or operational 
management. It has been shown earlier that the specialisation of the 
administrative work by function in most public firms was developed in 
response to the demands of the development of large scale industry with 
diversifed operations. One crucial weakness inherent in this type of 
structure had been the lack of adequate coordination of the various 
parts of the organisation. Line management decisions (production 
managers) were shared with other functional and staff departments 
(procurement, imports, distribution, personnel, finance) in head 
offices. Orders which came from a multitude of functional departments 
caused conflict in the organisation of production, and deprived line 
managers of authority and responsibility (3*0. In his study of the 
management systems in five public industrial firms, A Mettouchi found, 
as early as 1975, that these large firms suffered from lack of 
coordination of their different segments of activity. He particularly 
stressed the weak coordination of imports, production and distribution
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operations (35).
The functionalised form of administration also led to the 
emergence of substantial functional superstructures,* many of which were 
unnecessary. The Ad-Hoc Commission drew attention to the excessively 
high ratio of administrative employees to productive workers (36). 
Another official report noted that ”a large proportion of the workforce 
is involved in activities not directly related to production in many 
public enterprises” (37). Table 1 below shows very clearly the 
disproportion between the number of administrative employees and 
production workers in the CVI Complex (manufacture of industrial 
vehicles).
According to international standards, the ratio of white collar to 
blue collar workers ought to be 1 to 3. However this ratio was 
completely reversed in the CVI and was slightly over 3 to 1 in 1982. It 
was also reported that in 1978 the proportion of the administrative 
personnel represented about 52 per cent of the total workforce in an 
unamed national public enterprise.(38).
Table 1 Composition of work force in the CVI Cpmplex
Category of 
worker
Normal size of 
workforce
Size of workforce
employed
actually
1976 1978 1982
Production workers 2113 1364 1790 2646
Administrative
employees 805 3051 4010 6158
Total 4415 5800 8804
SQupce: Chikhi, S, ”1 £ travail §Q ysiQe1”’ in les cahiers du CREA,
No. 4 1984, Algiers, p 8
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One obvious implication of the inflation of the administrative 
apparatus and complexity of enterprise structure was the rapid rise in 
their operating costs. The Five-Year Plan (1980-84) remarked that 
"the difficulties created by the inadequate enterprise structures 
produced very high operating costs in relation to their level of 
activity11 (39). Moreover, the proliferation of the administrative 
staff at the intermediate and higher levels of management posed also 
the problem of allocating these administrative expenses among the 
component units.
3.3.3 Internal controls
The concentration of the most qualified personnel in enterprise 
headquarters in Algiers has been accompanied by a loss of control over 
the actions and behaviour of the operating units and divisions. The 
extensive involvement of the general management in the day-to-day 
operations of the component production units together with the 
institution of cumbersome and bureaucratic control procedures increased 
the administrative load on the senior executives to such an extent that 
they became unable to handle their operational responsibilities 
efficiently. Cumulative loss of control occurred as instructions and 
information are transmitted down through successive hierarchical 
levels. Lengthy internal planning and decision-making procedures, and 
inadequate coordination have contributed to ill-informed, inappropriate 
decisions. In short, policy formulation in Algerian public enterprises 
became simply too intricate to be handled by administrative methods of 
management and the absence of modern informational technologies, 
aggrevated this problem.
The internal production planning and control processes will be 
examined in more detail in Chapter Four, but a summary of the broad 
features of the internal managemeht mechanisms in public enterprises
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before the reform is appropriate at this point.
(a) Standard yardsticks of performance at both the enterprise and 
production unit levels which enables standard costing and measures of 
comparative performance to replace some of the close personal 
supervision otherwise required did not exist. For example, there were 
no uniform technical norms for the use of factor inputs, capacity 
utilisation, inventory levels and financial resources. Each operating 
unit had to make its own estimates.
(b) The various segments of enterprise operations, ie. manufacturing, 
marketing, procurement, investment, were often considered as a joint 
activity. One Algerian economist noted in this respect that "the 
accounting practices which had been developing in almost all 
enterprises tended to mix everything with everything else. Enterprise 
activities were consolidated and recorded in one single accounting 
document" (40). The implication of this deficiency is that cross­
subsidisation crept in and became a widespread practice in public 
enterprises.
(c) Most public enterprises failed to work out a transfer price system 
to be used for the settlement of transactions that took place between 
the various parts of the organisation. The complex problem of internal 
pricing procedures has two distinct elements. The first concerns the 
prices quoted for purchases between two independent operating units. 
The second concerns prices to be quoted between workshops subordinate 
to an integrated operating unit. As far as the second point is 
concerned (i-e. within a given production unit) the pricing policy 
depends substantially on the existence of cost accounting methods and 
the ability of management to allocate the joint costs among the various 
products and to determine the cost per unit of production.
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Unfortunately such methods have not been developed in most public 
enterprises with the result that real production costs of the various 
products were unknown to management. Exchanges between successive 
complementary production stages within an operating unit were often 
expressed in physical terms. As far as the transfer prices quoted for 
exchanges taking place between distinct operating units are concerned, 
they are not determined on the basis of free negotiations between the 
seller and buyer units but fixed by the general management of the 
parent enterprise. They are frequently kept constant for lengthy 
periods so that after some years transfer prices tended to bear little 
relationship to the actual costs incurred in their production and to 
the changing pattern of relative scarcities. These deficiencies have 
several implications for corporate control.
They limit managers* ability to appraise objectively the 
performance of the individual operating units and divisions. Since 
transfer prices are distorted, internal checks on the efficiency of the 
various sub-units could not be undertaken using normal profit and loss 
accounting criteria. It leaves the door open for ample cross­
subsidisation. (41)
The absence of information about the performance of individual 
production units weakens the ability of central management to induce 
efficiency in plant and divisional managers either by controls or 
incentives. The disposition of management to expand staff and tolerate 
slack was aggravated by a tendency to regard costs in a strictly 
instrumental fashion. Opponents of the large diversified and multi­
function firms argued that such forms of organisation would lead to the 
neglect of the financial aspects and to the diffusion of responsibility 
for the fulfilment of objectives (42).
The failure to identify the true economic performance of the different
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levels of activity may lead higher management to take arbitary 
decisions in the allocation of resources. Cross- subsidisation may 
conceal inefficiencies at one or another level and many encourage the 
retention of an activity even if its return is negative. Under such 
circumstances, differential performance and subsequence resource 
allocation cannot be connected, that is, top management becomes unable 
to reallocate resources from loss-making to profitiable lines. The 
Five-Year Plan (1980-84) indicated that ”the difficulties associated 
with the concentration of enterprise structures have impaired the 
efficient use of capacity, rational allocation of resources and 
produced excessive operating costs and serious financial deficits 
despite continued state support” (43).
(d) Lacking an appropriate management mechanism to control and 
regulate enterprise decisions, the central administrations tended to 
intervene directly in the internal affairs of enterprises and the 
operating units. The Five-Year Plan (1980-1984) described this 
intervention as follows: "Moreover, the lack of a clear framework 
within which the central administrations supervise enterprises 
operations led to interventions on the part of the supervisory 
ministries in the internal affairs of these enterprises, rendering 
illusionary their autonomy and responsibility” (44). These 
interventions led to the development of serious conflicts between the 
state and public enterprises.
Another aspect of the problem usually associated with deficient 
structure and management in enterprises is their impact on national 
planning. Since central planners did not have an appropriate shadow 
price system to be used for macro-economic decision-making purposes, 
they had to rely on the cost data transmitted to them by enterprises. 
This information may mislead central planners and lead them to take
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wrong decisions at a national level. This is perhaps why the Five- 
Year-Plan (1980-84) concluded that "the structural problems have 
deferred the implementation of (appropriate) instruments for the 
direction of the economy and resulted in the observed imbalance in plan 
implementation and distortions in the functioning of the economy" (45).
4 implications OF ENTERPRISE CONCENTRATION FOR SOCIAL CONTROL
Concentration of enterprise structures has serious social and 
political implications because it leads to the concentration of 
economic power and political influence. How far a nation ought to have 
all her industrial eggs in relatively few baskets may be an important 
question. Concentration of economic power is generally inconsistent 
with the democratic process in a country. This issue is of particular 
importance in a developing country where social control institutions 
are usually weak. Concentration of economic power which is usually 
associated with large firms involves a potential loss of social 
control at two distinct levels: central control from above and worker
control from below.
4.1 Effects of Concentration on Cgntrai Control
One significant consequence of the rapid growth of the public 
enterprises and the increasing concentration of Algerian industry in 
1970’s has been the loss of control exercised by the central 
administration over their operations and policies. Instead of helping 
pubic decision-making, the monolithic groups built themselves into d§ 
facto parallel exclusive direction agencies. Enterprise managers and 
senior executives were alleged to have been pursuing their own 
political ambitious by building large ’empires'. A Boukrami, for 
instance, suggested that "the tendencies to develop large groups can be 
explained by the desire of the micro-economic units to secure the
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maximum of the national product by exploiting the bargaining power of 
the firm. This situation is well known in Algerian practice since the 
management of large public firms have always tried to escape the 
control of central planners” (46). This situation was further 
aggravated by the absence of powerful social control institutions (47). 
Public enterprise seems to have become an arena for political rivalries 
with the enterprise managers and the technocrats in the industrial 
sectoral ministries emerging succesful.
In fact, because of their large size and importance in the 
economy, some enterprises became so powerful that the influence, 
prestige and status of their director-generals surpassed that of a 
minister or a highly ranked party member. The expression ’’states 
within a state” is often used to describe the rising power of these 
executives (48).
Finally, the concentration of all public enterprise headquarters 
in the capital Algiers, far from the production units, gave the 
impression that Algiers was the only decision-making centre in the 
country and thus produced severe regional imbalances.
4.2 The Impact of Large Size on Worker Participation
The concentration of decision making authority in the hands of the 
senior managements of public enterprises has had adverse affects on 
worker participation. It diminished the influence of workers. The 
system of Socialist Management (GSE) introduced in 1971 was intended 
to give the workers a say in the running of the enterprises in which 
they worked. The Algerian leadership also used this participative 
system as a buffer against the powerful position of the director- 
generals. Under this system, the enterprise was internally structured 
on a two-tier basis: the enterprise (at the national level) and the
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production unit (at the local or operating level). The texts of the 
GSE view the production unit as the basic cell in the administration of 
industry. In principle, worker participation takes place at both 
levels. No account was taken of any intermediate levels between the 
enterprise and the production units. The reason for this was to 
involve engineers and technical staff more closly with production 
decisions and to keep the administrative staff to a minimum.
Effective implementation of the participative scheme in subsequent 
years has encountered many difficulties. Part of the problem arises 
from the fact that the code of practice did not allow for the 
complexity of the enterprises such as those in steel and petroleum 
industries which in reality represent more than one single industrial 
activity. It has been previously shown that the actual structures of 
most public enterprises comprise several administrative levels. The 
problem, therefore, was how to reconcile the participative scheme with 
the existing complex and differentiated structures.
It has been officially admitted that ’’the introduction of new 
social relations in enterprises were impaired by the excessive 
centralisation of their managements’’ (49)« The production units tended 
to lose their autonomy in the types of the multi-tier structures 
adopted by most public enterprises. In an interview study carried out 
in 15 public enterprises in 1979, R Zeffane concluded that the 
existing organisational structures influenced the extent of 
implementation of the participative system (50). Out of a list of 19 
decision areas he found out that, in 6 of the 15 enterprises surveyed, 
worker representatives were not involved at all in any of the decision 
areas considered. In those enterprises where the workers 
representative bodies said they were involved in decision-making, the
n
main decision making areas were restricted to personnel matters
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whereas matters requiring greater technical knowledge or those of a 
strategic character remained with the specialists representing the 
conventional line of control. Table 2 shows the low degree of 
involvement in various types of decisions. This means that although 
formal control over policy is theoretically to be shared with workers 
representatives, in practice, influence and power were exercised 
predominantly by managerial personnel.
Table 2 Workers! involvement in various types O f  decisions
Types of Decisions
Involvement
Production decisions out of 15 enterprises
overtime to be worked 2
output to be scheduled against given plans 2
selecting the type/brand of equipment 0
dictating the methods of work to be used 0
allocating the number of operatives (workers)
required for each job on the worker floor 0
purchasing new equipment to increase output 
or widen activity 1
replacing machinery and equipment 0
deciding on what work flow machinery or
equipment should be ; 0
inspection decision 0
5
P§C§gnnel decisions
work rate requirements 3
appointing operatives 9
operating workflow supervisors 9
operating senior administrative staff 2
promoting supervisory staff 2
on the job training methods to be used 1
training methods to be used outside organisation 0
26
Other decisiQDS
pricing of output 2
creating a new product 2
launching a new product  0
4
Source: Zeffane, R, "Intepnatignal Pgf§pgc£iygs on MgngggQigot apd
QcgiDi§atiQn”. Gower Publishing Corporation Ltd., 1981, 
London, p.72
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Effective implementation of the participative scheme required 
either a considerable adaptation of the existing structures (le. 
reduction of administrative tiers, breaking up of enterprises), a 
position defended by workers representatives and their supporters in 
the state-party apparatus, or a broad interpretation of the rules of 
GSE to suit the pre-existing structures, a view, not surprisingly, 
defended by management and senior ministerial staff.
The size and complexity of the public enterprises led some 
executives to rethink the participative model with the aim of 
adapting its principles to the existing structures which they regarded 
as essential for the functioning of the enterprise and its adjustment 
to national goals. It was also suggested that the use of modern 
technology tended to involve many technical decisions beyond the 
comprehension of most of the work force making participation difficult. 
A government official pointed out that " ... past experience has 
clearly shown that the two-tier system cannot meet at one and the same 
time the requirements of a centralised functioning of the economy and 
the principles of worker participation at all work levels" (51). 
Another senior official in the Ministry of Industry raised the 
possibility of altering the GSE rules to cope with the technical and 
economic reality of the enterprise as follows: "Is the two-tier system 
efficient? Is it not possible to work out another form of organisation 
which takes into account the different types of relationships within an 
enterprise? The enterprise is a complex organisation in which there 
are hierarchical relationships between the director general, the chief 
responsible for a given function and the manager of a given production 
or service unit" (52).
Workers representatives, in contrast, seem to stick to the letter 
and spirit of the GSE Charter and ask for a share in decision-making
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within enterprises. In their view, it is the existing structure which 
should be brought into line with the rules of the participative scheme. 
They ask for the elimination of the intermediate administrative tiers 
between the enterprise and the operating units. They realise the 
threats posed to them by the proliferation of the administrative 
superkingdoms in enterprise headquarters; the costs of which will have 
to be borne by the productive workers in the operating units. They 
also see the formation of several administrative tiers within 
enterprises as strengthening the concentration-of decision-making 
authority in the hands of the higher management (53).
In fact, as public enterprises grew bigger and their structures 
more complex, influence and power were exercised predominantly by 
managerial personnel. Worker participation was reduced to a mere 
slogan. The system seems to have failed to bring together the 
interests of both management and workers. One illustration of this 
failure is the rise of open social conflicts, discontent and unrest 
among rank and file workers in the late 1970’s following the 
deterioration in their living conditions (54).
The main problem stems from the conflicting ambitions in Algerian 
socialism to reconcile central planning with participative management 
and it is further aggravated by the different ideas concerning the 
’organisational logic’ of administration and the constraints imposed by 
the contingencies of organisational size and technological complexity. 
These failures have accelerated the move towards the reform of 
enterprise structures.
5 CONCLUSION
The national public enterprise has become the predominant form of 
organisation in Algerian industry since 1965. Due to a series of
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mergers and acquisitions following the nationalisation wave during the 
second half of the 1960s and to heavy public spending in industry in 
1970s, these public concerns grew very rapidly. They became large 
conglomerate firms responsible for the administration of a whole branch 
of industry. This pattern of concentration in Algerian industry came 
under severe attack in 1980 as one the major causes of the country’s 
economic ills.
This Chapter has analysed the various distortions associated with 
the deficient organisation of Algerian industry and the internal 
structures of public enterprises. While these structural distortions 
are indeed an important element in Algeria’s economic problems they are 
not its sole cause. The next five Chapters will seek to show that the 
nature of the planning mechanism and the system of enterprise 
management were also significant contributory factors.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PLANNING OF ENTERPRISE INVESTMENT
1 THE INVESTMENT CRISIS
As noted in Chapter Two, one outstanding feature of the Algerian 
strategy of economic development during the last two decades has been 
its emphasis on extensive capital formation. This strategy, the 
origins of which go back to the mid-1960’s, flows from the widely held 
view among Algerian planners and policy makers at the time that rapid 
economic growth can be secured only through rapid industrialisation. 
The main concern of the central planners, therefore, was not with 
raising the immediate living standards of the population but to give 
priority to industrialisation and the development of the so-called 
1 industrialising industries *.
Broadly speaking, these include such basic industries as metal 
manufacturing (i.e. steel, metallurgy, mechanical and electrical 
engineering), energy and energy-related industries, building materials, 
fertilizer and agricultural machinery. The specific feature of these 
industries, according to the advocates of industrialisation, is that 
when located in a given environment they will generate a whole process 
of ’industrialising1 effects upon other parts of this environment. In 
particular their induced effects upon agriculture will be considerable, 
since they will supply it with the necessary inputs for modernisation 
and more intensive cultivation. They also act as the ’motor’ of the 
development process by producing the raw materials and machinery for 
other sectors of industry engaged in the production of finished goods 
such as vehicles, farm machinery, pumps, and irrigation equipment, 
electrical goods and plastics thus strengthening the inter-industry 
matrix. In this model, the energy-related industries, mainly oil and
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gas, will provide fuel, feedstocks and finance for the 
industrialisation process.
This strategy seeks to ensure that national resources are more 
effectively utilised within the country in order to reduce 
progressively the extroversion of the economy. The long-term 
objective was to construct a ’complete1 productive sector capable of 
satisfying the needs of consumption, and at the same time the full 
utilisation of local resources. The target set for industry in the 
country’s long-term development objectives and strategy (1967-1980) was 
to construct an integrated and viable industrial base by 1980. Three 
development plans had been implemented during the pre-reform period:, 
the Three-Year Plan (1967-1969)^ the First Four-Year Plan (1970-1973) 
and the Second Four-Year Plan (1974-1977). 1978 and 1979 were years
of transition and reassessment before the introduction of a Five-Year 
Plan (1980-1984).
- It was estimated that, in order to facilitate the implementation 
of this ambitious development strategy, direct state involvement in 
investment decisions was necessary. In practice, this was achieved 
through three main policy measures:
(a) the employment of public sector enterprises as agents to carry out 
the industrialisation programme decided by the central 
authorities;
(b) the centralisation of investment decisions. Public sector 
investment has since 1970 been integrated into the national 
economic plan. The objective of this centralisation is two-fold. 
One: to concentrate the nation’s resources on certain objectives
and avoid their dissipation on other objectives which would divert 
them from the purpose of rapid industrialisation; and two: to
enable the central planners to monitor, coordinate and control the
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investment programme carried out by public enterprises;
(c) the adoption of high rates of capital accumulation. This was 
essential to carry out the ambitious investment strategy and to 
finance the rapid expansion of the educational system facilities 
to produce skilled workers, technicians and managers for the new 
factories.
After 1967 the priority given to capital accumulation and in 
particular to productive investment, resulted in living standards, 
which were already low, being held down by a deliberate policy of 
restraint on consumption expenditure. Following the improved 
financial prospects resulting from the oil price increases in 1974, the 
implementation of the long-term development strategy was speeded up. 
This was reflected in the sharp increase in investment during the First 
Four-Year Plan (1970-1973). The volume of investment rose from 9.06 AD 
billion during the period 1967-1969 and 27.27 billion during the First 
Four-Year Plan, to 110 AD billion during the Second Four-Year Plan and 
93.63 AD billion during 1978 (1). The rate of gross fixed capital 
formation in Algeria has been one of the highest in the world since it 
represented on average more than 40 per cent of the country’s gross 
national product in the period 1967-1980 (2).
The priority given to the industrial sector is reflected in its 
share in total investment expenditure. The proportion of investment 
funds allocated to industry was 49 per cent in the pre-planning period 
(1967-1969), 35 per cent under the First Four-Year Plan and 43 per cent 
under the Second Four-Year Plan; only 18 and 15 per cent went to 
agriculture over the periods (1967-1973) and (1974-1978) respectively.
Unfortunately, the implementation of this extensive growth 
strategy faced many difficulties and produced many distortions in the 
Algerian economy. These difficulties have been thoroughly examined by
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several official and unofficial studies. They can be grouped under 
five main headings.
1.1 Low Ratgs of Project iQstallatiQn
Table 1 shows that public enterprises were able to implement only 
a small proportion of their planned investment; over the last decade 
the public industrial enterprises were able to absorb on average only 
53 per cent of their planned investment expenditures.
Table 1 Ratio of actual to planned investment in public sector 
iodusto H26Z=12Z81
1967-1969 1970-1973 1974-1977 1978 1967-1978
Total industry 35 57 44 48 53
Hydrocarbons 54 61 57 52 57
Capital & intermediate
goods 25 54 40 51 56
Source: Ministry of Planning, "Synthesg de Bilan Economigue gt Social
196Zrl9Z8", 1980, Algiers, p 6.
The rapid rise in the level of investment in the industrial sector 
since 1971, and especially after 1974, was far beyond the absorption 
capacity of the Algerian economic system and could not guarantee an 
equally rapid growth of planned capacity. As a result, the industrial 
programme was subject to delays and, in consequence, escalating costs. 
The delays in the completion of investment projects, many of which had 
to be carried over from one planning period to the next, created a 
problem which the planning system could not cope with. At the end of 
1978, projects valued at 210 AD billion remained to be completed - the 
equivalent of four years of planned investment at the 1978 investment 
level. According to official statistics for investment as a whole,
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the actual cost of the investment programme turned out to be two to 
three times higher than the planned expenditure targets over the period 
(1967-1978) (3).
1.2 Sgcous Financial Problems
As will be shown in Chapter Eight, the high investment rates 
assigned to the public enterprises combined with wrong investment 
decisions, delays in the completion of investment projects and the 
subsequent escalation of their costs had profoundly adverse effects on 
the finances of the public enterprises. These distortions were a 
major cause of the public debt problems and the strong inflationary 
pressures which were hitting the country during this period.
1.3 Lqw Efficiency of Investment
Investment in Algeria has been very inefficient in spite of the 
high rate of capital formation, and output growth for industry as a 
whole has been much slower than expected. The Ministry of Planning 
estimated the gross incremental capital-output ration to be 11.2 : 1 in 
industry excluding the oil and gas sector (9 : 1 including this sector) 
which is very high by any reasonable standards. This finding is 
confirmed by a study carried out by C Palloix who showed that the ratio 
of output to the stock of fixed capital in Algerian public sector 
industry had been falling over the 1967-1978 period. He also found 
that labour productivity in public sector industry was falling over the 
same period. This downward trend in the efficiency of public sector 
investment is illustrated in Table 2.
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Table 2 The efficiency of capital and output per worker in Algerian 
IDdystry IgXQlydlDg hyd£Qca£bon§] bgtween I266 and 1271
Year Ratio of industrial output industrial output
to capital stock per worker
(AD current prices)
1966 0.416 35596
1967 0.348 -
1968 0.397 —
1969 0.364 —
1970 0.324 -
1971 0.294 —
1972 0.282 _
1973 0.319 23404
1974 0.303 24181
1975 0.282 24171
1976 0.256 23916
1977 0.210 21518
Source: Palloix, C, ’’Industrialisation et Finaneement lors des Deux
Plan Quadriennaux (1970-1977)”, Revue du Tiers Monde, Vol 21, 
no 83, July-September 1980, Paris, pp 552-585.
1•  ^ Inter-Sectoral Imbalances
The priority given to industrial investment since the second half 
of the 1 9 6 0 ’ s  aggravated the disparities and tensions existing between 
the development of heavy industry and petrochemicals and that of other 
sectors of the economy, particularly agriculture, the consumer goods 
industry, and infrastructure, especially housing, transport and storage 
facilities. As a result, the prices of many basic consumer goods and 
services rose sharply leading to a drop in real wages and real incomes 
with accompanying disincentive effects. Severe shortages of consumer 
goods and agricultural investment goods became widespread and a number 
of disequilibria within the heavy industry sector and in the economy as 
a whole emerged. These inter-sectoral imbalances became one of the 
most serious obstacles to economic growth. They have restrained the 
overall rate of development and caused serious bottlenecks and problems
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within the priority industrial sector itself.
1*5 Excessive Dependence on Foreign Technology
Unable to implement the investment programme using their own 
planning resources, the public industrial enterprises turned massively 
to foreign firms, mostly multinationals, who built and equipped 
complete factories under ’turn-key1 and’product-in-hand’ contracts. 
Such arrangements increased the cost of the industrialisation 
programme, increased Algeria’s technological dependence on the 
industrialised world and weakened national control over the planning 
process. They also had the effect of limiting inter-industry 
integration and the technological coherence of the entire productive 
sector.
But what went wrong? Two main schools of thought emerged in 
Algeria in the early 1980’s to explain the real causes of these 
distortions. The first of these attributes these ’disproportions’ to 
the contradictions inherent in the development strategy itself. 
According to this view, the excessive emphasis on industry aggravated 
the disparities and tensions existing between the development of 
industry and that of the other sectors. These inter-sectoral 
disequilibria have restrained not only the overall rate of development 
but caused serious bottlenecks in the industrial sector itself. 
Decisions concerning the choice of production techniques, the size, 
location and forms of investment projects, were all made within a 
narrow sectoral context and did not take into account the wider 
industrial and economic environment (4).
The second school of thought which is of particular interest to 
the subject of this research, considers the deficiency of the planning 
system and, in particular, the intense conflicts between various 
interests within the larger public sector system and their struggle for
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power, as the main source of these distortions. Two very broad but 
conflicting tendencies emerged,within the public sector in the late 
1970’s each having its own interpretation of the real causes underlying 
the economic and financial distortions. The politicians and central 
bureaucrats, on the one hand, and the technocrats (i,e* enterprise 
managers and the industrial ministries), on the other.
To the former, the investment 'debacle* is mainly due to the 
independent policies adopted by most public enterprises who, 
recognising the fragility and weakness of the planning system, acquired 
considerable economic powers and got their way in opposition to the 
wishes of the state’s top economic planners. To the technocrats, the 
failure of the industrialisation strategy is largely due to the 
external constraints and obstacles placed on them by the over-rigid 
institutional and social context in which they operate. They 
particularly refer to the centralised system of planning investment and 
the complete subordination of the enterprises to the central 
administration.
This Chapter will attempt to examine the planning of investment in 
Algeria as it prevailed in the pre-reform period. The objective is to 
try to assess these claims and show that the observed distortions are 
the result of the system itself and its modus Qperandi.
2 THE PLANNING AND CONTROL OF ENTERPRISE INVESTMENT
2.1 The Institutional F£gmgwQ£k and Its Development
In order to facilitate the implementation of planned investment a
number of financial and planning measures were introduced in 1970. As
a rule, these measures were intended to integrate the investment 
decisions of the enterprises into the national planning system.
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Under the 1970 regulations no public sector investment can be 
carried out until it has been approved by the central authorities and 
provided with a financing plan. Under this system, the final decision 
whether to accept or reject an investment proposal formally rests with 
the central planning office (the Secretary of State for Planning 
between 1970 and 1979 and, since that date, the Ministry of Planning); 
and the decision to finance the project rests with the Ministry of 
Finance. The financial and banking institutions were assigned a more 
subordinate role in the planning system. Their main task was to 
channel centralised investment funds to enterprises and to control 
the implementation of these projects. Moreover, in order to achieve 
the aims sought by the centralisation of investment decisions and 
resources, public enterprises were instructed to deal with no more than 
one bank at a time. The banks were required to provide capital funds 
only for those investments which had been accepted and approved by the 
central planning office. In order to make sure that investment 
decisions do not escape central control, a clear distinction has been 
made between the investment and production activities of the public 
enterprises. The two activities were kept in separate accounts and 
the financing of expansion operations from the enterprises' current 
revenues or from bank overdrafts was prohibited.
Another major change brought about by the 1970 financial 
regulations was the limitation put on self-financing by public sector 
enterprises. They were not allowed to keep their depreciation 
allowances and reserves. These were appropriated by the state budget 
in repayment of their contracted investment loans. Furthermore, up to 
1974 public enterprises were required to hand back part of their 
achieved profits to the Treasury as a contribution to national savings.
Finally, the 1970 financial reforms proposed a transition from
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budget financing to the use of credit for investment and working 
capital. The introduction of credit in capital construction was seen 
as an effective way of combatting the wasteful and extravagant use of 
capital funds which had been associated with the previous regime of 
free budgetary grants. By introducing the principle of financing 
investment by credit the authorities were also hoping to maximise the 
funds available for accumulation through the obligation placed on 
enterprises to reimburse their contracted loans. It was with the same 
objective in mind that all forms of budgetary subsidies to productive 
activities were abolished. It would appear that the shift to credit 
as a source of financing was also welcomed by the managements of 
enterprises who, given their ambitious development targets, badly 
needed financial resources to achieve them, in addition to the 
inadequate funds supplied from budgetary resources. The adoption of 
credit financing has also meant that the enterprises are now able to 
raise funds from local and foreign funding institutions.
2.2 The Planning Process
The object of this analysis of the planning process is to 
determine the locus of the decision-making authority in the area of 
investment and to see how the planning objectives formulated by the 
growth strategy are (or are not) translated into an internally 
consistent programme. Enterprise investment decisions are made within 
a fairly complex administrative structure which operates mainly 
according to civil service rules. Furthermore, most decision 
processes above the enterprise level are little known to the external 
observer. Despite a number of attempts by the central planners in the 
1970’s to formalise the planning process and institutionalise it in 
legal terms, its form was never finally settled. The real world 
decision process involves a myriad of influences of an administrative
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and political* nature. In what follows attention will be focused on 
a somewhat idealised construction of the annual investment plan as it 
operated in the 1970's (5).
A target rate of capital accumulation is fixed by the government 
(the Council of Ministers). On the basis of the development targets 
set by the sectoral ministries for the various branches of industry and 
the long-term economic and political priorities fixed by the 
government, the central planning office establishes aggregate targets 
for each sector and allocates the appropriate capital funds to achieve 
them.
Before launching any investment project, public enterprises are 
instructed to prepare an investment report or a pre-investment study 
for each investment project, applying a uniform procedure commonly 
known as the 'technical-economic study1. This report, which contains 
detailed, standardised data about the cost structure of the project and 
its technical specifications, is the main basis for an executive 
decision on the acceptance, revision or rejection of investment 
request. Work on the feasibility study of the project usually 
involves a number of iterations between the enterprise and the parent 
ministry (6). This report, when complete, is sent under the 
responsibility of the sectoral ministry to the planning authority and 
the financial agencies.
The central planning office then, at least in theory, evaluates 
the investment project and subjects it to further scrutiny. The 
outcome may be either acceptance, revision or rejection of the 
investment request. If the project is accepted by the planning 
authority it is then said that it has been 'individualised1, that is 
approved and included in the 'nomenclature' of the annual plan.
All successful projects must go to the Banque Alg^rienne de
Developpement, or BAD, which provides them with adequate financing 
resources (financing plan). It should be noted that the construction 
of the financing plan by the BAD is a complex procedure involving a 
numbe ofiterations between the Central Banque of Algeria (for transfer 
of funds abroad), the primary bank (for medium-term funds) and the 
Treasury (for long-term funds). When all these steps have been 
completed and when the Ministry of Finance approves the financing plan, 
the enterprise is then invited to sign a ’Credit Agreement’ with the 
relevant primary bank. This agreement lays down the obligations of 
each side and states the repayment conditions of the loan (ie. a 
schedule for the release of funds, reimbursement time limits, interest 
charges etc). It is only then that the public enterprise can start 
the execution of the project.
Finally, if it appears during the implementation of the project, 
and this is often the case, that the actual costs turn out to be higher 
than expected, then the enterprise can ask for a re-evaluation of the 
project. But in this event the project has to go through all the 
procedures described above for a second time.
Before examining in detail the limitations of this type of 
planning and control, a number of points need to be made. The first 
is that the planning of investment in Algeria is not a physical 
planning system. It is limited to the process of allocating 
centralised funds to various branches of the economy. All the details 
involved in the implementation of projects are undertaken by the 
enterprises themselves. Obviously, this considerably enhances the 
authority of the enterprises in relation to that of the central 
administration. The next point concerns the role played by the 
sectoral ministries in the planning of investment. These intermediate 
bodies have expanded their powers at the expense of both the central
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planning office (concerning such issues as the rate of growth, choice 
of technology, location of plant) and the enterprises (feasibility 
studies, installation of projects, choice of subcontractors). As 
mentioned in Chapter Two, the planning of investment in Algeria has 
suffered greatly as a consequence of the low political status which the 
central planning office has relative to that of the other functional 
and sectoral ministries. Finally, the above discussion clearly shows 
that, as far as investment is concerned, there is no clear dividing 
line between the centre and enterprises with respect to both the 
decision making powers and financial resources. The enterprises have 
no investment strategy of their own and their investments are simply 
those of the state.
This system of investment planning gave rise to serious conflicts 
between the state administration and enterprises in the late 1970’s. 
These can be examined under three main headings: the approval
procedure; the financing procedure; and the methods of implementation 
of projects.
2.3 The Approval of Public Investment
It has been mentioned previously that the decision to invest was 
centralised with a view to ensuring that the projects retained in the 
annual plan are consistent with the overall priorities set by the 
central policy makers and properly coordinated to ensure the overall 
coherence of the investment programme. With the intensification of 
the investment effort, the central planning office lost control over 
public sector investment in its assessment of the development effort 
over the 1967-1978 period, the Ministry of Planning admitted that ’’the 
investment approval procedure which was intended to assist the planning 
authorities to check the compatibility of the investment project with
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the development plan and to control its cost, the technical norms, the 
size of output and location (of the project) was ineffective” (7). 
There are several reasons for this.
2.3.1 Inadequate fgasibility studies
Although it is the central planning office which specifically 
approves the bulk of investment in industry, the individual projects, 
their analysis, and all but the final stamping of approval are 
initiated by the enterprises and their sponsoring ministries. One 
reason why the planning authorities failed to exercise control of the 
’planned’ investment of the enterprises lies precisely in the way in 
which these investment proposals were framed in the feasibility studies 
and the degree of accuracy of the information contained in them. In 
practice, the investment report, which serves as a basis for an 
executive decision, is very often ill-prepared, incomplete and 
inaccurate. The so-called technical-economic study is a voluminous 
document which comprises the following information:
1 An estimation of market demand.
2 The technical features of the project (engineering study) which 
describes the physical characteristics of the project, the design 
of the plan and buildings, the technical aspects of the output.
3 The cost of the project broken down over the construction and the 
installation period and made up of different elements such as site 
preparation, buildings, and equipment.
4 A financial appraisal (financial study). This establishes what 
the project will cost in budgetary terms and the expected 
revenues.
5 The expected sources of finance (local and foreign sources).
6 A timetable for project execution.
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Experience has shown that this type of information, which is 
required by the central planning office to evaluate the project is 
rarely, if ever, provided with accuracy. Indeed, in very many cases 
these reports are carried out by foreign consultancy firms which have 
no knowledge of the local conditions and resources. Even if the 
problem of obtaining standardised data were to be solved, the ability 
of the central planning office to evaluate the investment requests is 
severely restricted by the very limited number of highly trained 
engineers and economists at its disposal. For instance, the 
Department of Industry within the Ministry of Planning had at its 
disposal only five cadres who were in charge of studying more than 400 
investment proposals a year in 1981.
At the enterprise level, the poor quality of the feasibility 
studies is due mainly to the shortage of highly trained technical and 
managerial teams to design and carry out the complex operations 
involved in the preparation of investment projects. The absence of 
adequate data on prices, demand analysis, sources of supply and the 
lack of costing standards for site preparation and plan construction, 
were major hindrances to the elaboration of a sound and reliable 
feasibility study. The enterprises also point out that the pre­
investment phase is always uncertain because the project in its early 
stages is only an 'idea1 and the costs related, for instance, to the 
site of the project, the sources of supply and the technical 
specifications of the project cannot be assessed with accuracy (8).
Obviously, this type of planning in which the industrial 
enterprises have considerable powers in the preparation of investment 
projects enhances their authority in relation to that of the central 
planning office.
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2.3.2 Inadequate investment ecegaratiQn
In the 1970's, the central planning office was not involved in the 
early stages of preparation of investment projects. These were carried 
out by the enterprises themselves and the sectoral ministries. When 
the central planners came to approve the projects they took no account 
of the conditions under which these projects were to be implemented. 
The central planning office did not assess the investment proposal in 
the light of the enterprise's readiness to carry out the project; nor 
did it ensure that the means for its implementation had been secured 
before it granted its seal of approval. Under this system each 
individual enterprise started a large number of projects at the same 
time but it could not complete them all according to plan due to the 
presence of various obstacles: difficulty in finding an adequate site,
shortages of local construction and engineering facilities, unreliable 
supply links, inadequate infrastructure facilities and communications, 
irregular water supplies, shortage of qualified manpower in backward 
areas. The combined effects of all these obstacles was to cause long 
delays in the installation of projects and excessive investment costs 
which distorted the initial cost structure of the projects. The 
following two examples illustrate these difficulties.
In 1974, SONATRACH subcontracted the construction of an oil 
refinery in Bejala at a cost of 3 billion AD. It was discovered only 
two years later that the area on which the project was built was 
inadequate (unstable soil). The enterprise decided to abandon the 
project but only after large sums of money had been spent on research 
and development and on site preparation not to mention the fee paid to 
the subcontractor (9).
The same enterprise started another project located this time in 
the region of Arzew. The choice of this region was justified by the
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fact that the new factory would use as its inputs the output of another 
plant belonging to the same enterprise located not far from Arzew. 
However, when the project entered into operation it was realised that 
these material inputs were inadequate for use in the new factory 
because they lost much of their chemical properties on transport. The 
adverse implications of this problem for the project and the enterprise 
are obvious.
2.3.3 The absence of decision criteria
Another difficulty which the central planning office had to face 
in its relationship with the public enterprises in the pre-reform 
period relates to the absence of clearly-specified criteria for the 
selection of investment projects. As a rule, public sector investment 
requests were judged on the basis of macro-economic and social 
considerations. Algerian public enterprises were regarded in the 
1970’s as engines for industrialisation and socio-economic development. 
They were charged with a bewildering array of objectives such as the 
creation of jobs, reduction of regional disparities, construction of a 
national industrial base, self-sufficiency, inter-sectoral 
integration, training of workers etc. These extra- enterprise 
obligations were not identified, quantified and converted into 
indicators of social performance. Such broadly defined and often 
conflicting objectives need to be translated into specific tasks and 
obligations if an unambiguous measure of performance is to be achieved.
In his study of management practices in a sample of public 
industrial enterprises, A Mettouchi remarked as early as 1975 that the 
directives of the national plan had been of little practical value in 
steering the enterprises’ behaviour towards the achievement of targets 
desired by the centre. He gave several reasons for this:
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(a) the national economic plan is presented on a traditional 'branch* 
basis and makes no mention of the public enterprises/
(b) the pluri-annual national plan is not disaggregated into annual 
operational plans;
(c) the plan does not refer to specific products but to broad product 
categories^ '
(d) the national plan is not the only source of information available 
to enterprises when constructing their development strategies and 
formulating their long-term objectives. They also receive 
directives from their sponsoring ministries (10).
In practice, the distribution of centralised investment funds by 
the central planning office among various enterprises is fundamentally 
a function of the "priorities set by the long-term development 
strategy" (11), and the priority within this strategy given to the so- 
called industrialising industries; of the estimated revenues from oil 
and gas exports and of the ability of the enterprises to secure 
adequate credit from their foreign suppliers. Moreover, the central 
authorities' appraisal of an investment project is usually made with 
reference to the costs as defined by the enterprises themselves; and on 
the basis of the growth targets assigned to each sector in the long­
term development strategy. The assessment does not take into account 
such important factors as the financial viability of the project; the 
production techniques built into them,* the availability of local 
resources and linkages to other industries. The central planning 
office have neither the knowledge nor the information required to do 
so. The investment is, therefore, in the hands of managers and the 
ministerial staff. This observation explains also why the central 
planning office lost control over the investment policy and why it was 
perceived by the enterprises as a 'rubber stamping* institution (12).
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In assessing the projects put before them, the staff at the 
planning authority were involved in comparing the financial costs of 
different projects on the same basis rather than analysing the economic 
costs and benefits of these projects (13). The weakness of this 
method is that it does not allow the identification of the 'extra- 
enterprise’ obligations assigned to the public enterprises by the long­
term development strategy and the computation of the incidence of these 
obligations on the revenue of the enterprise. Worse still, the 
central planning office paid little attention to the overall financial 
position of the enterprises making the investment request or the 
financial viability of the project. In this sense, it was dealing 
with ’projects1 and not with ’enterprises’. One manifestation of this 
in the pre-reform period is that the public enterprises were allowed to 
invest and expand at a very rapid rate despite their manifest inability 
to generate a cash flow sufficient to secure their own expansion and to 
pay the loans contracted with the local and foreign funding 
institutions.
It became evident at the end of the 1970’s that the absence of a 
clear cut investment criteria had serious consequences for both the 
central planner and the enterprise. First, it was held responsible 
for the ’investment mania’ in Algeria. The priority given to rapid 
industrialisation combined with the absence of responsibility for 
unsuccessful investment decisions induced enterprises to step up their 
claims for centralised funds by ’hiking themselves on to the plan', a 
tendency which was stronger the lower the level at which the investment 
decisions were taken. Secondly, the absence of clear investment 
decision rules resulted in serious mistakes made in the choice 
of the production techniques utilised, the size of plant and its 
location (14). Finally, as will be shown later in this Chapter, the
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lack of clear Investment parameters for the allocation of central funds 
has been a major source for the undisguised and never-ending conflicts 
between the enterprises and the banking system.
The Minister of Finance described the collapse of central 
investment planning at the end of the 1970’s in the following terms: 
!IA logic has developed among enterprises in which the investment 
decision escaped the control of the central planners who very often 
have no other option but to accept the project as it stands” (15). 
This happened in a number of ways:
(a) The enterprises (and their sponsoring ministries) often enter into 
contracts with constructors well before the project is approved by 
the planning authority
(b) The modification of projects by enterprise on their own 
initiative.
(c) The implementation of ’priate’ or unauthorised investment projects 
and their financing from the enterprises current revenues or by 
short-term bank loans.
2.3.4 Delays in £h§ approyal procedure
Paradoxically, the investment review procedure applied in the 
1970’s failed not only to assist the planning authority to exercise a 
tight control over the country’s investment policy and to keep the 
investment costs within reasonable limits but actually contributed to 
cost increases. There is ample evidence that the central planning 
office took a long time before it granted permission to enterprises to 
start their investment operations. Delays of up to two years occurred 
very frequently. The public enterprises have always complained about 
this problem, pointing to its adverse inflationary effects on the costs 
of investment projects. The three following cases illustrate the 
scale of this problem (16).
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Case 1 In June 1977, SONITEX (textiles) signed a contract with 
an Italian firm, SNAM, for the construction of a textile factory in 
Merouana at a cost of 333-8 AD million. The central planning office 
took 14 months to approve the project. Consequently, the Italian firm 
asked for a 25 per cent increase in the initial cost of the project not 
to mentioned the interest charges on the loan made available to it by 
the subcontractor.
Case 2 In June 1977, the SNIC (chemicals) subcontracted the 
installation of a chemical plant at Lakhdaria to a French firm SPECHIM 
at a price of 403 AD million. The project was held up for several 
months due to a delay in the approval procedure. In consequence, the 
French firm claimed a 19-47 AD million increase in the contracted cost 
plus a 10 AD million interest charges on the loan granted to the 
Algerian firm. The additional costs had to be paid in hard currency.
Case 3 In the same year, SONIC (paper and cellulose) signed a 
contract with a West German firm for the installation of a factory 
producing a variety of school articles at a fee of 16.55 AD million. 
It took the central planning office 15 months to approve the project. 
As a result of this delay, the German firm claimed a 10 per cent 
increase in the initial price paid entirely in foreign currency.
2-3-5 Cuts in cgpital expenditures
Public enterprises have repeatedly claimed that the capital 
expenditures allocated by the central planning office to their 
investment projects fell well below the levels requested in the 
feasibility studies. Under the circumstances the public enterprise 
has two options:
(a) modify the project, i,e. reduce size or capacity;
(b) start the project and apply for a re-evaluation of the initial
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cost.
This latter option proved in practice to have adverse consequences 
on the final cost of the project, because the project will then have to 
travel once again through the planning cycle described which takes 
considerable time thus lengthening even further project installation 
periods.
Table 3 Cuts in capital expenditures regugsted by enterprises in the 
heayy industry sector 112ZQrl9ZZ)
Project Actual funds as a 
percentage of 
requested funds
First Fourrlear Plan 
Electrical wires 62.6
Telephone cables 43.2
Electrical engineering 100
Electrification 73.4
Lighting equipment 0.10
Batteries & accumulators 61.0
Household appliances 56.0
Second Four-Year Plan
TV and Hi Fi equipment 62.4
Telephone equipment 81.0
Bulbs (Mohammadia) 70.5
Repair workshop (Oran) 69.0
Repair workshop (Annaba) 71.0
Sourcg: Revolution Africaine, no 825, May 14, 1979.
2.4 The Financing of Enterprises! Inyes£ment §nd Bgnk Control
The above discussion of the investment planning cycle shows that 
the Algerian Bank for Development (BAD) and the primary banks play a 
key role in the decision-making process. The primary function of the 
BAD is to provide the investment projects approved by the central 
planning office with adequate financial resources. A technical 
committee meets on a regular basis to examine the projects and to 
choose the most suitable sources of finance for them (17). In
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constructing the financing plan, the committee is instructed to take 
into consideration the following elements:
(a) the expected financial returns)
(b) the external constraints placed on the enterprise)
(c) the overall financial position of the enterprise *
(d) the specific nature of the investment (18).
According to the Ministry of Finance, the aim of these guidelines 
is to assist the BAD to "adapt the credits to the specific nature of 
each project" (19). It should be noted, however, that the authority 
of the BAD is very restricted in this respect since it cannot reject 
the project, modify it, or withhold payment. It has a formal 
obligation to provide funds for all projects approved by the central 
planning office.
Because the 1970 financial regulations prohibited self-financing 
and suspended all forms of budgetary grants to the productive sector, 
public enterprises’ investment operations have been financed 
exclusively by medium and long-term credits. As a rule, the medium- 
term loans are granted either by the Algerian primary banks or by the 
foreign subcontractors (or their governments). Long-term credits, in 
contrast, are provided by the BAD or raised by the Algerian banks on 
behalf of the enterprises in the international financial market (20). 
When a satisfactory financing plan is worked out by the BAD it is then 
sent to the Ministry of Finance for final approval and inclusion in the 
annual budget.
The primary bank has a two-fold role in the planning of 
investments: to channel the capital funds to enterprises and to control 
the implementation of the investment projects. Before releasing the 
funds the primary bank must first ascertain that the project is 
actually authorised and is endowed with the necessary funds. It must
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also verify that the funds requested by the enterprise are well within 
the limits prescribed by the plan.
The planning procedure and the financial system described above 
worked very badly in practice. It produced severe conflicts between 
the enterprises and the banking institutions. It has also been held 
responsible for many of the distortions which occurred in the system of 
investment planning. By the end of the 1970’s, neither the banks nor 
the enterprises v/ere happy about the way in which the system worked. 
The system was criticised on several grounds.
2.4.1 Inadequate financing patters
The financing plans constructed by the BAD and to which the banks 
refer in their control operations, did not match the real world 
requirements of the project. As a rule, the actual financial 
requirements of the project during its implementation are far in excess 
of the planned funds. The inadequacy of the financing plan is due to 
a number of factors: lack of coordination between the bank, the
central planning office and the enterprise during the early stages of 
project preparation; the unreliability of the feasibility studies; the 
excessive investment costs following delays in the construction of 
projects and the central planners’ deliberate policy of cutting the 
capital funds requested by the enterprises. One significant 
consequence of these problems is that many medium-term loans used in 
the 1970’s to finance industrial projects came to maturity even before 
the projects were completed. The enterprises have frequently raised 
this problem during the reform debate, arguing that under the 
circumstances they had no other alternative but to go to the bank to 
ask for short-term loans (i*e* overdrafts) thus increasing even further 
their debt problem.
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2.4.2 The distorted role of cpgdit
As will be shown in Chapter Eight, the intensification of the 
investment effort, the delays in the installation of projects and the 
subsequent rise in their costs have had profoundly adverse effects on 
the finances of the public industrial enterprises. In 1980, the great 
majority had reached a position where none of them was able to repay 
their long-term investment loans. Moreover, the recovery of the 
external and medium-term bank loans was achieved only at a high price. 
Since these loans are rediscounted at (i.e. financed by) the Central Bank 
of Algeria their repayment involved an expansion of money supply. The 
scale of this was significant enough to cause inflationary pressures. 
This state of affairs has triggered off a tremendous feeling of 
resentment on the part of the banks and financial institutions who have 
been highly critical of not only the system of financing public sector 
investments but also of the whole industrialisation strategy carried 
out by the enterprises and the sectoral ministries. Their criticisms 
focussed on two main issues.
The first relates to the ineffectiveness of the controls exercised 
by the banks. Their role was reduced to ’dressing* the projects 
approved by the central planning office with financing plans. 
However, because of the high number of industrial projects which they 
had to handle and the complexity of the administrative tasks involved, 
the banks took a long time to verify the projects and provide them with 
adequate funds. These delays provoked frustration and anger among the 
managers who saw them as an additional source of delay in the 
installation of their investment projects.
The other criticism made of the financial system is the distortion 
of ’credit’ and the marginal role played by the banks in investment 
planning. This arises from the neglect of financial aspects when
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investment projects are selected. Some economists have suggested 
that the primary task of the banks in the pre-reform period was not to 
grant ’credits1 to enterprises but to handle their ’debts’ (21). This 
is so because the financing of investment in Algeria does not proceed 
on the basis that loans should be repaid by enterprises within a 
prescribed term. In fact the enterprises were under no effective 
constraint to generate revenues sufficient to pay off their debts. 
Moreover, the enterprises did not pay for the financial resources at 
their disposal; these were considered by the enterprise as essentially 
free of charge. The interest rates applied by the Algerian banks were
held at a ridiculously low level (2 to 5.5 per cent) in relation to the 
high rates of inflation (12 to 20 per cent) and did not reflect the 
opportunity cost of capital. These low, or more precisely, negative 
interest rates were held responsible for the investment mania in 
Algeria and for the low efficiency of investment. This criticism was 
frequently expressed by the banks and financial agencies.
The weakness of the banking system relative to that of the public 
productive sector in Algeria in the pre-reform period led some 
economists to conclude that ’’the monetary constraint is exercised 
neither by the primary bank nor by the Central Bank; it is 
’appropriated’ by the public enterprises who have the real monetary 
power” (22).
2.4.3 The criticisms of the enterprises
Attacks on the financial system came also from the enterprises 
but this time for different reasons. In their view, the use of credit 
in financing their investment operations is meaningless under the 
Algerian system of centralised planning and control. They see the 
1970's financial regulations as being unrealistic and far too
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demanding. They require the public enterprises not only to be 
profitable, but to finance their growth operations under a system where 
investment decisions are made by external agencies, and where the 
enterprises have no control over their financial resources.
The competence of enterprises in investment decisions is very 
restricted and even such minor investments as maintenance, 
modernisation and replacement of plant and machinery are decided by the 
central authorities. The centralisation of such investments combined 
with the prohibition on self-financing had serious consequences for the 
enterprises. It led to inadequate maintenance of equipment and 
machinery, which in turn resulted in frequent work stoppages and 
chronic underutilisation of productive capacity. To overcome this 
problem, the enterprises were in many cases forced to use their current 
revenues to finance these investments, thus overstretching their meagre 
resources. It has also been argued that the financing of enterprises1 
investment operations exclusively by credit meant in practice that the 
interest charges have become quite a burden for the enterprises 
especially given the high growth rates assigned to them by the central 
planners.
A final complaint by the enterprises was that in carrying out 
their investment projects they had to take in charge a number of 
’extra-enterprise’ expenditures such as those incurred in the 
preparation of the pre-investment studies, the site of the project and 
infrastructure facilities, the training of workers. Up to 1979 the 
costs of these operations which have no immediate returns to the 
enterprise, had been financed by interest-bearing bank loans when they 
should have been borne by the state budget.
2.5 The Fqods of Projgct ImplgQ3§ntatiQQ
It may be recalled from an earlier section that the implementation
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of investment projects is decentralised. The enterprises have full 
responsibility for the implementation of their investment projects. 
They have large powers of choice regarding the methods of project 
construction, the subcontractors, the sources of supply, the production 
technologies, and in determining the details of the construction 
operations.
Here again there was a large gap between the plan and the actual 
outcome. Unable to implement the investment using their own planning 
resources, the enterprises turned massively to foreign firms, mostly 
transnationals, who built and equipped complete factories under turn­
key1 and Tproauct-in-handT contracts. The balance sheet of the 
development record carried out in the late 1970’s has been highly 
critical of the policies adopted by the public enterprises in this 
area. These elaborate forms of technology transfer, it is argued, 
increased the cost of the investment programme, strengthened Algeria’s 
technological dependence on the industrialised nations, restricted 
inter-sectoral integration and weakened the technological coherence of 
the entire productive sector and national control over the 
planning process. Critics of this process frequently refer to the 
’illusion’ and ’myth’ of the technology transfer (23). Three issues in 
particular are raised.
The first is that the public enterprises were not tough enough in 
their bargaining with the multinationals. They tended to accept 
certain restrictive conditions and clauses in the contract which placed 
the multinationals in a position of strength. Thus, the Algerian 
enterprises are reported to have frequently accepted too readily the 
subcontractor's demands for price revisions while the initial contracts 
are concluded on the basis of firm and irrevocable prices. In many 
other instances the enterprises concluded contracts which give large
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powers to the subcontractors on the revision of initial prices (24).
Table 4 shows that the number of 'turn-key5 and product-in-hand1 
contracts which hardly existed at all in the late 1960*s increased 
rapidly in the 1970fs.
Table 4 Changes in the forms of import of technology
Type of contract No of Contracts 
Before 1969 1970-1973 1974-1977
Engineering contracts 16 16 13
Contracts for the delivery and 
installation of equipment 30 34 19
Project installation contracts 18 15 42
Turn-key contracts 16 27 58
Product-in-hand contracts 0 1 16
Joint-ventures 5 7 8
Total 73 100 - 116
Source: Yachir, F, "Les Flux diimportation de Technologie dans le
Secteur Industrie! Public en Algdrie", RASJEP, no 4, December
1980, p 6.
Under these formulae, the foreign subcontractor is responsible not 
only for the installation of the project, but also for the training of 
the Algerian workers and for the daily running of the factory until it 
reaches a satisfactory working capacity. These forms of technology 
transfer proved very expensive and thus increased considerably the cost 
of investment in Algeria. More importance perhaps is the fact that they 
offered little opportunity to the Algerian workers, engineers and 
technicians to acquire experience and new skills in the installation of 
projects, thus impairing the development of an indigenous technology. 
In a famous study, Glasman concluded that the Algerian cadres of the
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public sector are in charge of administrative problems whereas the 
foreign experts and cadres are in charge of technological matters. 
According to this author there is in Algeria "a technocracy without a 
technology" (25).
A final criticism of public enterprises was that they leant too 
heavily on foreign firms not only for the construction of the 
industrial projects but also for the choice of technology. It has 
become a common practice in Algeria that the public enterprises entrust 
the technical study, the design of the plant, the choice of sources of 
supply, the choice of technology and the construction of the plant, to 
one multinational firm. Algerian firms, therefore lost control over 
the projects. The multinations have installed the ’most 
sophisticated' and ’latest1 technology available in the world. These 
technologies increased Algeria’s technological dependence and proved to 
be incompatible with the local conditions and constraints. In his 
reflection on the impact of these forms of transfer of technology on 
national planning, one Algerian economist suggested that in the 1970’s 
"the national economic plan is constructed on the basis of the offers 
made by the overseas firms" (26).
3 CONCLUSION
This Chapter began with a brief outline of the investment crisis 
in Algeria in the second half of the 1970‘s; then moved to an 
examination of the planning and control mechanisms involved in 
investment decisions. The objective was to show that public 
enterprise investment decisions in the pre-reform period were made 
within the framework of a complex planning system which is run on 
purely civil service rules. Under this system, there is no dividing 
line between the state and the enterprises. In fact, the absence of
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clearly defined criteria for the allocation of central funds combined 
with the acceleration of investment and the over-rigid planning system 
produced serious distortions in the economy and led to conflicts 
between the state and enterprises.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE PLANNING AND CONTROL OF ENTERPRISE IMPORTS
1 INTRODUCTION
Central control over foreign trade operations is another 
important constraint imposed on public enterprises. Import controls 
greatly affect the economic activity of enterprises by setting tight 
limits upon their ability to satisfy their import needs. It will be 
argued in this Chapter that the administrative methods of control which 
prevailed in the 1970s in this area failed to influence enterprise 
behaviour in the direction desired by central planners, and did not 
offer adequate operational flexibility permitting enterprises to secure 
a continuous flow of imported supplies.
Algeria is heavily involved in foreign trade. Total imports 
constituted on average about 37 per cent of the countryTs gross 
domestic product over the period 1978-1981 (1). In 1980, some 61.39 
per cent of imports came from the EEC block} 11.4 per cent from other 
Western industrialised countries*, and 10.1 per cent from North America. 
On the export side, 92 per cent of total exports went to Western 
European countries with 48 per cent going to North America, 39.07 per 
cent to Western Europe and the remaining 8 per cent going to other 
parts of the world.
The commodity composition of 1979 foreign trade is shov/n in Table 
1 below. On the import side, imports of capital goods and semi­
manufactured occupy a privileged position in the overall import bill 
for 1979 with just over 35 per cent going to the latter and 33 per cent 
going to the former. The share of foodstuffs, which was relatively 
lower in the late 1960s, increased to about 16 per cent in 1979.
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These figures indicate that Algeria is heavily involved in foreign 
trade transactions.
Table 1: Composition of Algerian fopeigQ trade in 19Z9(in percentages]
Product category Imports Exports
1 Food, drink and beverages
2 Energy and fuels 
3/4 Raw materials
15.89 1.33
2.5 93.60
non-manufactures 5.10 0.70
5 Semi-manufactured goods 35.19 0.48
6 Equipment and machinery 32.72 -
7 Consumer goods 8.93 -
8 Miscellaneous 0.22 -
100.00 100.00
Source: l!Annuaire Statistique de l’Algerie. L’Office National de
Statistiques (ONS). 1981. Algiers.
In particular, it relies substantially on foreign markets for the 
supplies of a wide range of goods and services. Algerian exports, in 
contrast, are not as much diversified. They are formed almost 
exclusively of oil and gas shipments to Western countries, 93.6 per 
cent going to these commodities.
The strategic importance of foreign trade in the Algerian economy 
and in particular its substantial dependence on foreign sources of 
supply suggests that success in this area depends to a large extent on 
the ability of central authorities to work out a flexible but effective 
control framework so as to harmonise the conflicting interests of 
enterprises and the state.
2 THE ORGANISATION OF STATE MONOPOLY OVER IMPORTS
2.1 The Institutional Setting ynd Its EYQlUtiQn
The evolution of state intervention in import operations is very
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closely related to the development of public sector enterprises. Two 
distinct periods can be identified in this respect: the first is from
1963 to 1970 and the second from 1970 until the present.
The period 1963-70 was characterised by the dominance of private 
firms and limited state intervention in import operations. Imports 
were regulated mainly by means of tariffs, quotas and foreign exchange 
control procedures. However, in 1964 specialised buyer groups known 
as "Groupements Professionnels d’Achat”, or GPAs, were introduced by 
the Ministry of Trade. They were designed to act as intermediate 
links between the state and private firms. These buyer groups, in 
which the state had a representation, were involved in the distribution 
of import quotas between the member firms and carried out purchases on 
their behalf. These groups were formed in five branches of activity: 
wood products (BIOMEX), textiles (GITEXAL, GAPIT), milk and dairy 
products (GAIRLAC) and leather and skins (GICP). Although membership 
of these groups was compulsory, the system was quite flexible and the 
state exercised little control over the import policy of these groups. 
However, the groups were to become more and more inconsistent with the 
institutional nature of the economy which was coming rapidly under 
state control. It should be noted that in other branches of industry 
in which there were no groups, import operations were carried out by 
public enterprise.
In 1970, the GPAs were abolished and a tight system of state 
monopoly over foreign trade was introduced. The years 1971 and 1972 
witnessed important structural changes: the state monopoly over
imports was established and systematically delegated to the national 
public enterprises. In 1971» about 80 per cent of foreign trade 
transactions were brought under the control of 19 national public 
enterprises. Although the previous import control procedures were
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partly preserved during this period, a new administrative procedure 
designed to regulate enterprise imports was being introduced. In 1973 
a Ministry of Trade ruling formalised this procedure and became what is 
commonly known now in Algerian public law literature as the 
”AutQri§a£iQQ GlQjDale dllrBPQctafciQQ11, or AGI, for short (2). Under 
this rule, all undertakings, be they private or public, had to state 
their expected import needs of raw materials, semi-manufactured goods 
and machinery one year in advance if they were to have any chances of 
obtaining them. The AGI scheme was further developed and became law 
in 1974 (3). It has become ever since the predominant procedure 
governing import operations. The implication of this is that access 
of private enterprises to foreign suppliers was severely reduced 
between 1974 and 1978 and abolished altogether in 1978. The rest of 
this Chapter will be devoted to a close examination of this planning 
procedure and how it has worked in practice.
2.2 Sgrne Organisational Fegtu£gs
As a rule, state monopoly over imports is delegated to national 
public undertakings. From a sectoral point of view, these may be 
either production or trade enterprises. While the former are under 
the administrative authority of the sectoral ministries, the latter are 
subordinated to the Ministry of Trade. By and large, trade 
enterprises, which are more recently established and fewer in number, 
deal in consumer goods. Production enterprises, on the other hand, 
are numerous and account for a larger share of imports of a wide range 
of goods and services for both the consumer and producer markets. The 
AGI system introduced in 1974 involves a two-fold delegation of state 
monopoly over import operations.
First, from the state directly to the relevant public enterprise. 
This is called ’exclusive monopoly1 (4), or simply monopoly, when the
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enterprise in question is the only entity which can import given goods. 
As a rule, this concerns a number of products included in the so-called 
list ’A* for which the enterprise has an exclusive monopoly right and 
which it cannot delegate to other enterprises. These products are 
also referred to as ”AGI/MQnQpQlyV Secondly, from these monopoly 
enterprises to other user undertakings. This second stage of 
delegation covers products of list ’B? over which public enterprise has 
an import monopoly but which it can delegate to other user enterprises 
(5). This delegation of authority is, however, subject to one 
important limiting qualification: the products the imports of which 
have been delegated by the monopoly enterprise cannot be resold by the 
recipient enterprise. List ’B’ usually includes two types of imports 
classified according to their final destination.
Imports needed by other enterprises to carry out the day-to-day 
production operations such as raw materials, semi-manufactured 
goods, and spare parts. These are usually referred to in the 
import plan as the "AGI/Currgnt Operations” (6).
Imports needed for planned investment projects. These include, as 
their name implies, imports of plant and equipment intended for 
investment purposes. This type of import is referred to as 
"AGI/Plaened laEggts”.
Monopoly over imports of list *B’ is often referred to as ‘partial 
or visa monopoly’. The partial monopoly was introduced to relieve the 
work load on the monopoly enterprise and to make the import system more 
flexible and effective. Once they get the approval (or visa) of the 
relevant monopoly enterprise, the recipient enterprises are free to 
choose their suppliers and the goods to be purchased.
From this brief account of the state monopoly over imports it is 
clear that public enterprises occupy a central position in the overall 
picture. It is important to note that public enterprises are allowed 
to operate directly in world markets once their import plans had been 
worked out and approved by the central authorities. They are free to 
seek alternative sources of supply and to choose those that suit them 
best. Several advantages were claimed for this pattern of 
organisation (7).
1 Operational flexibility is made possible by the wide powers given to 
enterprises in their import policies and direct access to world 
markets. In particular this flexibility ensures a continuous and 
speedy flow of supplies to the various production units.
2 Since production enterprises are the main importers they will have 
no interest in buying foreign goods which may compete with their own 
products.
3 Valuable experience will be acquired by enterprise management 
through direct contacts and operation in international markets. This 
experience allows managers to consider alternative sources of supply 
and the terms of trade associated with them. One particular advantage 
which is emphasised is that the concentration of import decisions in 
the hands of few large public enterprises enhances the bargaining power 
of the Algerian state in its dealings in international markets. 
Enterprises can obtain considerable economic concessions from their 
foreign supplies in the form of favourable financing arrangements, cost 
reductions and speedier deliveries through purchases in bulk.
4 The system opens up possibilities of realising a more efficient 
transfer of technology due to direct deals and the knowledge acquired 
of world markets. Production enterprises are in particular better 
placed to judge the kind of production techniques that should be
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imported.
5 The state can, through its specialised institutions, exercise a 
tight control over foreign currency flows precisely because of the 
restricted number of enterprises engaging in foreign trade.
While these claims may be questionable, they reflect different 
conceptions as to how economic power in the public sector should be 
organised and run, and the vested interests which lie behind this or 
that pattern of organisation. What is not in doubt, however, is that 
in practice many deficiencies were found associated with this 
particular type of organisation. In effect, the spelling out of these 
deficiencies is the object of the remainder of this Chapter. Here 
mention will be made of the main organisational weaknesses only.
While the public ownership of foreign trade was effectively 
achieved in 1974, Algerian central planners and policy makers had only 
vague ideas as to the most effective way of organising and running this 
vital sector of the economy. One apt illustration of the highly 
empirical approach is the issue raised by the distribution of import 
rights among the various public enterprises. This resulted in 
practice in constant clashes between them. This conflict of interest 
is not simply between the production and trade enterprises, which are 
under the formal authority of different sponsoring ministries; it 
arises also because of the overlapping of the import rights of various 
production enterprises within the same sectoral grouping. One example 
of the conflicts between production and trade enterprises is to be 
found in the textiles industries. While the production enterprise for 
textiles (SONITEX) was facing serious problems in disposing of its 
products in the local market, the trade enterprise (SN.COTEC) which was 
given formal authority over the imports of these products in 1974, was 
importing large quantities of textile products and selling them in the
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same local market. This is not an isolated case. The same 
overlapping happened between SONELEC and SONACAT (electrical 
appliances), SONACOME and ENC (office furniture, household appliances, 
hardware) and between SN.SEMPAC and ONACO (food and cereal products). 
These practices were of course very damaging to the production 
enterprises and undermined the objective of protecting local infant 
industries.
The second shortcoming is the non-compliance with the rules and 
regulations introduced in 1974. An example of this is the resale by 
many user enterprises of imported goods in list fBr which are intended 
for their own operations (8). In this way, they enter into direct 
competition with the exclusive monopoly enterprises. Moreover, the 
monopoly enterprises did not coordinate their actions in granting their 
monopoly rights to other user enterprises. This led to duplication of 
effort and dilution of responsibilities for the imports of many goods.
The last problem which should be mentioned is the highly 
fragmented character of the state monopoly over imports, that is, the 
large number of national enterprises engaging directly in foreign 
markets. This, together with their formal subordination to several 
different central administrations, has complicated even further the 
task of the central planners in securing at least some form of 
rudimentary intersectoral coordination.
The above structural deficiencies should be borne in mind when 
dealing with the planning and control of enterprise imports which will 
be discussed next.
3 THE PLANNING AND CONTROL OF ENTERPRISE IMPORTS
Prior to 1980, enterprise import decisions were made within the
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framework of a procedural system which, if the rules and regulations 
are strictly interpreted, give little autonomy to enterprises. All 
enterprises, whether public or private, were required to submit an 
annual import plan for the coming year to their sponsoring ministries. 
These enterprise import requests were then negotiated with an 
interministerial commission chaired by the Ministry of Trade and an 
overall foreign exchange quota was made available to the enterprise to 
allow it to meet its import requirements. In a final stage, the 
actual execution of the import plan was carried out by the enterprise 
itself under close control by the primary banks and the customs 
authorities.
3.1 The Elaboration of £h§ Enterprise Import Plan
Each public enterprise is required by law to construct an import 
plan stating its projected import needs of raw materials, semi­
manufactures and capital equipment one year ahead. The size and 
structure of imports are determined by the relevant monopoly enterprise 
on the basis of the import orders placed by its customers or by 
estimating the demand for these products in the local market. In 
order to help the central authorities distribute the foreign exchange 
funds among its various uses, public enterprises were required to 
classify their import requests into three main categories: imports
which will be carried out by the monopoly enterprises and sold to the 
final users or consumers (AGI/Monopoly), imports destined for specific 
planned investment projects (AGI/Planned Targets) and imports for their 
own use (AGI/Current Operations). When these import programmes are 
worked out by enterprises they are then transmitted through the 
sponsoring ministry to the Ministry of Trade. On the basis of these 
micro import plans, an Interministerial Commission chaired by the 
Ministry of Trade deliberates and constructs the National Import Plan
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(Programme General (^Importation, or PGI). Enterprise plans are 
finally approved and a foreign currency quota is allocated to each 
individual enterprise to carry out its import plan. It should be 
recalled that the lfImport Authoritisation Procedure” or AGI, is a right 
granted by the Ministry of Trade to the enterprise to import and it is 
at the same time an amount of foreign currency allocated to it to carry 
out its requirements.
On what basis were these AGIs granted? There had been, up to 
1980, no formal and clearly defined criteria for the allocation of 
foreign currency reserves among public enterprises. But it is clear 
that the decisions made by the Ministry of Trade were the result of 
bargaining that took place within the Interministerial Commission. 
However, the outcome is generally determined by several factors. One 
important factor is the commitment to economic growth in the national 
economic plan. This meant that import quotas were more or less 
determined by the investment and production targets embodied in the 
annual economic plan and investments already in progress. For 
instance, producer and intermediate products have traditionally been 
given first priority in import decisions in Algeria. Another factor 
is the balance of payments constraint. In particular, the expected 
revenues from oil and gas exports had a considerable bearing on the 
size of imports. Another related element was the ability of the 
public enterprise in question to secure favourable credit terms from 
its foreign suppliers or from their governments.
One striking feature of the working of the state monopoly over 
imports in the 1970s was the absence of economic analysis of the 
contribution of imports to either the national economy or to the 
enterprises. The central authorities were unable to evaluate 
carefully and precisely the import needs of enterprises. One
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important point which should be noted here is that neither the Ministry 
of Trade nor the sponsoring ministries were involved in the detailed 
decisions as to what or how much ought to be imported by public 
enterprises. It was in fact the public enterprises who decided, 
within the credits limits set for them and the type of products 
requested in their import plans, which products should be imported and 
the size and structure of their import purchases. This inevitably 
decentralises considerable power over imports to the level of the 
enterprise. Moreover, in the case of an AGI/Monopoly, the foreign 
exchange quota was usually allocated to that enterprise which had an 
exclusive dealing in a particular product group, which in turn was 
responsible for the allocation of this quota among the various 
recipient enterprises. It was in effect this monopoly enterprise and 
not the Ministry of Trade which exercised whatever choice was delegated 
to it by the Ministry in determining the share going to each recipient 
enterprise.
Although domestic markets were not insulated from foreign markets, 
the financial balance of the enterprise directly or indirectly engaging 
in foreign trade in no way indicates the extent to which their import 
activities are consistent with an efficient use of resources at the 
enterprise level and in national terms. This is so for three main 
reasons.
Firstly, prices of domestic factor inputs do not necessarily 
reflect factor costs. Home prices were administratively fixed and 
were poor indicators of the relative scarcities of factors. The 
implication of this is that decisions as to whether to import an item 
or to produce it locally may be distorted because they are based on 
wrong calculations.
Secondly, there exist no shadow exchange rates even in an informal
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sense which would reflect some of the preferences and priorities of the 
central planners. Algeria uses one single exchange rate for all her 
trading partners. In view of the fact that the Algerian currency, the 
Dinar, is inconvertible, the public enterprises did not have the 
necessary information to permit them to make rational import decisions. 
Furthermore, the exchange rate, which is set officially, has 
traditionally over-valued the Dinar. Because of the high rate of 
inflation and the persistent shortages of producer, intermediate and 
consumer goods in the local market, public enterprises find it more 
advantageous (and cheaper) to import these goods at the official rate 
of exchange than to buy them from local markets. This may result in 
considerable waste of scarce resources and in reinforcing the country's 
dependence on external markets.
A third and last reason, has been the inability of most Algerian 
public enterprises to finance their import purchases from their own 
operations. On the one hand, self-financing was not allowed in public 
enterprises. On the other, public enterprises did not, with the 
exception of the national oil enterprise, SONATRACH, produce for 
exports and consequently it was not possible to establish a link 
between the import requests of enterprises and their contribution to 
exports.
Theoretically, it is through the power to grant or refuse 
enterprise import demands that the Ministry of Trade influences the 
size and structure of enterprise imports and directs transactions to 
one or another trading-partner country in the light of the overall 
balance of payments objectives as well as political and other 
considerations. This operational control could obviously be of great 
importance. However, experience in the 1970s shows quite clearly that 
this type of control did not exist (9).
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Absence of clearly defined criteria for the allocation of central 
foreign exchange reserves among public enterprises resulted in practice 
in the rise of strong conflicts of interest between the enterprises and 
the central authorities when the import plan was worked out. The 
enterprise, as a user of inputs as well as a distributor to other 
enterprises, had every interest to ensure an adequate and regular flow 
of the imported goods it required. Aware of the prevailing state of 
disequilibrium that characterises the supply system in Algeria, 
enterprise managers tended to inflate their import requirements in 
order to provide a security margin for the fulfilment of their 
production and investment targets. The central planners, in 
anticipation of this type of behaviour on the part of enterprise 
managers and in the light of balance of payments constraints, would try 
to cut some of the fat and allocate import quotas well below those 
requested by enterprises. N. Bouzidi described this type of behaviour 
as follows: "Because of the limits imposed by balance of payments
constraints, the approach which seems to have guided central 
arbitration was to reduce systematically the import requests of 
enterprises. The latter will, in turn and for precisely the same 
reason, overestimate their import requests” (10).
In practice, public enterprises could overcome this problem and 
were able to obtain continuous import supplies only through the 
adoption of two strategies: first, the withholding and/or distortion
of information regarding their real import needs and, secondly, the 
hoarding of all types of goods in short supply. With regards to the 
distortion of information, A Bouzidi noted that "the enterprise has in 
effect succeeded, through a system of cheating to impose its working 
methods and defend its interests with the central authorities being 
unable to do anything about it” (11). As far as the hoarding of
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material inputs is concerned, evidence comes this time from the 
Ministry of Light Industries. "It may be worthwhile noting the 
practice of holding excessive stocks in enterprises. These practices 
are the result of the deadly-slow import administrative procedures. 
Where an European industrialist stocks one item, an Algerian 
industrialist must often stock three items to face the possible 
shortage of supplies. This practice of holding excessive stock levels 
applies to spare parts as well as to consumables and raw materials" 
(12).
As for import quotas distributed by the monopoly enterprises, 
these enterprises seem to have been influenced by two considerations. 
The first of these is the awareness of the propensity of most user 
enterprises to inflate their import proposals, the phenomenon mentioned 
above. The second is the need to give priority to their own needs 
before the user enterprises* requirements are considered. The quotas 
for the user enterprises are then unequally distributed between public 
and private firms with a particular preference given to the former. 
It is not hard to see under these circumstances why the monopoly 
enterprises failed in the 1970s to meet the actual needs of their 
client enterprises.
The above discussion would suggest that the function of the 
Ministry of Trade was reduced to adding together the import plans made 
by each individual enterprise to obtain the national import plan. In 
other words it meant that the AGI or import plan of the enterprise 
became in fact a component of the national import plan rather than a 
natural product of it. Certainly, the import policy of a country, and 
in particular its balance of payments problems, means more than the 
summation of various import requests made by enterprises. This 
deficiency explains the inefficiencies of the a priori controls and the
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failure of central authorities to elaborate a stable and balanced 
foreign trade policy. The implications of this deficiency will be 
examined at the end of this Chapter, after an examination of the 
problems which arise during the implementation of enterprise import 
plans.
3.2 Implementation of Enterprise Import Plans and Bank Controls
It has been indicated above that clashes of interest between the 
enterprise and the central administration occurred at the time of plan 
construction. In the process of implementing these decisions, 
problems are likely to increase as the original forecasts of such 
import requirements are proved inaccurate. Formally, it is the 
Ministry of Trade which is responsible for supervising the imports by 
enterprises (13). This control is carried out at three levels:
1 Enterprises are required by law to transmit regular reports to the 
Ministry of Trade on their import operations.
2 The banks through which foreign exchange quotas are channelled to 
enterprises prepare monthly reports on the imports of each 
enterprise which is in receipt of an AGI quota.
3 The customs authorities exercise the physical verification of 
enterprise imports.
In practice, however, the Ministry of Trade played no role in this 
control. This function is carried out by the primary banks and the 
customs office applying strict administrative instructions issued by 
the Ministry of Finance.
In fact, the difficulty of working out an appropriate control 
mechanism within the framework of the national economic plan to ensure 
that import credits made available to enterprises will be used in a 
manner consistent with national plan objectives, throws a tremendous
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burden upon the Ministry of Finance. In the absence of clearly 
specified criteria for measuring the efficiency of enterprise imports 
from the standpoint of either the national economy or the enterprise 
itself, the Ministry of Finance faced a dilemma as to the 
interpretation which it would give to its control function. Two 
possibilities were open to it.
The first is to instruct the primary banks^to exercise control 
only in aggregate fcerm§. In this case the banks will ascertain that 
the importing enterprise does not spend in excess of its overall 
foreign exchange quota and that the goods imported are included in its 
import plan. Obviously this type of control allows a large room for 
manoeuvre to public enterprises in their import decisions since they 
are free to choose the goods to be imported. Its main weakness, 
however, is that the central authorities can in no way be sure that the 
import decisions made at enterprise level would be consistent with the 
national objective. This type of control, therefore, enhances the 
authority of the public enterprise in relation to that of the state.
The second possibility is that the banks can be instructed to 
exercise detailed a priori confccQl over enterprise imports. Here the 
import plan is disaggregated into several component parts and control 
is carried out by comparing the actual outturns with the estimates of 
these component parts. The banks will make sure that before even a 
contract of purchase comes into effect, the import transaction does 
effectively figure in the import plan of the enterprise and that the 
value of the transaction is well within the capital limit set for it. 
Here the banks become a real decision-making authority in the sense 
that it has a right of view over enterprise import transactions in 
detail before they are actually carried out. Obviously this type of 
control restricts the freedom of public enterprises.
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Neither of these two types of control which were tried in turns 
by the Ministry of Finance in the 1970s proved satisfactory. In
particular, the latter type of control was described as being 
interventionist, cumbersome, inadequate and very damaging to the 
relationships of enterprises with the banking system (14). The 
following pages will examine some of the rules governing bank controls 
and demonstrate their effect on enterprise operations.
In order to allow the banks to exercise control over foreign 
exchange flows and allocate import quotas to public enterprises, the 
latter were required to centralise all their import operations in one 
bank account. The rules and regulations dealing with imports and 
foreign currency controls were issued by the Ministry of Finance. 
Several directives were issued between 1970 and 1980. A close look at 
some of these directives will demonstrate the kind of problems involved 
in this type of regulation.
Directive No. 72 of February 6, 1972 made it compulsory for all 
importing enterprises to submit their import purchases and investment 
construction contracts to the banks for scrutiny and approval before 
they can be put into operation. This meant that enterprises were not 
free to use their centrally allocated foreign exchange allowances as 
they saw fit. It is in fact the bank which is going to handle it for 
them. Moreover, this Directive raised many practical problems for 
enterprises. The banks took a long time to grant permission to 
enterprises to start their import operations. It was recognised that 
the consequences of this type of control were long delays in 
procurement, work stoppages in many plants and increases in the prices 
of imported goods. A report prepared by the then Ministry of Industry 
and Energy illustrates this point. ”In general, the administrative 
framework designed for the purposes of an indispensable control over
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imports and foreign exchange is weighing heavily on all importing 
enterprises. This is due to the length and complexity of the chain of 
control, the slowness of administration and the banking system, the 
staff of which are not always aware of the requirements of industry at 
a time when enterprises are not in full control of their import 
programmes” (15). The implication of this is that the domestic market 
was marked by serious rigidities and general shortages. Worse still, 
this procedure of bank approval was found to induce cheating and false 
reporting on the part of enterprise managers. A confession made 
publicly by an enterprise manager in 1976 illustrates this type of 
behaviour "this Directive is recognised to be inapplicable in both 
theory and practice because it ignores entirely the mechanisms which 
determine hard currency flows .... it is at the expense of organised 
and open cheating and ceaseless efforts that the contracts necessary to 
the pursuit of our activities can be started and carried out after they 
had been kept by the bank for several months” (16).
One survey on the causes of excessive costs in Algerian industry 
carried out for the Ministry of Industry and Energy in the early 1970s 
indicated that work stoppages and breakdowns due to shortages of 
imported raw materials and spare parts were very frequent occurances in 
most public industrial enterprises which depend heavily on imports. 
It was estimated for instance that delays in the delivery of imports 
ranged between four and six months (17).
Moreover, faced with a rigid and cumbersome import system and 
fearing possible shortages in the future, enterprises tended to hold 
large stocks of raw materials and spare parts well in excess of their 
actual needs. One can easily imagine, therefore, the amplitude of the 
problem and its impact upon the financial balance of the enterprise.
Directive No. 100 of September 4, 1976, which was issued to
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clarify the procedures to be used by banks in their handling of 
enterprises* foreign exchange quotas reasserted that the AGIs would 
cover a whole year and that enterprises should not spend more than the 
overall foreign exchange quotas allocated to them. The implementation 
of this Directive had serious repercussions on the conduct of 
investment projects by public enterprises. In the case of imports of 
plant and machinery for investment projects, the installation of which 
may extend over several years, the enterprises which performed well and 
were ahead of schedule in the installation of the plant, were penalised 
for doing so simply because no imports could be made once the annual 
allocation for that particular project had been used up before the end 
of the year. However, given the fact that the AGI was delivered only 
once a year, enterprises were obliged to stop their work until a fresh 
new AGI was allocated to them within the framework of the import plan 
of the coming year.
Finally, a close look at the contents of the Directive No. 1, 
issued by the Ministry of Finance on February 11, 1979 illustrates even 
more clearly the type of constraints imposed on public enterprises and 
weaknesses inherent in the administrative system of planning and 
control. In effect, this directive carried over all the 
inconsistencies and constraints introduced by the previous regulations 
(18). The implementation of this Directive in practice produced 
further problems.
On the one hand, in view of the fact that the national import plan 
(PGI) is closed on December 31 of each year, no import transactions 
could take place after this date. This particular restriction failed 
to take account of the fact that the adoption of the national import 
plan was officially fixed for 15 September of each year and that, in 
practice, enterprises were seldom notified of their import quotas
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before the end of March. This meant that enterprises were cut off 
from foreign supplies for more than three months. One can imagine the 
implications of such bureaucratic rigidities for enterprise operations.
On the other hand, public enterprises were not allowed to combine 
foreign exchange reserves allocated for the imports of, say, equipment 
and machinery (:Le. AGI/Planned Targets) with funds allocated for the 
purchase of products for their current operations or for products to be 
sold to other user enterprises (te. AGI/Monopoly). Furthermore, 
enterprises were not free, even within a given AGI, to use funds 
initially allocated to one major product group to pay for another 
product group. Cross-use of funds was allowed to take place only 
between different 'posts* of the same product-category, provided of 
course that the foreign exchange quota allocated to that particular 
product-category was not exceeded (19). This last restriction was 
criticised on two grounds.
First, enterprises could not forecast accurately and in minute 
detail their import requirements one year ahead. In fact, these 
estimates were no more than rough approximations made at the time when 
plans are elaborated. Strict adherence of banks to these estimates 
simply ignores this important fact. It may be sufficient to refer to 
the problems encountered in the planning of investments to realise how 
superfluous and sterile this control may be. Secondly, prohibition of 
the cross-use of funds meant that public enterprises were no longer 
free to determine their import priorities at the time when the import 
plan was being implemented. This lack of freedom produced absurd 
situations. Savings from funds planned for the imports of one product 
category could not be used for the purpose of other goods which were 
badly needed by the enteprise. Moreover, enterprises were not allowed 
to recover the foreign exchange funds for any cancelled or withdrawn
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import orders. Thus, if an Algerian public enterprise wished, for one 
reason or another, to cancel a contrat of purchase then it would 
automatically lose its claim to these funds. Oddly enough, this legal 
disposition applies even where there is a breach of contract on the 
part of the overseas supplier. One economist suggested that this 
particular administrative restriction may be conducive to waste and 
misallocation of the country's scarce foreign currency resources. 
Thus, in order not to lose their centrally allocated funds, enterprises 
would be urged to use them for the purchase of anything they can get 
hold of (20).
It must be clear by now that bank control is reduced to an a 
E E i o r i  control of a mechanistic and administrative nature closely 
copied from relationships between public bodies and civil service 
accountants. Its main focus is the control of enterprises' use of the 
centrally allocated foreign currency reserves. It is clear, however, 
that this bank control was neither effective in preventing 
overestimation of import requests at the planning stage nor an excess 
of actual costs over the estimates, and the banks encountered many 
obstacles in their verification.
The vested interests of the banking system in securing a tight 
control over foreign exchange operations which was not conceived within 
a comprehensive and coherent framework, jeopardised, through their 
"sterile and sterilising" administrative procedures, the initial search 
for a flexible procurement system. In particular, this bank control, 
because it was a control over the wrong thing, failed to harmonise the 
interests of enterprises and those of the state. As one commentator 
noted, "However rigorous the directives of the Ministry of Finance may 
be .... enterprises have always succeeded in getting round them" (21). 
Referring to the excessive reliance of most public enterprises on their
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foreign suppliers a senior bank manager remarked that, "Past experience 
has shown that banks granted their seal of approval to enterprise 
payments abroad on the basis of agreements the terms of which were 
often worked out by the overseas suppliers and constructors themselves, 
a situation which clearly satisfies the regulations in their form but 
not in their spirit" (22).
4 macroeconomic DISTORTIONS
Attention has so far been focused merely on the implications of 
the rigid and cumbercome import controls for the operations of public 
enterprises. It has become an accepted fact in recent years in 
Algeria in the light of the experience of the 1970s that the delegation 
of state monopoly over imports and the administrative methods of 
planning and control produced serious adverse effects on the national 
economy.
4.1 Balance of Payments Problems
The absence of economic and financial criteria for the allocation 
of the centralised foreign exchange funds among public enterprises has 
been a significant factor putting acute pressure on the balance of 
payments. The ambitious development programme* the uncoordinated; 
direct access of most public enterprises to foreign suppliers; the 
over-valuation of the domestic currency and the shortages and sellers' 
market conditions at home have all created a build-in predisposition to 
excessive imports. Table 2 shows the growing deficits in Algeria's 
balance of goods and services over the periods of the three development 
plans.
Imports of goods and services have been growing very rapidly since 
1974. This coincided with the launching of the Second Four-Year Plan 
with its huge investment expenditures. Total imports as a percentage
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of the gross domestic product, which measures the propensity of the 
economy to import, is estimated to have risen from 22.8 per cent in 
1967 to 30.1 per cent in 1973 and to the excessive level of 48.1 per 
cent in 1978 (23). These figures indicate the high degree of 
dependence of the Algerian economy on foreign markets for its suppliers 
with all types of goods and services.
Table 2 Trends in Algeria's balance of current operations betwegn 
1961 and 1918 (in billions of AD)
3-Year Plan 
(1967-69)
1st 4-Year 
Plan
(1970-73)
2nd 4-Year 
Plan
(1974-77)
1978 1967-78
Imports (CAF) 12.481 27.245 90.069 31.698 161.753
Exports (FOB) 12.400 21.718 83.016 25.163 142.243
Balance of 
trade -.081 -5.531 -7.639 -6.804 -19.450
Exports of 
services 1.212 2.275 1.781 1.412 9.981
Imports of 
services 5.566 6.239 21.855 10.103 43.764
Balance of 
current 
operations 4.434 -9.196 -24.116 -15.496 -53.243
Soupce: Ministry of Planning, "Synthese du Bilan Economigye et Social
de la Decennie 19§7rl978,!, May 1980, p 303.
Algerian enterprises have become increasingly involved in foreign 
trade as more and more imports of raw materials and semi-manufactures 
are needed for the operation of their newly installed production units. 
Table 3 indicates the relative importance of this category of goods in 
total imports. The upward trend in the imports of these types of 
products indicates that the production capacities installed are far 
from covering the actual needs of the domestic market and that the 
production units installed are closely tied to foreign sources of supply 
in their day-to-day production operations. In both cases, this seems
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Table 3 Share of raw materials god semi-manufactures in total ifflDOrta 
Qf goods (1973-1979) in currgQt eriQSS (in billions of AD)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
1 Raw materials 
& semi-manuf­
actured 
products 2.503 6.129 6.848 5.857 8.111 12.800
2 Total value 
of imported 
goods 8.659 16.821 24.117 22.227 29.534 34.439 .
1 as % of 2 35.5 36.4 28.3 26.3 27.0 37.0 40.0
Source: Direction des StatjLstigues et de la Comptabilite NatifiDSlg*
1980* Algiers.
to be contrary to the central planners' official policy of self- 
sufficiency and economic independence vis-a-vis world markets which 
manifests itself in the adoption of an intensive industrialisation 
programme. One would have expected to see, at least, some form of 
intra and inter-sectoral cooperation to reduce the pressure on the 
balance of payments. In practice, intra and inter-sectoral linkages 
have been minimal. The reasons for the absence of inter-enterprise 
cooperation are various and complex, but three significant factors can 
be identified.
First, the type of import planning and control where vertical 
flows of resources and information are predominant, does not permit a 
wider use of horizontal information emanating from the market and 
direct contacts between sellers and buyers. In particular, the 
current processes involved in the planning and rationing of centralised 
foreign exchange funds among enterprises coupled with the de facto 
monopoly position of most Algerian public enterprises, do not stimulate 
managements to rationalise their import decisions. The flow of 
resources to enterprises is divorced from the success indicator system
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and managers are not forced to bear the risks involved in their import 
decisions. The second reason is the lack of coordination of 
investment decisions of various enterprises at the time when their 
investment projects are being approved by the central authorities. 
Delays in the planning and installation of these investment projects is 
another reason for lack of industrial integration.
Finally, because of the shortages of manpower and material 
resources required for the intensive development programmes adopted by 
most public industrial enterprises, the latter turned massively to 
foreign suppliers for the realisation of their investment projects. 
In fact, new and more integrated industrial plants were introduced and 
became predominent during the second half of the 1970s (24). One of 
the consequences of this rapid increase in enterprises purchases from 
abroad is the heterogenity of the equipment and machinery purchased 
from various sources of supply; with each market having its own 
technical norms and specifications. One negative effect of this state 
of affairs is that the advantages to be derived from forward and 
backward industrial linkages are not obtained. It also increases the 
risk that Algerian industry will remain perpetually dependent on these 
same sources of supply including all sorts of intermediate products 
(ie. semi-products and spare parts) and the advisory services related 
to them.
4.2 Incnggggd DgpgQdencg Qn Fgcgign Ac&iSQry Sgcyicgg
The import of foreign technology and know-how is another area in 
which clashes of interests between the state and public enterprises 
occurred. In the 1970s the public enterprises relied to an increasing 
extent on foreign expertise and know-how not only for the realisation 
of their investment projects but also for the running of their current
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operations. It was estimated that over the period 1973-78 alone, 
Algeria spent more than 28 AD billion on external advisory services, a 
figure which ranks the country high in the list of those developing 
countries purchasing foreign technologies. Trends in the development 
of total expenditure on foreign technical assistance are shown in Table 
4 below. The proportion of the costs of contracts represented by 
technical assistance rose from 28 per cent in 1973 to about 39 per cent 
in 1978 with the highest level of 45 per cent being reached in 1977. 
Moreover, imports of these ’advisory services' tended to shift from the 
simplest form of pre-investment studies to the hiring of experts and 
qualified personnel to run the production operations.
Mot unexpectedly, industrial enterprises occupy a central position 
in the imports of these services as more than 96 per cent of the funds 
transferred abroad were made by them in 1978. 75 per cent of
enterprise imports of these services came from the EEC countries in the 
same year.
Table 4 Total cost of technical assistance oyer the pgriod 19Z3=Z8 in 
current prices (in billions of AD)
Year Number of 
contracts
Total value 
of contracts 
(1)
Cost of technical 
assistance 
(2)
1 as % of 2
1973 511 3.6 1.0 27.7%
1974 689 8.9 2.7 30.3%
1975 891 14.4 4.7 33.5%
1976 939 15.3 5.0 32.6%
1977 936 14.6 6.6 42.2%
1978 946 22,3 8,6 38.6%
29.4 28.8
Spupcg: Ministry of Planning, "Syothegg dy SilSQ EcQOQrDiQUg gfc Sgcisl
del 1§ Dgcgooig (1967-78)", May 1980, Annexe IV-24, p. 315.
It may be worthwhile noting that imports of these technical 
facilities were not centrally regulated. In fact, the AGI control 
procedure relates only to imports of goods and makes no allowance for
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them. These were decided upon by enterprises themselves and included 
in the centrally allocated investment funds.
4.3 Ex£§EDil Debt EcQblems
The direct and uncoordinated access of most Algerian enterprises 
to the international financial markets has led to a diffusion of 
authority over the countryfs external financial policy and to an 
accelerated rise in the size of external debt. In fact, the ability of 
public enterprises to secure foreign finance was considered as an 
important criterion in approving enterprise investment proposals. The 
relative weakness of the Ministry of Finance in these negotiations has 
meant that little coordination and control could be exercised over the 
country’s foreign financial relations.
Moreover, the ambitious development schemes adopted by most 
enterprises and the chaotic circumstances under which these investments 
were realised together with the deficiencies in the functioning of the 
newly installed production units have all contributed to increased 
pressure on Algeria’s balance of current operations. Deficits in this 
balance have been increasing rapidly despite the intensive use of oil 
and gas revenues. These growing deficits could be financed only from 
external resources which had reached unprecedented levels at the end of 
the 1970s. Table 5 below illustrates the estimated external debt. 
It reached 40 per cent of the gross national product in 1976. The 
reimbursement of the contracted debts and the services related to them 
had also been rising steadily over the same period. Expressed as a 
percentage of total value of exports, these rose from about 3 per cent 
in 1967 to 39 per cent in 1979.
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Table 5 Icgods in Aig§niils exfcecQal d§b£ iio Millions q£ us$l
i m 12Z5 12Z6 12ZZ 19ZS 19Z9
Estimated 
external debt 12.6 8.7 13.0 15.3 20.3 25.6
External debt
as a % of GNP 24 33 40 - — —
Soynsg: Table constructed by the author on the basis of data from the
World Bank Report, 1982, p 139.
5 CONCLUSION
It has been argued in this Chapter that the administrative methods 
of planning and control of enterprise imports failed to reach a balance 
between the interests of public enterprises and those of the state. 
There is ample evidence to support the view that the regulation of 
enterprise imports by administrative means, in the absence of clearly 
defined criteria for decision-making, failed^to achieve either of the 
two objectives sought simultaneously by the central planners in their 
import policy,* namely flexibility for enterprise managers in their 
procurement operations and satisfactory control over the country's 
external economic relations. The reform of public enterprises is 
intended to deal with these adverse affects.
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CHAPTER SIX
REGULATION OF ENTERPRISE PRODUCTION OPERATIONS
1 INTRODUCTION
The problem of goals in a centrally-regulated economy is a 
controversial one. It was thought in the period prior to the 1980 
reform that due to the ’non-contradictory’ nature of a socialist 
economy, since the statefs goal reflected in the national economic plan 
is supreme and the role of the firm as plan executant a subservient 
one, there could be no conflict between the goals of the state, the 
firm and its management; and that the latter are determined by the 
former. Most Algerian official documents implicitly assume that the 
managers are social welfare maximisers. Managers were assumed to act 
altruistically in the sense that their utility depends solely on, and 
increases with, social welfare. Under these restrictive conditions 
the public managers can be relied upon to implement decentralised 
decision rules.
Experience of the 1970’s showed, however, the limitations of this 
view. In fact, the central planners’ interests may diverge from those 
of the firm and its imployees forming a complex means-end structure 
where divergent, or even opposing, goals clash. At the pinnacle of 
the hierarchy of goals are the central planners’ goals, rather vaguely 
defined as the ’maximisation of national income* or ’satisfaction of 
the social needs' of the population. Management theory as well as 
practice in centrally-planned economies indicated that, to synchronise 
management’s goals with those of the state or to induce economic 
behaviour on the part of management, the central planners must 
recognise what management’s goals are and adapt and integrate their 
network of directives, parameters, performance criteria rewards and
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punishments so that the management formula (information-incentives- 
resource allocation) constitutes an integrated whole with compatible 
elements all steering the firm and its management in one direction (1).
It is argued in this Chapter that in the pre-reform period the 
Algerian planners lacked a coherent management mechanism to steer 
enterprise interests towards the achievement of plan objectives and to 
stimulate economic behaviour on the part of management. In 
particular, financial and economic criteria could not be used to 
influence management decisions because the market was eroded and 
distorted since it did not lead to results wanted by ideologists. 
However, nothing has replaced it since planning of production 
operations was recognised to have been a dismal failure. Worse still, 
the a priori controls exercised by the various central control agencies 
failed to achieve the objectives of the state and to force enterprise 
managements to operate efficiently.
2 ENTERPRISE COMPETENCE IN DECISION=MAKING
Despite the extensive formal powers granted to the central 
administration in its relationship with industrial enterprises and the 
plethora of direct administrative controls, management did have 
considerable freedom in the spheres of production activities. 
Decisions connected with production activities relate mainly to current 
production which involve decisions on the extent of utilisation of the 
existing productive capacity and the combination of the factors of 
production. More concretely, these decisions cover a wide range of 
activities pertaining to production, procurement, manapower, financing 
and pricing policies. Moreover, since most Algerian public 
enterprises were large, vertifically-integrated units running their own 
distribution outlets, the sales function is included in their
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production operations.
This freedom stems from the fact that the Algerian central planner 
in the 1970's did not go so far as to determine in detail the size and 
structure of production at the level of the enterprise; nor did he 
tell managements how to combine the various factors of production to 
obtain a given output. Decisions relating to current operations were 
made on a decentralised basis, although they were subject to some form 
of approval.
The First Four-Year Plan (1970-1974) noted in this respect that 
"from the standpoint of the autonomy of the enterprise in decision­
making, the new regulations concern for the time being the 
centralisation of investment decisions. The production programmes, in 
contrast, will be drawn up by the national enterprises themselves 
within the framework of a control system to ensure that their 
productive capacities are fully utilised and that their policies 
conform with those of the national objectives. These production 
programmes, which will be prepared each year by enterprises, will be 
centrally approved” (2).
As a rule public enterprises did have large powers in decisions 
relating to current operations. In view of the great diversity both 
of supply and demand, it was considered practically impossible to plan 
correctly the expected structure of supply and demand in a centralised 
way and, therefore, it was not expedient to give exact and compulsory 
instructions regarding production matters. The stated aim of this 
decentralised system was to avoid the expansion of bureaucracy into 
management and to encourage decentralised initiative (3).
Implicit in this overall organisational set-up is the acceptance 
of the market. The plan was not the only device for the allocation of 
resources; the market was equally referred to in the regulation of
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production and as a source of information to enterprises in decisions 
relating to the level and mix of output. The supply system was 
decentralised with enterprises free to seek and establish their own 
supply links. There were no output and delivery plans imposed from 
above. In particular, public enterprises were free to determine the 
quality and quantity of output increases, delivery schedules, packaging 
and transport details. Moreover, since there were no centrally 
determined norms for the utilisation of factor inputs, enterprise 
managements had to define their own inventory levels of various 
materials and spare parts. They were also free to construct their own 
internal management and control systems and work procedures. In most 
calculations for internal decision-making purposes, enterprises were 
expected to allocate costs free of any central prescriptions. 
However, in order to facilitate both the horizontal and vertical 
information flows in the economy and also to be able to exercise some 
form of control over market relationships, public enterprises were 
requested to enter into direct medium and long-term contracts with each 
other (4). Their production plans were in fact expected to be 
constructedon the basis of the assessment they make of these 
procurement and market possibilities.
Public enterprise managers had up to 1978 large powers in their 
manpower decisions. There were no centrally imposed norms for the use 
and allocation of manpower resources within public sector enterprises. 
Enterprises could choose the composition of their labour force freely. 
The salaries of the director-general of the enterprise and his first 
deputy were frequently determined in reference to salaries paid in the 
civil service sector. In particular, their salary was fixed 
independently of the overall performance of the enterprise. Incomes 
paid out to the workers and the rest of the employees, in contrast,
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were up to 1978, determined by a collective agreement between the 
workers and management, with the agreement being subject to approval by 
the relevant sponsoring ministry.
However, in the face of the growing wage disparities between the 
wages paid by public industrial enterprises, the Ministry of Industry 
and Energy attempted in the early 1970fs to elaborate a uniform wage 
policy for its sector. Indeed, a sectoral salary grid covering around 
2000 work posts was established and agreed upon with the collective of 
workers and became the basic reference in wage negotiations in 
subsequent years. It should be noted, however, that the intervention 
of central authorities in this area remained more apparent than real, 
because it was not conceived within the framework of a comprehensive 
national policy designed to unify the income and wage policy in all 
public sector undertakings. Thus, despite the fact that the size of 
the wage fund and the relative earnings of different skill categories 
in public industrial enterprises were subject to scrutiny by the 
sectoral ministry, the former were in general able to secure a wage 
fund large enough to recruit and attract the type of labour they 
needed. In 1976 intensive work started on a national salary grid. 
It was officially declared in 1978 that wage and income decisions 
should no longer be delegated to public enterprises (5).
In order to meet their growing needs for specific technical and 
managerial skills, most public industrial enterprises established their 
own worker training centres. Prior to 1979, the costs of establishing 
and running these centres were borne by the enterprises themselves 
although they benefited the whole community.
If public enterprises enjoyed large powers in production, sales 
and wage decisions, this autonomy is severely restricted in financing 
and pricing policies. All enterprise financial resources and
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operations were kept in one single bank account. The enterprise can 
borrow from its bank but it cannot lend to banks and other enterprises. 
The implication of this is that the enterprise has no alternative 
source of financing. It is subordinated to one single bank for all 
its operations. All forms of state subsidies were abolished in 1970 
with the introduction of debt financing. According to the 1970's 
regulations, enterprise current operations were to be financed from the 
sale of goods and services to other enterprises or to the population 
and, where necessary, from bank loans. Even when a public enterprise 
is facing serious and persistent financial difficulties, it is not 
offered a subsidy to restore its balance. Instead, it is offered an 
interest-bearing and reimbursable bank loan. The rate of interest 
charged for these loans is usually lower than the going rate of 
inflation (5.5 per cent).
However, in an attempt to control the aggregate level of credit in 
the economy, a planning procedure was introduced by the Ministry of 
Finance in 1970: the financing plan. This new procedure was aimed at
controlling the short-term loans to the economy which had reached a 
significant level. These loans were used to meet the growing needs of 
public enterprises as a result of their rapid expansion and the 
financial problems they were facing (6). According to the 1970 
financial system, public enterprises were required to assess their 
working capital requirements one year in advance. Article 30 of the 
1970 regulations stipulated that "in order to define their working 
capital requirements, the national enterprise must communicate to the 
Ministry of Finance on September the 30th each year at the latest their 
balance sheet, the planned current operations1 account and a statement 
of the sources of financing of their production (activities) as well as 
their production plans for the coming year". This control
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function was delegated by the Ministry of Finance to the primary banks 
in 1971 (7).
Because of the difficulty of forecasting with accuracy the 
financial flows one year in advance, public enterprises were allowed to 
adjust their forecasts in six-monthly and quarterly plans. In this 
way, the financing plan became, once approved by the primary bank, the 
basis for allocating the financial resources to enterprises. In order 
to force enterprise managers to remain within the credit limits set in 
their plans, the 1970 regulations empowered the primary bank to charge 
a fine of 2 per cent for any loans exceeding plans or for failure to 
reimburse previous loans on schedule. It should be noted, however, 
that the primary banks were not given the right to stop granting 
further loans to loss-making enterprises.
The financial autonomy of the public enterprise was also reduced 
by the fact that most of the newly installed plants were not endowed 
with an adequate level of working capital to start production on a 
sound financial basis. Managers have often argued that financing 
their current operations exclusively by credit simply reinforced even 
further their subordination to the banking system. As will be shown 
later in this Chapter, this system worked quite badly in practice.
Another area in which the decision-making authority of the public 
enterprise was severely limited was the administrative fixing of their 
prices. Ordonnance No. 75-37 (1975) illustrates well this lack of 
autonomy (8). It set the rules governing the price policy and the 
price fixing procedures in major branches of the economy. Although it 
was formally held that prices should be related to their costs of 
production, in practice most prices charged by public sector 
enterprises were administratively fixed and kept unchanged for many 
years. They reflected mostly political and social priorities mainly
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to fight inflation and to subsidise some priority production or a 
social group. Four main price categories were identified (9):
1 Fixed prices: these included prices of basic food products such
as cereals, semolina, cooking oil, coffee, sugar ... etc. The 
prices of these products were kept constant for several years.
2 Special prices: these included the prices of products whose costs 
of production were known to be high but which the government wants 
to encourage (cotton, tobacco, sugar beet ... etc). They also 
include industrial goods which are used as inputs to some priority 
sectors particularly agriculture (eg fertilizer, animal food, 
agricultural machinery ... etc).
3 Stabilised prices: this category of prices comprises most
producer goods (ie. iron and steel products, equipment and 
machinery, fuels, construction materials, electricity and gas). 
These prices were kept stable over the period of the medium-term 
plan (4 years). The stated objective was to keep down investment 
costs.
4 Controlled prices: as a rule* these prices can be increased up to 
certain limits. They include a large section of the light 
manufacturing industry (eg. shoes, clothing, household appliances). 
It is important to note here that in the pre-reform period most
prices in the public sector were subject to some form of approval 
regardless of the category in which they were classified. According 
to the 1975 Ordonnance mentioned above, prices were determined either 
by a decree (fixed and special prices), by an inter-ministerial 
decision (stabilised prices) or negotiated with the Ministry of Trade 
(controlled prices).
One important consequence for the enterprise of the arbitrary and 
centralised price system is that profitability could no longer be used
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as the basic criterion for economic decisions and measurement of 
performance. Ironically, the central planners did not have an optimal 
shadow price system on which to base their policy decisions. They 
relied mostly on cost data supplied to them, by the enterprises 
themselves. However, most public enterprises, because of the 
complexity of their internal structures, the multitude of their 
functions and the deficiency of their internal information systems did 
not know precisely the cost structures of their products. The absence 
of any objective criterion for price-fixing together with the 
administrative freezing of prices over a long period of time and the 
inflation of costs led to the distortion of the Algerian price system. 
Prices tended to depart quite considerably from the costs incurred in 
production and distribution. They also failed to equate supply and 
demand. Under these circumstances, profitability had little, if any, 
connection with efficiency.
Failure of prices to reflect market conditions has meant that 
enormous differences in profit margins may exist not only between two 
different sectors but also between various product groups within the 
same sector. In effect, the importance of the concept of profit is 
necessarily affected by the existence of so many public enterprises 
which make losses through not fault of their own. It would appear 
that the Algerian authorities were well aware of this problem. An 
official document noted in 1977 that: "A distinction must be made
between a positive financial result which conceals a bad management and 
a negative financial result which may fail to reflect the genuine 
efforts made within public enterprise to improve management and 
performance" (10).
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3 PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: DUTY AND EURPOSE
Algerian public industrial enterprises were regarded in the 1970fs 
as engines for industrialisation and rapid socio-economic development. 
They were charged with a bewildering array of objectives such as the 
creation of jobs, reduction of regional disparities, construction of a 
national industrial base, self-sufficiency, inter-sectoral integration, 
training of workers and social equity ... etc. The issue raised here 
is not whether public enteprises should or should not carry out non­
business functions but rather how these functions can be identified, 
quantified and converted into indicators of social performance. In 
fact, these broadly defined and often conflicting objectives need to be 
translated into specific tasks and obligations. While the integration 
of these objectives is important in itself, it is also necessary for an 
unambiguous measurement of performance. Unfortunately, in the 
Algerian public enterprises business functions were fused with 'public* 
services and no attempt at even a rough estimation of them was made in 
the accounting system. Neither was there any attempt to sort out the 
additional cost of politically dictated tasks (eg. location of plant, 
administrative price fixing ..etc). Moreover, the vertical mutual 
dependence between the state and the enterprise in the setting of 
objectives and the financing of their realisation tended to reinforce 
the public1 character of the public industrial enterprise at the 
expense of its 'business1 functions.
Undoubtedly, the confusion in the definition of enterprise 
objectives, the perpetuation of this confusion over serveral 
years coupled with the overlappings in the competence of the state and 
enterprises, shaped the behaviour of managers. It would appear that 
the latter formed their own perceptions as to how the system worked and 
quickly adjusted their policies to cope with its requirements and to
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exploit its weaknessess. In fact, considering the size of their 
operations, their role in the economy, and the special tasks assigned 
to their enterprises, managements did not construct their production 
plans on the basis of their perceived interests in the market place. 
Instead, managers made their own interpretation of the expectations of 
the leading social forces and tried to conform to them. A declaration 
made by the director-general of SNS (steel enterprise) in the late 
1960*3 illustrates this point. ”In our country, the profitability of 
these enterprises cannot be calculated and expressed in monetary terms 
only. As a global phenomenon, the steel industry cannot be seen in 
isolation from the spillover effects it has. As a source of growth, 
the steel industry can be assessed only in the long-run and in the 
light of the dynamic growth it will generate” (11).
This brief outline of the constraints imposed on public enterprise 
managers in their day-to-day decisions and the ambiguity in the 
definition of their objectives suggests'that the control system for 
achieving business performance is likely to be soft. In particular, 
the narrowly drawn role of the market naturally conditioned the choice 
and evolution of the financial and economic controls exercised by the 
central administration over the public sector enterprises. But if the 
public enterprise could not be judged on the basis of ’arms length1 
negotiation involving more or less objective parameters or universally 
applied criteria how did the central administration exercise control 
over the choices made within the enterprises and the economic units 
subordinated to them? The answer is simple: when the principal
cannot control results because he cannot measure performance then he 
may either be involved in the decision-making process itself or 
excluded from it altogether. This is the case of most Algerian public 
enterprises. Before examining the implications of the absence of an
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appropriate financial and economic control framework, a close look at 
the administrative control system used in the 1970’s is now in order.
4 CENTRAL CONTROL OVER PRODUCTION OPERATIONS
In the absence of an appropriate financial and economic control 
framework, the Algerian authorities introduced the concept of the 
’enterprise plan1 in 1974 as a means of regulating the enterprises’ 
productions activities (12). This document was intended to define, 
limit and determine the actual operation of the enterprise. It was 
hoped that the enterprise plan, which is built around the production 
plan, would perform four main functions:
1 To act as a link between the national and enterprise objectives. 
In particular, this would allow the central planners to verify 
that the proposals put forward by enterprises are consistent with 
the general guidelines of the national economic plan.
2 To enable both the management of the enterprise and central 
authorities to assess the quality of work done within the 
enterprises. The performance of the enterprise is to be judged on 
the basis of the degree of achievement of planned targets to be 
negotiated with the collective of workers (ie management and 
workers).
3 To improve the enterprise’s relationships with its environment, 
that is the various central control agencies and other 
enterprises. As the planning document put it "the construction 
of a plan covering all aspects of enterprise operations, notably 
procurement and distribution, will enable enterprises to avoid the 
danger of bureaucracy and central intervention in their internal 
affairs” (13).
4 To be used as a framework within which industrial democracy is to
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be exercised through the participation of workers and employees in 
the elaboration of these plans and the running of their 
enterprises.
It should be noted, however, that since the State Secretary for 
Planning (SEP) was not involved in the planning of production at the 
national level, it did not give much detail as to how these plans were 
to be worked out; nor did it offer specific guidelines in respect of 
the detailed contents of these plans, the planning processes and the 
timetables involved. As a matter of fact, these matters were left at 
the discretion of the sponsoring ministries and the enterprises 
subordinated to them. The Second Four-Year Plan (1974-1977) limited 
itself to indicating that the enterprise plan should be constructed on 
the same lines as those of the national economic plan. This means 
that it should comprise four main facets:
- production plan
- manpower and training plan
- distribution plan (including procurement)
- financing plan
4.1 Planning and Control in Practice
It- may be stretching the word too far to speak of planning in 
Algerian public enterprises, if by planning is meant the process 
whereby enterprise current operations are regulated by the central 
administration. It will become clear in the next pages that planning 
in the sense of a conscious effort which aims to create a sound 
•structure of mutual commitments’ between the state and the enterprises 
and between enterprises themselves to achieve a predetermined result 
was lacking in the Algerian organisation set-up (14). Planning in the 
1970’s was effectively reduced to a forecasting exercise in which the 
enterprise tried to determine with more or less accuracy the level of
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its operations over the next twelve months and put forward the means 
needed for achieving them (15).
A closer look at the planning process and the a pciori control 
procedure adopted by the Ministry of Heavy Industry may help one to 
understand the working of the control system (16). In this Ministry, 
the construction of the enterprise plan involved three main stages. 
In the first stage, the management of the basic production units put 
forward output and sales proposals on the basis of previously achieved 
levels, the existing productive capacity and a rough estimation of the 
demand for their products. These targets which are usually expressed 
in physical terms, had to be discussed and approved in a meeting held 
with the Management Council of the Unit (CDE) on which workers have 
representatives. In the second stage, the planning department of the 
parent enterprise gathers the proposals of the various production units 
and constructs the production plan of the enterprise. The various 
components of the draft enterprise plan (ie. output, supplies, manpower) 
are then discussed in a meeting held with the Management Council of the 
Enterprise (CDE) and workers representatives (ATE). It is at this 
stage that the physical planned targets are translated into monetary 
terms and the budgets of the enterprise and the production units are 
drafted. It is also at this stage that some form of consistency 
between the production targets and the resources necessary to achieve 
them is made by the general management of the enterprise.
In a third phase, these planned targets and the budgets of the 
enterprise are transmitted to the sponsoring ministry where they will 
be subject to further negotiation and bargaining with management and 
workers representatives. The position of the ministry is usually to 
request an increase in output targets and improvements in the rates of 
capacity utilisation and labour productivity. Management and workers,
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on the other hand, would normally argue that progress can only be very 
slow due to the external constraints which effect their operations such 
as the shortages of material inputs, difficulty of obtaining bank loans 
for renewing some of the enterprise assets, infrastructure bottlenecks, 
housing and transport problems faced by workers and employees ... etc. 
In this way, a lengthy bargaining process takes place at this stage in 
which the wishes of the collective of workers usually prevail (17). 
Once the plan is approved by the sponsoring ministry it becomes the 
basic document guiding the management of the enterprise in their future 
operations and for the evaluation of their performance.
Copies of this plan are also sent to other central bodies such as 
the Ministry of Trade (sales and import plans), the primary bank 
(financing plan) and the central planning office. It must be finally 
noted that during the implementation of these plans, the public 
enterprises had to prepare and transmit regularly (monthly and 
quarterly) reports to several central control agencies.
4.2 Contents of the Plan
The plan proposals differed from one sectoral ministry to another 
but as a rule they were no more than rough estimates concerning 
production, sales and procurement, manpower and finance (budgets). 
The production targets were limited to a small range of products often 
referred to as ’planned products’. At the end of the 1970’s, the 
number of these products was about 150 in the Ministry of Heavy 
Industry and 90 in the Ministry of Light Industries. Evaluation of 
enterprises’ performance by the sectoral ministries, when it is made at 
all, was based on a variety of partial, mainly physical, indicators. 
For example, the following performance indicators were used by the 
Ministry of Heavy Industry in the period prior to the 1980 reform:
181
1 The output targets of major products in physical terms.
2 Rates of capacity utilisation in each production unit. The 
achieved rates were compared not with the potential productive 
capacity but with what is possible under the specific Algerian 
conditions and constraints (eg. disruption of production due to 
shortages of material inputs, delays in bringing production to 
full capacity due to inexperienced labour. ... etc).
3 Labour productivity defined either as the ratio of gross output to 
total number of employees or gross value added per worker.
4 Cost stabilisation targets. The central authorities were seeking 
to keep major cost components within the budgeted targets. Here, 
particular attention was paid to expenditures on wages, material 
inputs and consumables.
5 The value added and net operating result. These two indicators
were computed at two levels: the enterprise and the operating
units.
It should be indicated that all these targets were calculated by 
enterprises for a period of three years: the last year, the year under
consideration and the coming year. Evaluation of the work bone within 
the enterprises was made by comparing the changes in the above- 
mentioned indicators over the three year period.
A wide range of more elaborate indicators were in use in the 
Ministry of Light Industries in the second half of the 1970Ts each 
covering one particular aspect of enterprise operations (18). 
However, only a few of these indicators can be considered of genuine 
importance. These are:
1 Output targets in physical terms.
2 Rates of capacity utilisation in each production unit.
3 Levels of inventory of output.
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4 Value of turnover (excluding taxes).
5 Value added.
6 The net operating result of each operating unit (after allocation
of the head office’s overhead expenses).
7 Cost stabilisation targets. There were several ratios in use
with each ratio dealing with one particular cost category. There 
was, for instance, an index for total spending in the enterprise 
and the component operating units which was expressed as a ratio 
of total costs to the volume of output. In the same way, there 
was a ratio for expenditures on manpower and training which is 
expressed as a ratio of total labour costs to the volume of 
production, and another for expenditures on raw materials and 
intermediate products ... etc.
Several comments can be made about these planning procedures and 
indicators. The first of these is that public enterprises were free 
to determine their production plans. In particular, the method of 
plan construction proceeded from the ’bottom to the top’, that is, 
enterprise managements were not handed down ready-made plans which they 
had to fulfil. It is in fact the enterprise who makes the proposals, 
carries out the calculations involved and transmits information about 
its own performance to the higher authorities. The instructions 
issued by the ministry of ’tutelle’ to these enterprises and the 
operating units derive from the information supplied to it by these 
very same units. Obviously, this enhances the authority of enterprise 
managers in planning in comparison to that of the central authorities. 
In fact, since they themselves lacked clearly defined criteria for 
decision-making and measurement of performance, the sectoral ministries 
were incapable of giving clearly stated guidelines to enterprises 
subordinated to them (19). Moreover, within the enterprise itself, it
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is in fact the production unit and not the head office which initiates 
the planning process by making proposals and requesting the means for 
achieving them.
Secondly, public enterprises could not construct consistent, let 
alone optimal, plans. The reasons for this failure are both external 
and internal to the enterprise. Among the internal factors is the 
large size of most public enterprises and the adverse effects this has 
on the ability of senior managements to coordinate and control complex 
systems. Obviously, successful corporate planning requires highly 
skilled managers to bring together the various parts of the 
organisation, a prerequisite which was lacking in the Algerian labour 
market at that time. Among the external factors which affect 
enterprises* planning operations was the rigidity of the Algerian 
supply system, delays in the acquisition of imported materials and 
spare parts.due to inflexible import regulations, the inability of 
managers to foresee with reasonable accuracy future financial flows, 
infrastructure bottlenecks.
These difficulties explain why most public enterprises tended to 
put forward plan proposals with no account taken of the external 
constraints which affect their operations (20). These constraints 
were regarded by enterprise managers as lying outside their competence. 
One illustration of this attitude is that when evaluating the 
performance of the enterprises and the production units, managers 
called for the elimination of the effects of all the factors 
’independent’ of the enterprise. Thus, for instance, changes in the 
prices of materials or of finished products in both world and local 
markets were considered as exogenous factors and their consequences had 
to be left out of account when evaluating enterprise performance (21). 
In the same manner, the failure of one producer enterprise under the
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authority of one sectoral ministry to supply the required inputs of a 
user enterprise under the authority of another ministry was also 
regarded as an external constraint which has to be taken into 
consideration when assessing the work of the enterprise.
This atmosphere is not at all conducive to the exercise of 
initiative in public enterprises and is largely responsible for the 
dilution of responsibility for their poor performance. From a 
managerial point of view, it can be argued that the success of public 
sector enterprises in the implementation of their plans depends 
precisely on the ability of managements to foresee and bring into 
control these external factors. While it is very difficult indeed to 
deny the negative effects these external constraints may have on the 
performance of the public enterprises, it would appear, however, that 
this argument has been somewhat exaggerated by managers and used by 
them quite often as an alibi to justify their poor performance. This 
assumption is quite plausible since it is very hard to distinguish in 
practice with any precision when the worsening of plan indices is due 
to the failure of enterprise management and when to factors outside its 
control. In addition, it is evident that the enterprises never cared 
to refer to ‘independent1 factors when these happened to act in their 
favour. It must finally be noted that up to 1978, the point of view 
defended by enterprise managers and workers gained the support of the 
political leadership.
A third feature of the planning procedures relates to the low 
reliability of the information transmitted by the enterprises to the 
higher authorities. In fact, the basic weakness of the planning 
procedure described above is the (implicit) unrealistic assumption 
about enterprise behaviour. The fact that the system of planning 
production operations was decentralised does not by itself assure that
185
the enterprises will be willing to give economically optimal answers 
within their information constraints. Indeed, there are grounds for 
expecting bigger information distortions as a result of the large 
powers granted to enterprises in production decisions^ When 
enterprise plans were elaborated, a strong conflict of interest 
developed between the production units and the enterprises as to 
whether output should be increased either by a better utilisation of 
the existing resources or by raising additional claims to the centrally 
allocated investment funds (22). Enterprises also tended to propose 
relatively low output targets and higher input targets, thus leading to 
the distortion of the input-output tables with consequent harmful 
effects on the national economy.
Worse still, since the performance of the enterprises and the 
production units was judged by the higher authorities on the basis of 
the information submitted to them by these very same units, the latter 
were induced to generate systematically distorted information to attain 
their objectives. Their reports were coloured and doctored in order to 
induce a favourable response from the higher authorities. In the 
process of constructing the plan there then exists a built-in mechanism 
which not only reduces the worth of the messages but also transmits 
them in accordance with the preferences of interests of the levels 
through which the messages pass. In many cases, enterprise 
managements were reluctant to transmit information concerning their 
operations to the central administration. One commentator explained 
this type of behaviour as follows: ”... it cannot be excluded that the
withholding of information by enterprise managements was part of their 
bargaining conditions with the central administration” (23). It 
should be noted, however, that the low reliability of information was 
also due to the absence of uniform work methods, management norms and
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data presentation procedures. It is clear, for instance, that the 
productivity ratios and norms set by the production units, which are as 
yet difficult to comprehend by the general management of the 
enterprise, must be completely incomprehensible to the staff of the 
parent ministry who are so remote from the production units. A report 
of the Ministry of Light Industry recognised this deficiency by stating 
that "the reliability of information which arrives at the Ministry is 
doubtful despite the various meetings, cross-checks and contacts. It 
has been observed that the data relating to one particular parameter 
differ from one service to another within the same enterprise” (24).
The inadequacy of the informational basis of the planning 
procedure has another aspect, namely the high costs of administration 
and compliance incurred in operating the control system. In view of 
the multiplicity of the central control agencies which come into 
contact with the public enterprises and to which the latter had to send 
regular information and reports, the control system produced heavy 
reporting requirements for the enterprises. In his study of 
management practices in five public industrial enterprises,A Mettouchi 
found as early as 1975 that "the environment of the enterprises asks 
for too much information about their operations, the exploitation and 
use of which for the purpose of monitoring and steering the enterprises 
is not always clear. This environment results in a duplication of 
reporting and renders the planning process cumbersome and inflexible 
instead of facilitating its adaption to the development of the socio­
economic productive structures" (25).
The fourth and last comment concerns the performance criteria 
used. It has been shown above that performance targets were 
calculated by the enterprises themselves and negotiated with the 
sectoral ministries. The issue which should be noted here, however,
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is that there is no indication as to which of the several performance 
indicators previously mentioned should be accorded priority by 
enterprise managers in case of a conflict between them (eg. conflict 
between increases in output levels and reduction of costs). This 
condition is necessarily not only for an adequate measurement of the 
quality of work done within the enterprise but also for guiding 
enterprise managements in their economic decisions. For instance, it 
becomes impossible to state what percentage of overall plan fulfilment 
is constituted by a 120 per cent fulfilment of the output plan, a 96 
per cent fulfilment of product-mix plan and a 90 per cent attainment of 
its cost stabilisation targets. To be able to determine the overall 
performance of the enterprise, one needs to know the marginal rates of 
substitution between these indices. This has never been estimated in 
Algeria.
The above analysis shows that the control system in the 1970’s was 
designed to enable the central authorities to follow up the activities 
of public sector enteprises, to check the honesty of their operations 
and to obtain the necessary information from them rather than to induce 
managements to pay close attention to cost and make rational choices. 
Indeed, lack of economic calculation in public enterprises was due to 
the fact that enterprise managers lacked clearly defined rules for 
choice and optimality calculations, which itself is due to an ambiguity 
in the definition of their objectives. The implication of this for 
enterprise management is that value criteria were neglected and 
replaced with physical indicators. The end result is that money 
played a predominantly neutral role in public sector enterprises and 
this in turn resulted in loss of efficiency on a larger scale. This 
deficiency explains also why the internal information systems adopted 
by most public enterprises were directed more towards external
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reporting to supervisers rather than internal decision-making and 
control purposes (26).
It is in fact a characteristic feature intrinsic of this type of 
planning and control that public enterprises had to bear no risk. 
Major management decisions had to be approved in advance by the central 
authorities, and thus responsibility was thrown on to the latter. In 
the case of failure, this approval served, not without reason, to 
exempt enterprise managements from all responsibility. Thus, while 
the market was eroded and distorted because it did not lead to results 
wanted by politicians, the production planning which replaced it was a 
dismal failure.
5 THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS OF ALGERIAN INDUSTRY
The control system described above failed to deal with several 
serious financial, economic and management problems which public 
enterprises and the national economy as a whole were facing. These 
distortions can be summarised under four main headings.
5.1 PoQr Financial Performance
Most public sector enterprises were making heavy financial 
deficits in spite of the various relief operations mounted by the 
state. The deficits and their causes will be examined in Chapter 
Eight.
5.2 Und§n=Utili§a£iQn q£ Productive Capacity
It has been estimated that Algerian industry was on average 
operating at 50 per cent of its potential in the 1970’s, and in many 
cases this figure may reach as low as 20 per cent. Table 1 below 
shows the rates of capacity utilisation in key industries on the eve of 
the 1980 economic reforms. In particular, the Table demonstrates the
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Table 1 Trends in capacity u£iii§afciQQ in Aiggriso cyclic §gstQr 
industry 11218=1280)
The branch 
of industry
Products Rates
1978
%
of capacity use 
1979 1980
- % %
Mining Iron ore 72 81 90
Phosphate 79 66 62
Zinc 24 - -
Iron & Steel Cast-iron 60 103 73
Welded tubes 72 100 82
Rings for concrete works 22 33 35
Metal containers, packs 62 80 80
Gas cylinder 60 70 76
Mechanical Metal constructions 51 50 52
engineering, Boiler works 33 - -
metallurgy, Tractors 75 98 84
electrical Industrial vehicles 90 100 100
industries Machine tools 25 — -
Cables 67 77 78
Batteries 100 — -
Accumulators 62 92 92
Construction Cement 36 52 49
materials Bricks & tiles 63 52 49
Ceramics 85 — -
Glass 103 36 -
Food Flour & semolina 103 99 84
processing Refined sugar 55 49 74
Cooking oils 83 75 83
Textiles & Yarn 76 81 72
leather Woven (fabric) 85 — -
Shoes 57 102 100
Wood & Paper Woodwork 95 - -
Printing paper 44 49 47
Packing paper & cartons 45 - -
Chemical Fertilisers 41 40 40
industries Paints 90 92 99
Detergents 76 78 73
Ethylene 30 —
Source: Bouzidi, A,"Questions ActugUgg d§ la PlanificatiQn Alggcignng",
ENAL/ENAP, 1984 Algiers, pp 60-61.
wide variations in capacity use over time, a pattern which has become a 
striking feature of Algerian industry in recent years.
There were many reasons for the widespread under-utilisation of 
production capacity. First, the time required to bring the newly 
installed plans into full operation has been usually long in Algeria
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due to the lack of industrial experience, technical skills and the 
hostility of the environment in which these imported, high technology 
factories were transplanted. Excess capacity has also been due to 
poor investment decisions. It is often the case that the new project 
is located too far from its raw material base or from water sources 
resulting in frequent disruptions of production. Another cause of the 
excess of capacity is the overestimation of demand at the initial 
stages of development of the project. Finally, breakdowns due to 
inadequate maintenance of machinery, shortages of spare parts and 
material inputs, which are frequently imported from remote foreign 
markets, have also been responsible for the sharp variations in the use 
of productive capacity over time.
5.3 Low Factor Productivity gnd Growth
There seems to be a consensus among Algerian policy makers and 
academics that the performance of public industrial enterprises in
terms of productivity and growth were well below expectations 
considering the amplitude of the investment effort in this sector. 
Evidence on the productivity of labour and capital in public sector 
industry, defined respectively as the average value added per man and 
average value added per unit of capital, is summarised in Table 2.
It can be seen from the Table that with the exception of mining 
and energy, labour productivity in public sector industry was on 
average negative between 1967 and 1982. What is striking in these 
figures is that the low productivity levels were not limited to those 
industries customarily known as capital-intensive (eg steel, metal 
constructions, machine-tool, electronics) which require high technical 
skills and special training which are usually scarce in a developing 
country, but extend also to small and medium-sized industries (leather
191
Table 2 Lafesyc and capital BCQduefciiufcy in Algerian industry 0262= 
12§2)
Branch of industry Labour
productivity
Productivity 
of capital
Water & energy
Mining & clay works
Steel, metal, mechanical & 
electrical industries
Building materials
Chemistry & rubber
Wood & paper
Food processing
Textiles
Leather & skin
6.1
0.5
-2.5
• 1.6
1.2
2.0
3.6
10.2
- 12.1
-26.3
-17.3
- 22.3 
-13.0 
-  0.8
8.4
Source: Centre National d'Etudes et d’Analyses pour la Planification
(CENEAP), "Emploi et Prgductiyitg en Alg^cie”, September 
1985, Algiers.
and skin, food processing, textiles). The Table also indicates that 
the situation is even worse for the productivity of capital which was 
on average negative over the same period. Paradoxically, the 
efficiency of capital reaches its lowest levels in such basic and high 
priority branches of industry as metal processing, machine rool, 
mechanical engineering, electrical engineering and electronics (-26.3), 
in rubber and petrochemical industries (-18.9), and in a large section 
of light manufacturing (-22.3 wood and paper, -17.3 building materials) 
which received the bulk of government investment funds in the 1970fs. 
This paradox explains the tremendous difficulties faced by the Algerian 
public industrial enterprises in acquiring and utilising efficiently 
the new production technologies.
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The causes of the low productivity of factor inputs in a 
developing country like Algeria are not far to seek: lack of
industrial experience and shortage of technical skills, deficient 
organisation of production, inadequate maintenance of plant and 
machinery, excessive overmanning, deficient organisation of work, 
inadequate training, weak incentives to management and workers, 
managerial inefficiency, unreliability of local sources of supply, 
inadequate foreign exchange allocations, bureaucratic inertia, 
inadequate infrastructure, inadequate living conditions for the work 
force (inadequate housing conditions, high cost of living, shortage of 
basic consumer goods and transport facilities) which in turn result in 
high turnover, absenteeism and labour unrest.
5.4 Market Cqygrage
Despite Algeria’s heavy spending in industry for more than a 
decade, the domestic industrial output could not keep pace with the 
rapid growth of demand in the local market. This is true for almost 
all types of industrial goods. Thus, whereas in 1967 the domestic 
industrial output covered 48 per cent of Algeria's needs, this figure 
fell to 38.9 per cent in 1973, 26.4 per cent in 1974 and 24 per cent in 
1977 (27). Undoubtedly, the inability of industry to meet the growing 
complex and highly diversified local needs has largely contributed to 
the severe pressures in the domestic market for these products and 
induced an increase in the overall import bill to fill the deficit.
Having surveyed the evidence related to economic and financial 
performance, the next step is to examine the link between the 
performance of public sector enterprises and the system of planning and 
control described earlier in this Chapter. In fact, the system of 
regulating production operations by predominantly administrative means
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had several other economic and management defects. Broadly speaking, 
these defects can be attributed to weaknesses inherent in two key 
components of the planning and control mechanisms used in the 1970’s: 
the price system and performance indicators.
5.5 The Effects ef the Distorted Ecice System
The common practice of fixing the price of public enterprises’ 
output below cost had the disadvantage of neutralising the effect of 
value magnitudes on enterprise performance and managerial decisions. 
In particular, public enterprises were making heavy financial operating 
deficits through no fault of their own. These deficits had to be 
borne by the state budget since managements could no longer be held 
responsible for the poor financial performance of their enterprises. 
It had also the effect of introducing cross-subsidisation on a large 
scale into the national economy. The failure of the centrally-fixed 
prices to reflect market conditions produced serious adverse effects. 
Shortages of consumer goods became persistent and endemic. Shortages 
extended from food to many other consumption goods in daily use, 
against a backgroound of unsatisfied demand for durables, from housing 
to furniture and motor cars. These shortages have had other adverse 
consequences such as the ineffectiveness of monetary incentives, the 
indiscriminate purchase and hoarding of any goods available. This has 
produced an inefficient distribution of goods and has caused shortages 
even of those goods available in quantities normally sufficient to 
satisfy population needs. There was a rapid growth of black or ’grey’ 
markets in which deficit goods were obtained at a higher price or 
through ’connections’ or corruption.
Inevitably, consumption scarcities spilled over into the supply of 
materials and intermediate products to enterprises, especially for
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imported inputs. Faced with the general conditions of shortage, 
public enterprise managers adopted three main techniques to meet their 
supply needs. Firstly, firms, just like consumers, hoarded 
inventories of materials which became too high and badly distributed. 
While some public enterprises were facing serious problems in the 
management of their excessive inventories, in others inventory levels 
were not sufficient to sustain continued production levels in many 
sectors. This is especially true of construction materials, spare 
parts, machinery and agricultural products subject to seasonal 
fluctuations. A second response was to use hard currency to import 
from abroad. The discussion in Chapter Five on the planning of 
imports has shown the amplitude of this phenomenon. Thirdly, 
enterprises switched to producing the inputs themselves. The result 
of this was an unjustifiably high degree of vertical integration and 
the duplication of production on a small scale on the shortage goods 
(28). The freezing of prices of equipment and intermediate inputs 
below cost over a long period of time also led to excessive and 
wasteful use of these goods by enterprises. In sum, it had become 
increasingly evident in the decade prior to the reform that the system 
of rigid prices, serving primarily as accounting devices and 
instruments of social and political policy, was producing serious 
misallocations of resources.
Another problem closely related to the pricing issue has been the 
difficulty of establishing direct trade links between enterprises 
belonging to different sectors. Research carried out in this 
particular area indicates that ”... within the state sector, one notes 
the insignificance of exchanges taking place between enterprises 
subordinated to different sponsoring bodies. There is every reason to 
believe that the administrative problems involved in these exchanges
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are an important handicap to the development of speedy and direct 
relationships11 <29). In fact most Algerian enterprises are concerned 
to reduce the risks of obtaining regular supplies by manufacturing them 
themselves, often at a high cost, instead of relying on outside 
suppliers and subcontractors who could provide the supplies more 
cheaply, is a factor which has inhibited the growth of inter-enterprise 
links. Experience has also shown that the inter-enterprise conflicts 
over such important matters as prices, quality, delivery schedules and 
technical specifications of products (or services) were significant 
and could not be easily solved by administrative means (through special 
arbitration committees).
Furthermore, since the majority of Algerian public enterprises 
enjoyed virtually a monopoly position in production, imports and 
distribution of a wide range of products used by other enterprises and 
final consumers, they tended to neglect user demand. Most public 
enterprises did not know their markets as no market research studies 
and consumer surveys were carried out, and therefore tended to be 
production-oriented rather than market-oriented. The implication is 
that little attention was paid to the formation, development and 
organisation of the markets (30).
In fact, many mistakes had been made in the 1970fs with respect to 
both the size and structure of output precisely because of the absence 
of relevant market research studies. This problem is particularly 
serious for those plants in which the existing production capacity is 
not easily convertible. At the Berrouaghia complex, for instance, 
large stocks of unsaleable vans and water pumps had been accumulating 
for many years simply because these products were technically designed 
according to standards not in general use in the local market (31). 
In the textile industry, "the consumer often does not find the goods he
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wants. What is offered to him is generally of poor quality, expensive 
and does not correspond to his taste or to fashion trends” (32). In a 
third case, while mineral water is consumed in large quantities in the 
hot summer season, only small quantities are offered for sale during 
this period (33).
Public enterprises’ indifference to users’ preferences and quality 
considerations is a natural product of the administrative management 
system itself and the monopoly position of most Algerian public 
enterprises. In effect, lacking an appropriate incentive system, 
public enterprises could not be put under any pressure to produce high 
quality products, adjust quickly to market demand and develop after­
sales services to customers. Deterioration of the marketing 
efficiency in public sector enterprises is closely related to the 
deficient success indicator system. In particular, the central 
planners1 emphasis on, and the high priority they give to, physical 
growth of output and the expansion of productive capacity in evaluating 
the success of enterprise performance, encouraged production for its 
own sake irrespective of user demand. Clearly as long as the primary 
objective of management is to strain to meet targets set in terms of 
physical quantities, adjustment to market requirements will suffer.
5.6 The Effects of Inadequate Performance Indicators
Performance indicators are the central part of any management 
formula which defines the principles on which a given enterprise 
operates. Performance indicators usually perform four main functions 
in a public enterprise (34):
(a) informs the centre about the performance of the enterprise
(b) a basis for decision-making within the enterprise
(c) a basis for rewarding management and workers
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(d) a basis for regulating the flow of resources to the enterprise.
Unfortunately, the link between these functions and performance 
could not be established in Algerian public enterprises in the period 
prior to the reform. One very important reason for this was the 
ambiguity in the definition of enterprise objectives and the inadequcy 
of the success indicator system in operation. This problem means that 
most public enterprises lacked appropriate effective operating 
mechanisms. It has been shown earlier that under the Algerian 
conditions profit could not be used as the main indicator of 
performance. However, nothing has replaced it since the sectoral 
ministries were incapable of devising production norms, financial and 
management targets which would effectively reflect the real productive 
potential of the production units and force managements to use the 
resources at their disposal efficiently.
The first consequence of the absence of clearly specified 
performance criteria in the 1970’s was the inability of Algerian 
authorities to measure the performance of the public industrial 
enterprises and to determine whether the resources at their disposal 
were economically utilised. Indeed, the central authorities lost 
control over enterprise operations.
Another consequence of the lack of effective operating mechanisms 
was the extension of bureaucracy into public sector industry. 
Decisions at the enterprise level were rarely taken in the 
entrepreneurial spirit. This atmosphere was not at all conducive to 
the exercise of initiative. With prices commonly determined elsewhere 
and the output-mix and quantity constrained by the existing equipment, 
managerial discretion could make itself felt primarily in the area of 
cutting costs. But given the employment structure of public 
enterprises, the first cost to be cut was labour. This, however, was
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virtually impossible because of the emphasis on a fair deal to workers 
and harmonious labour-management relations.
Moreover, the central planners’ marked emphasis in the 1970's on 
physical growth of output introduced a number of problems. The main 
cause of these problems resides in the fact that partial physical 
indicators do not reflect the quality of enterprise performance 
correctly. Indeed, many of these physical indicators operated in ways 
which caused management to deviate from the pursuit of efficiency, and 
largely defeated their own ends. The priority given to the growth of 
output in physical terms in the evaluation of enterprise performance 
produced impressive results on paper in the form of high rates of 
(quantitative) growth, but concealed the social utility of the output 
and the social cost at which it was being attained. Plans in physical 
terms were incapable of reflecting charp changes in product complexity, 
quality or changes in manufacturing costs or relative demand and 
scarcities. In the 1970’s, public enterprises were under no pressure 
to rationalise their operations and reduce costs. The Ministry of 
Finance and the banks in particular have been critical of public 
industrial enterprises' indifference towards their own financial 
viability. Their continuing and accumulated operating deficits and 
high debt portfolios with the banks have frequently been presented in 
support of this argument. Thus, the Minister of Finance declared in a 
conference held with enterprise and bank managers in 1981 that "The 
main cause of the present production situation is the adoption of 
certain methods of management marked by the absence of a normative 
framework applicable to, and binding for, all economic partners, the 
absence of rigour and reversion to easy solutions" (35).
The absence of a success indicator system affected the central 
authorities* ability to regulate the flow of resources to public
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enterprises. On the one hand, public enterprises were notorious for 
hoarding labour well in excess of their actual needs, but there was 
nothing that the central authorities could do about this. The problem 
of overmanning in public sector enterprises has been examined on 
several occasions in this study and need not be repeated here. It may 
be sufficient to note the negative effects a high wage bill may have 
not only on the finance of the enterprise in question but also on the 
level (and distribution of) incomes at the national level and the 
inflationary pressures which may follow from this especially if wages 
are not linked to the growth in labour productivity. The following 
section will focus attention on the financing of the enterprises1 
current operations and the friction and conflict with the banking 
system which this produced.
In Algeria the flow of funds to public enterprises in the pre­
reform period were not determined by reference to their profitability 
but on the basis of the ’real needs’ of these enterprises as determined 
in their production plans. The problem of financing an enterprise’s 
needs for working capital is to allow the enterprise sufficient funds 
to cover requirements but not to exceed them so as to prevent 
accumulation of inventories and possible deviations from the plans. 
However, since the flow of funds to enterprises were by no means 
related to their financial performance there arose the complex problem 
of how to stimulate managers to keep as much working capital as 
necessary for efficient operation, but no more. This issue is at the 
heart of the serious and never-ending conflicts between public 
enterprises and the banking system. Under the financial system of the 
1970’s, the banks found themselves involved in trying to make detailed 
decisions as to just what constitutes legitimate working capital 
requirements for individual enterprises. This type of control faced
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several difficulties: the process was time-consuming, and banks often
lacked the information and the business expertise to know just what 
levels were reasonable. An official document issued in 1978 
summarised these difficulties as follows: "Consequently, the control
procedures used by banks are deadly slow and cumbersome, and the role 
of banks is distorted leading to the establishment of a control system 
which gives precedence to the compliance with administrative rules 
rather than to the financial efficiency of enterprises’ operations” 
(36). Moreover, it has been argued by enterprise managers that the 
banks frequently determined the funds to be granted to enterprises on 
the basis of their own constraints and paid little attention to the 
real needs of enterprises. Furthermore, enterprise managers 
complained about the banks’ refusal to process their payment orders and 
their repeated threats to freeze their accounts (37).
Experience has particularly shown that despite the various a 
priori checks and controls exercised by banks over enterprises, they 
encountered many difficulties in their efforts to control working 
capital. Firstly, by introducing the ’production plan* in 1970, the 
Algerian authorities were hoping to relate financing to production. 
But in fact the financing plan frequently bore little relationship to 
the production plan. In other words, fulfilment by the enterprise of 
its production plan in physical terms did not necessarily lead to the 
fulfilment of its financing plan. The latter is really no more than a 
forecast of the enterprise’s future incomes and expenditures which may 
be determined by factors independent of the production operations 
relating to the year under consideration such as the repayment of 
overdue loans contracted in the past, the financing of ’unplanned* 
minor investments from enterprises’ own funds (the so-called ’pirate’ 
investments), and the customers readiness to pay for their purchases in
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due time.
Secondly, the failure of the central authorities to control 
working capital adequately is attributable to the acute financial 
problems faced by most public enterprises (38). Their considerable 
financial deficits, which had been accumulating over the years resulted 
in a massive increase in their working capital requirements which in 
turn, and in the last resort, had to be borne by the state budget. 
Most public industrial enterprises were unable to reimburse their 
outstanding banks loans. Chapter Eight will examine in more detail 
the size and structure of these debts. What needs mentioning here, 
however, is that the banks were not empowered in the pre-reform period 
to refrain from extending credit to an enterprise which failed to repay 
its previous loans on schedule. Thus, if a public enterprise is 
facing serious financial troubles, then the bank is instructed to grant 
the enterprise in question further loans to allow it to carry out its 
commitments with foreign suppliers, settle its overdue taxes and pay 
wages and salaries to its employees. This is so because public 
enterprises could not be declared bankrupt (39). In fact, the 
political, social and economic costs involved in closing down 
production activities in a large section of Algerian industry were 
simply too high to be afforded by the central planners and policy 
makers. This problem was temporarily overcome by the availability of 
a considerable economic rent formed by oil and gas revenues and by the 
adoption of inflationary financing policies.
Thirdly, public enterprises often used their own funds in an non- 
optimal way by investing them in stocks of materials and spare parts to 
an excessive degree. Enterprises set the highest norms possible for 
inventories of materials. There was very little that the bank could 
do about these widespread practices basically because of its lack of
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knowledge of an enterprise’s internal requirements. In the second 
place, the fact that the majority of public enterprises failed to 
receive payment from their customers (especially those of the public 
sector) increased considerably their working capital requirements, 
which had to be ultimated covered by new banks loans. Thus, the bank 
lost control over the firm’s activity. It finances indirectly what it 
refuses to finance directly since the activity is then financed by 
suppliers who, in turn, seek credit from the bank.
Finally, given the deficiency of the success indicator system it 
was not possible to introduce adequate incentive schemes in public 
sector enterprises. This important issue and its implications will be 
examined in more detail in Chapter Eight.
6 CONCLUSION
Attempt has been made in this Chapter to show that in the pre­
reform period the Algerian central authorities lacked an appropriate 
framework for controlling the current operations of enterprises. The 
market was eroded and distorted because it did not lead to results 
desired by ideologists. Nothing, however, was put in its place, and 
the planning of production was officially recognised to have been a 
dismal failure. The financial and economic instruments of control 
were neglected and replaced with cumbersome and inflexible 
administrative controls. This type of control led to the development 
of a permanent conflict of interest between public enterprises and the 
central administration leading to mutual recrimination and mistrust. 
At the same time, the administrative methods of planning and control 
gradually produced serious macro and micro-economic disturbances. In 
particular, they failed to induce enterprises to operate efficiently 
and to pursue policies which were optimal from the standpoint of the 
national economy.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
REGULATION OF WAGES AND INCENTIVES IN PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
1 INTRODUCTION
Another area in which a strong conflict of interest developed
between the state and public enterprises in the pre-reform period is
wages and incentives. Two striking features characterised the wage
and income scene in Algeria in the 1970Ts. The first was the absence
of a national salary grid applicable to all public sector enterprises.
In fact, public enterprises were more or less free in their manpower
and wage policies restricted only by the general guidelines addressed
to them by the relevant sectoral ministries. Each public enterprise
had its own remuneration system (which is often part of a wider sector
wage system). Thus the central planners had no control over the wages
and benefits distributed in public sector enterprises. The second
feature is that the use of wages and incentive schemes as natural
economic levers for stimulating worker effort has been the weakest
aspect of industrial management in Algeria. The central authorities
lacked an appropriate control framework to guide, managements in their
manpower decisions and force them to use the labour force rationally,
and wages and incentives in public enterprises were not related to the 
quality and quantity of work and its importance to the society.
There was, therefore, a real crisis in the organisation and 
management of the labour force in Algerian industry. This Chapter 
will try to examine some of the symptoms of this crisis and discuss 
their implications.
2 WAGES A m  SALARIES
Over the last 15 years, perhaps the most complex and least
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successful aspect of industrial management has been the effort to 
change the behavioural patterns of enterprise managers and labour. 
Wages are intimately linked with labour productivity. Motivating a 
greater degree of cooperation and productivity is rooted, however, not 
only in industrial organisation but also in the larger scale and 
cultural environment. This means that the effective rationalisation 
of the methods of management extends beyond the enterprise particularly 
with respect to labour.
Despite several official declaration of intent aiming to unify the 
wages paid in all public sector enterprises in a national salary grid 
and to relate wages to the quality and quantity of work (1), in 
practice very little was done by the central administration before 
1978. The central planners1 intervention in this sensitive area was 
restricted to the freezing of wages and other wage-related benefits in 
some sectors of the economy and legislation on wage increases in 
others. The role of the central administration was also confined to 
decisions relating to the definition of minimum (guaranteed) wage rates 
in the public sector economy (2). This means that up to 1978 there 
was no national policy on wages and incentives in the public sector.
Several reasons account for the delay in the introduction of a 
national wage policy. It should first be noted that prior to 1978, 
labour relations, and wage matters in particular, were dealt with in a 
rather populist’ manner emphasising - almost exclusively - propaganda 
and political mobilisation of the labour force. The political leaders 
and their supporters in the public sector were most concerned with 
achieving political stability, consensus through worker participation 
schemes and social peace with the trade unions (UGTA) rather than the 
most efficient organisation of production and improvements in labour 
productivity through appropriate wage and incentive systems. It was
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assumed that in a socialist enterprise the workers would rid themselves 
of greed and acquisitive ambitions, and instead they would be 
responding only to superior motives so that there would be complete 
identification of personal and socialist interest. According to this 
conception, the gulf between white-collar and blue-collar workers and 
between managerial and operative workers would disappear. The 
reality, however, turned out to be at variance with this idealistic 
view. The flaw in this type of thinking is that in the redistribution 
of national economic product equity is identified with the equality of 
incomes and not with the remuneration according to the quality and 
quantity of work and its importance to society.
A second reason is that the central planners lost control over the 
incomes distributed by public sector enterprises and therefore it was 
impossible for them to know the exact remuneration levels in the 
various branches of the economy. The technical complexities involved 
in the elaboration of a national salary scale applicable to a very 
large and heterogenous public sector (agriculture, industry, civil 
service, service industry ... etc) was another factor. The fourth 
reason is related to the existence of an active private sector which 
escaped state control entirely. Undoubtedly, the level of incomes and 
salaries paid in the private sector has an impact on the level and 
structure of wages in the public sector. Obviously, this impact 
should be closely studied and accounted for when envisaging the 
elaboration of a national wage policy. Unfortunately, the central 
authorities lacked even the basic information about the private sector.
The last, but not the least, important reason is intimately 
related to the extensive growth strategy adopted with its emphasis on 
quantitative sources of growth. Under this strategy, enterprise 
managers were not required or under any pressure to rationalise their
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labour decisions and use wages and incentives as economic levers for 
achieving higher productivity levels. Instead, their objective was to 
recruit as many workers as possible to fight unemployment.
2.1 Wage Distortions
The absence of appropriate mechanisms for controlling the level of 
remuneration in the public sector economy coupled with the massive 
investment carried out in the 1970's produced several distortions and 
disequilibria in the national economy.
One important problem was the emergence of a wide differentiation 
of wages within the public sector economy. These disparities in the 
earnings from work were found to exist not only between the various 
branches of the economy but also within the same branch. Various 
studies and surveys carried out in this particular area between 1974 
and 1980 pinpointed this serious problem (3). A survey carried out by 
the Ministry of Labour in 1978 in a sample of 40 production units 
provided empirical evidence about wage inequalities in the public 
sector. Some of the findings of this study are summarised in Table 1 
which depicts the range of average monthly wage earnings of various 
skill-categories in the production units investigated. The Table 
indicates that the monthly wage earnings within each skill-category 
varied greatly from one enterprise to another. It can be easily seen 
from the Table that the monthly salary of 2500 AD is earned by workers 
and employees belonging to the first five skill categories at the same 
time (from non-qualified to highly qualified workersand technicians). 
This meant that while the salary of 2500 AD may be earned by a highly 
qualified technician in one public enterprise this very same salary may 
be offered to a non-qualified workers in another public enterprise. 
The Table shows also that the average salary of a qualified worker
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employed in an enterprise paying high rise salaries would be roughly
Table 1 The range of average Irngpthlyl wage earnings of vaciQUg skill 
categories in 1218 iin AD).
Average wage 
in lowest wage 
bracket 
(1)
Average wage (2)/(1) 
in highest wage 
bracket 
(2)
Non-qualified workers 
Semi-qualified workers 
Qualified workers 
Clerical & highly qualified 
workers
Technicians & controllers 
Highly-skilled technicians 
a cadres
1062
1315
1457
1667
2167
3400
2630
3041
3525
4527
4615
6700
2.476
2.313
3.535
2.716
2.130
1.970
Source: Hadj Lazib, R, ”Le Sygtgme des Salaires" in la Revue du
CENEAP, no 6, Mars 1986, Algiers, p 63.
3.5 times higher than his salary if he were employed in another 
enterprise offering low wages.
Wage inequalities emerged also between the various sectors of the 
economy. The average monthly wages paid in the major sectors were as 
follows in the mid-1970’s (in AD)
- Agriculture 720
- Construction works 1177
- Local agencies 1211
- Civil service 1465
- Industry 1536
- Finance & services 1665
It should be noted that these overall figures represent the 
average salaries in each sector and therefore do not reflect the actual 
differences between the wage earnings of individual workers which are 
much bigger. It was found, for example, that the monthly wage of a
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manual worker varied from 459 AD in the textile industry to 1723 AD in 
the service industries. Many other absurd cases have also been quoted 
in the economic literature to illustrate the chaos which characterised 
the wage scene in Algeria in the 1970fs, eg. the mine worker who earned 
practically half the salary of a typist in a general office 
whose salary, in turn, was three times the salary of an agricultural 
worker (4).
Even in public industry in which a sectoral salary grid 
was introduced in the early 1970's, wide wage differentials existed 
between industrial enterprises. In some branches of industry, wages 
were reported to have varied according to the following 
proportions: (5)
Hydro-carbon sector 1 to 18
Extractive industries 1 to 8
Textiles 1 to 13
Steel industry 1 to 15
It is very important to note that the
earnings bore little relationship with the quality and quantity of work 
provided by each individual worker but were mainly due to the absence 
of a uniform wage system for the whole public sector economy.
The aforementioned wage distortions were accompanied by a number 
of problems which had a negative effect on labour productivity. The 
first was the negative impact of the wide wage disparities on worker 
mobility. Undoubtedly, the wage disparities between sectors, branches 
and even enterprises explain the high rate of worker mobility in the 
Algerian economy. It is a well established fact that most Algerian 
public enterprises suffered from the departure in great numbers of 
technical workers and qualified personnel to other enterprises in 
search of better pay and other wage-related benefits. For instance,
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in the CVI complex (industrial vehicles) near Algiers, the average rate 
of turnover was estimated at roughly 20 per cent between 1977 and 1980
(6). In heavy industry, it was estimated that labour turnover varied 
on average between 10 and 12 percent. Furthermore, it has been 
observed that more and more technical workers who had acquired 
considerable experience and special skills - at a high training cost - 
in public sector enterprises simply quit either to establish their own 
businesses or were attracted by better job prospects in the private 
sector. The wage disparity factor also explains why certain rich and 
dominant economic sectors and enterprises attracted the most qualified 
personnel to the detriment of others leading to disproportions which 
had serious economic consequences at the national level. Thus, 
SONATRACH, the giant oil company, alone employed some 36 percent of the 
country’s total popules of cadres in 1977. It also accounted for 
about 30 percent of the country’s technicians and qualified workforce 
in the same year (7).
Finally, it should be noted that these intra and inter-enterprise 
inequalities extended well beyond the sphere of incomes in cash to 
include several other forms of economic, social and cultural advantages 
and benefits (incomes in kind) to employees such as access to housing, 
the provision of consumer goods in short supply in the local market in 
special worker cooperatives, the acquisition of cars, holidays for 
workers’ children and families.
A second consequence of the distorted wage system was inflation. 
Serious inflationary pressures resulted from the growth of wages in the 
public sector not matched by similar increases in labour productivity. 
The central authorities were unable to regulate the size and structure 
of the wage funds of most public enterprises. In fact, the size of 
the wage fund in the majority of public enterprises was determined
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independently of the level of output or labour productivity. This led 
to excessive spending on wages in most public sector undertakings. 
Over-expenditure on wages, in turn, resulted in enormous pressures on 
the consumer market undermining its balance. This problem was further 
aggravated by the intensive investment effort in the public sector over 
the period 1970-1980. In fact, the widening of the investment 
’front1, which involved a considerable increase in expenditure on 
wages, was not always accompanied by similar increases in production 
and productivity levels because of the long delays in the installation 
of investment projects and widespread under-utilisation of plant and 
machinery. It is estimated that while wage earnings in the public 
sector (excluding the hydrocarbon sector) grew in global terms by a 
factor of 4.07 between 1970 and 1980 output increased only by a factor 
of 3.69 over the same period (8).
It is clear, however, that these overall figures mask the 
considerable disparities which existed between the various sectors of 
the economy and between workers with different skills. Indeed, there 
is evidence which indicates that the real wages of some worker 
categories started to deteriorate as from 1974. Table 2 below 
illustrates the trend in consumer prices and wages of major worker 
categories over the period 1970-1977. As shown in the Table, the most 
highly skilled and qualified workers were the most hit by inflation 
since their purchasing power started to fall behind as from 1974. 
These figures must be interpreted with special care since they were 
constructed on the basis of official prices which may depart quite 
considerably from actual market prices. In particular, the official 
price index does not take account of the widespread shortages of 
consumer goods and services, especially housing and transport, in the 
local market and the purchase of shortage goods at higher prices in the
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black market. It overlooks also the time spent in the search for
these goods or in the waiting lines. Obviously, the deterioration
Table 2 Price and wage changes in Algeria between 12ZQ-19ZZ
Skill category
1970-1973
(%)
1974-1976
(%)
1970-1977
i%)
General price index +20.4 +38.0 +67.0
Minimum basic wage +27.2 +82.5 +130.0
Non-qualified workers +16.4 +67.0 +95.0
Semi-qualified workers +23.1 +50.0 +87.0
Qualified workers +31.0 +38.0 +81.0
Highly-qualified workers +25.0 +20.0 +50.0
Source: Secretariat d’Etat au Plan, quoted by Benachenhou, R in
" L I E x r i e n c  e AlgeVienne de Elanification et de 
Dgveloppement11, OPU, 1983, Algiers, p 67.
of the purchasing power of these qualified and highly qualified 
employees is very damaging to their morale and does not encourage a 
major expansion of productivity through increases of work effort. 
This is especially true considering the fact that this category of the 
labour force is in short supply in Algeria.
The third aspect of the wage distortions which prevailed in the 
pre-reform period is the ’bureaucratisation1 and inconsistency of the 
wage system. This arose from the fact that the wages paid to workers 
and employees were divorced from the results of their work. Wages 
were distributed on the basis of subjective and ill-defined criteria 
and with reference to the post the worker or employee occupied in the 
established management structure within the enterprise and not 
according to objective and measurable work norms (personal effort, risk 
involved, experience, qualification, responsibility, seniority).
Under these circumstances, wages also lost much of their incentive 
function. In effect, the wages, promotion and social status of
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managers did not so much depend on the economic and financial results 
of the production units they were running as on their authority within 
the command hierarchy of enterprises and their loyalty to those who 
appointed them. Moreover, managers carried out mainly administrative 
functions which, considering the institutional set-up in which they 
operated, were given priority and consequently reflected high status 
and prestige. The implications of this state of affairs are not hard 
to find: neglect of normal managerial tasks and responsibilities,
devaluation of creative and productive work, development of a negative 
attitude towards work and indiscipline. In particular, engineers and 
technical workers who were badly needed in the production workshops and 
maintenance units sought promotion to intermediate and higher 
administrative levels where prestige was higher and the chances of 
being promoted more rapidly much greater (9). This meant the 
recruitment of new workers to replace them. It also led to the 
inflation of administrative personnel in public enterprises.
Finally, the absence of appropriate mechanisms for regulating the 
flow of manpower resources to public enterprises and especially the 
fact that the level and structure of their wage funds were disconnected 
from their performance, led to managements recruiting armies of 
redundant workers and neglecting the adverse effects of such a policy 
on their finances and on the national economy.
3 ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO EMPLOYEES
In contrast to the basic salary which is, on the whole, not 
subject to variation in order to ensure a certain minimum stability of 
the household budgets, the term Economic incentives' usually refers to 
the variable part of a worker's pay. They comprise all sorts of 
bonuses and premiums paid to employees including any profit-sharing
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arrangements. This definition assumes that, at least in theory, the 
variable part of remuneration is related to performance. In 
particular, economic incentives are designed to motivate people to 
realise a given objective. As will be shown in the following 
sections, although this variable part of the workers1 pay existed in 
most Algerian public enterprises and a substantial proportion of their 
wage bills was allocated to it, it failed under the Algerian 
institutional set-up to accomplish its stimulating role. A close look 
at the incentive systems adopted by public enterprises in the 1970’s 
permits the identification of two types of material incentives: the
premium systems and the profit-sharing scheme.
3.1 The Premium Systems
It may be worthwhile noting that in contrast to the profit-sharing 
scheme, public enterprises had up to 1978 large powers in their premium 
policies. With the exception of some branches of industry, the 
central planners’ intervention in the determination of the size and 
structure of the bonus funds of public enterprises was more apparent 
than real. There were as many systems of reward as enterprises. 
Each public enterprise worked out its own bonus system to attract the 
labour force it needed.
Two salient features characterised the bonus payments in public 
sector enterprises in the pre-reform period. The first is the 
multitude of bonuses and premium allowances paid to the workers and 
employees in the public sector. It is estimated that the number of 
premiums, which carried a variety of names (application, technicality, 
risk, dirt, heat, cold, productivity, remoteness, housing and 
transport, responsibility ... etc), could number as many as 35 in some 
public enterprises (10). The second feature of these premium payments 
is their weak inter-relationship with the employee’s performance.
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Indeed, with the exception perhaps of few enterprises in industry, the 
cases in which bonuses were related to the quality and quantity of 
effort provided by employees (either collectively or individually) were 
very rare indeed. For instance, it has been observed in some public 
enterprises that technicality' premiums, initially designed to reward 
workers with high technical skills, were paid to manual workers with no 
technical qualifications. It has also been found that 'productivity' 
bonuses were granted to workers while they were off work on sickness 
leave or on holidays (11).
The actual amount of these premiums naturally varied from one 
enterprise to another and between workers of the same enterprise but it 
could at times be considerable. Thus, premium payments represented in 
1975 40 percent of the wage fund of the oil company, SONATRACH, 20 and 
16 percent of the wage funds of SONITEX (textile) and SNTA (tobacco) 
respectively (12). In the steel industry they were estimated at 25 
percent in 1979.
Premium payments varied also from one employee to another within 
the same enterprise since they were as a rule determined with reference 
to their basic salaries. It seems that by and large the 
administrative personnel, managers and qualified workers were the first 
to benefit from these premiums. Thus, in SNLB (wood and furniture), 
for example, a qualified cadre with managerial responsibilities was 
paid a 'responsibility' premium which represented 70 percent of his 
monthly salary and a bonus to cover housing and transport expenses 
varying between 640 and 770 AD (the equivalent to one month's wage of a 
qualified worker). For a qualified worker (agent de maitrise) these 
figures would fall to 27 percent and 180 AD respectively. As for 
manual workers these types of premiums were reported to have been quite 
insignificant (13).
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Another example of the disparities in premium earnings in public 
enterprises is SONIPEC (shoes and leather products) where a (monthly) 
lump-sum premium, called indemnite fQEfaifcai££ de function alone 
represented the wage earnings of a semi-qualified (ouvrier specialise) 
worker over a three-month period. These examples indicate why 
some economists have suggested that income differentiations in 
public sector industry were due primarily to the existence of 
different premium systems in public enterprises and to their specific 
growth circumstances rather than to significant differences in basic 
wages (14).
Only the Ministry of Industry attempted in 1975 to link premium 
payments in public industrial enterprises with their performance. In 
fact, a uniform productivity premium, called ’prime de rendement 
collectif*, was introduced in industry in this year. This bonus was 
distributed to all employees of the enterprise and the production units 
subordinated to it including the administrative staff. The amount of 
bonuses available to the enterprise for distribution were fixed at 15 
percent of the enterprise’s wage bill. The conditions for obtaining 
bonuses were fulfilment of the production plan in physical terms and 
improvements in labour productivity and rates of capacity use in 
comparison with past achieved levels.
It would appear, however, that this incentive system worked very 
badly in practice and did not fulfil its functions efficiently. The 
single most important drawback of this type of premium was its low 
intensity. Since the collective productivity bonus was not a decisive 
factor in the budget of an employee, it did not provide real 
encouragement to greater effort. Thus, in contrast to other types of 
premiums which may represent up to 100 percent of an employee’s basic 
wage (eg. seniority, technicality, responsibility ... etc), the bonuses
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related to productivity rarely reached the level of 15 percent (15). 
Another reason was the inconsistency between the incentives on the one 
hand and the administrative orders and external constraints imposed on 
public enterprises (eg. shortage of spare parts, centralisation of 
investment decisions) on the other. A third weakness of the 
collective productivity premium relates to the deficiency of, and 
inconsistencies between, the various performance criteria which serve 
as a basis for the distribution of productivity bonuses. In 
sum, the common feeling was that the productivity bonus was an 
addition to salary independent of the results obtained by the 
individual employee (16).
3.2 ProfitrSharing Scheme
The second type of incentives to workers is the sharing of profits 
of the enterprise and the economic units. It may be recalled from 
Chapter Two that the Charter of the Socialist Management Scheme laid 
down the basic rules governing the internal organisation and 
functioning of the national public enterprise and formalised in 
particular the tv/o-tier system of this entity: the enterprise (general
office) and the component operating unit. This Charter also defined 
the notion of profit-sharing. Article 83 in particular noted that the 
net financial result (ie.profit) of the socialist enterprise and the 
production units will be divided into three distinct funds: the
enterprise fund, the profit-sharing fund and the contribution to the 
state budget. The Charter did not, however, specify in detail the 
mechanisms involved in the distribution of profits and the basis on 
which it will be made.
In practice, and up to 1975, no profits were distributed to 
workers in public industrial enterprises. Several reasons accounted
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for this delay: delays in the implementation of the new management
system itself in all public sector enterprises (17), lack of national 
accounting manual for measuring their performance (18) and the absence 
of a clear definition of the financial structure of the new Socialist’ 
enterprise. The last two conditions are crucial in any attempt to 
construct a profit-sharing scheme. It is probably for these reasons 
that the Government introduced a temporary scheme in 1976. The two 
Circulars no 932, July 1976 and no 1628, November 1977 provided the 
general guidelines governing the distribution of profits in public 
enterprises. These guidelines as well as their operation in practice 
will be examined in the following pages.
Circular no 932 introduced four basic principles for the 
distribution of profits in public enterprises and the production units. 
The first principle relates to the solidarity among workers and 
employees of the same enterprise. According to this rule, the 
operating units which are making profits should subsidise loss-making 
units within the same enterprise. This same solidarity rule applies 
equally, although this is not explicitly stated in the aforementioned 
document, to enterprises belonging to different sectors and branches of 
the economy. It stipulated that ”out of the 33.33 percent of the 
profits allocated to the sharing fund ... one third (1/3) for example 
will be allocated to a national fund to subsidise the workers of 
structurally loss-making enterprises such as the National Steel (SNS) 
and the Railway Enterprises (SNCFA)” (19).
The second principle indicated that in calculating the financial 
result (profit) reference should be made to the accounts of the 
operating unit and not to those of the parent enterprise.
The third principle dealt with the complex problem of performance 
criteria to be used as a basis for the distribution of profits. How
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to define objectively the net result of a production unit? The 
Circular no 920 was not clear about this issue. The use of the profit 
criterion as a basis for measuring enterprise performance is certainly 
inappropriate under Algerian conditions. Profit is affected by the 
existence of so many factors outside the control of public enterprises 
(centralised price fixing procedures, centralised sources of financing, 
state monopoly over imports), by the monopolistic structures of the 
local market and the diversity of objectives assigned to enterprises. 
This is perhaps why the 1976 Circular merely asserted that the chosen 
criteria should ensure that the "achieved result expresses a real 
creation of value” meaning perhaps value-added. However, the same 
document referred also to the fulfilment by enterprises of several 
other planned targets such as output levels, capacity utilisation, 
labour productivity and cost reduction to qualify for a share in 
profits. The 1976 legislation also made it clear that it was left to 
the sponsoring Ministry and the Ministry of Finance to decide jointly, 
on the basis of the accounts and information presented to them by the 
enterprises, whether profits made were the result of a genuine effort 
on the part of management and workers or simply the result of external 
factors.
The last principle dealt with the application of the equality rule 
mentioned above. It should be recalled that ’equality’ here refers to 
the equality between both enterprises and workers. As far as equality 
between enterprises is concerned, public enterprises were not allowed 
to allocate profits to their sharing funds in proportion to the 
profitability of their activity. Instead, all enterprises were 
instructed to retain one uniform proportion fixed at 33*33 percent of 
total net profit in 1976. The adoption of a uniform rate for all 
enterprises was thought to overcome the acute problem of variability of
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profit margins between enterprises and various branches of the economy. 
Circular no 932 indicated that lfthe determination of a (profit) rate 
which varies from one branch of activity to another assumes that 
production and productivity norms for the utilisation of labour and 
material inputs are available. But in the present state of our 
development and due to the malfunctioning of the means of production, 
the assessment of their efficiency through the definition of a given 
rate for each branch seems, quite objectively, a very difficult, if not 
impossible, task”. Moreover, in order to reduce the range of possible 
profit differentials between public enterprises, the central 
authorities linked the level of profits available for distribution to 
the size of the wage fund of the enterprise and the operating units. 
The amount of profit to be distributed must not exceed 15 percent of 
their wage bills.
The principle of equality between the workers in the same 
enterprise poses the problem of rules on which profits are to be 
distributed. In particular, administrative employees were recognised 
to have an equal right in profit-sharing as production workers. The 
aim was to avoid the introduction of divisions between the workers of 
the same enterprise incompatible with the very spirit of the Socialist 
Management Scheme. Consequently, three types of operating units were 
identified within an enterprise: the production unit, the trade unit
and the head-office unit. According to Circular no 932, the sharing 
funds of the production and trade units should not exceed one third 
(1/3) of their respective net profits (excluding tax). As for the 
head-office unit, which is not empowered under Algerian law to hire its 
services to the component operating units, the distribution of profits 
is subject to another rule. Its share in profits is made up of the 
consolidated profit of the parent enterprise after deduction of all tax
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charges and the profit shares of the various operating units 
subordinated to it. The amount of profit to be distributed to the 
_staff of the general office must not of course exceed 15 percent of the 
total wages paid to this category of personnel.
The 1977 Circular brought about three main corrections to the 
previous regime. The first of these deals with the criteria for 
measuring enterprise performance and in particular the financial 
result. Although this text carried over the same ambiguities inherent 
in the previous Circular with regard to the performance indicators to 
be used as a basis for the distribution of profits in public 
enterprises, there seemed to be a shift in favour of the 'planned 
targets’ rather than the financial targets. Circular no 1628 
stipulated that the financial results "should not be interpreted by 
looking at them exclusively from a financial angle. It should be 
determined whether there is a reduction in unit cost, whether the 
production plan is fulfilled as expected Moreover, aware of the
fact that the employment of the profit criterion as a basis for 
rewarding management and workers’ efforts was inappropriate under the 
Algerian conditions, this text invited the various control agencies to 
make a distinction "between a positive financial result which hides 
poor management and a negative financial result which may not reflect a 
genuine effort to improve management". Unfortunately, the above 
mentioned document gave no indication as to how this distinction can be 
made in practice.
Secondly, the implementation of Circular no 932 had shown in 
practice that employees at the head office earned more profits than 
their fellow workers in the production units, in some cases three times 
more (20). Circular no 1628 aimed to correct this deficiency. New 
norms were set for the distribution of profits in the head office unit.
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The amount of profits to be distributed in the head office unit is 
formed eventually by what remains of the total sum of the sharing funds 
of the (profit-making) operating units after deduction of 15 percent of 
their respective wage funds provided, of course, that the net 
(consolidated) operating result of the enterprise in question is at 
least equal to this remainder.
The last provision introduced by the 1977 legislation relates to 
the requirement that enterprises should cover first their previous 
deficits (in the form of bank overdrafts) before the distribution of 
any profits.
The implementation of the profit-sharing scheme as envisaged by 
the two aforementioned documents gave rise to serious conflicts in the 
public sector. First of all, the profit-sharing scheme which was 
initially intended to promote social harmony and reduce conflicts 
-within the public sector, introduced serious conflicts and inequalities 
between the employees of the same enterprise. In fact, the financial 
result of the enterprise and the production units were heavily affected 
by the large superstructure of officialdom which tended to develop 
rapidly in most public enterprises. The acuteness of this problem 
explains the defensive position of workers1 representatives and their 
repeated demands for taking immediate action to reduce the 
administrative personnel in public enterprises in recent years (21).
The growing inequalities between the profits distributed in the 
trade and service enterprises on the one hand and the production 
enterprises on the other is another deficiency of the profit-sharing 
scheme. Table 3 below illustrates these disparities. Thus, in 1975 
the profit shares ranged from 530 AD in the electrical industries 
(SONELEC) to 3000 AD in the banking system (BAD). These inequalities 
persisted even after the promulgation of the Circular no 1628. For
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instance, while AIR ALGERIE (airline company) distributed a profit 
share of 3600 AD in 1978, SOGEDIA (food processing enterprise) was 
incurring heavy financial losses because its prices were kept unchanged 
for more than a decade (22). Undoubtedly, the low profitability 
margins of the production units is due to the high costs of national 
gestation, ie. carrying out national development objectives, lack of 
industrial experience and inefficient management. But they are also a 
natural result of the Algerian arbitrary price system which tended to 
penalise the production units by fixing their prices often well below 
cost.
Table 3 Profits distributed in selected enterprises in 19Z5
Enterprises No of No of profit- No of Profit-share
units making units workers (AD)
Trade & services
SNNGA 37 37 2832 1055.75
S0NAC0B 13 12 2027 2420.06
BAD 1 1  186 3000
Industry
S0NAC0ME 49 33 11000 700
SONELEC 7 3 1302 530
Source: Union Generale des Travailleurs Algeriens (UGTA). Rapport
sur la Repartition des Benefices, 1975, Algiers.
Indeed, in many cases the amount of profits to be distributed by 
public enterprises were more determined by the variability of profit 
margins between various activities and the pricing policy adopted by 
the state than by the efficiency of their operations. This explains 
the frustration of workers in production enterprises who argued that 
they were penalised through no fault of their own. This same 
defensive strategy was also adopted by workers representatives who 
frequently referred to the External factors’ which impinge heavily
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on their performance such as the centralisation of investment 
decisions and shortages of material inputs due to stringent import 
regulations (23).
A final significant weakness of the profit-sharing scheme was its 
failure to provide all employees with an interest in the success of 
their enterprises and especially in the reduction of costs and the 
attainment of higher profits. Paradoxically, in a country where 
profit-sharing was not considered as an objective per: se but as a 
symbol of worker participation in management, workers and employees 
tended to perceive their annual profit shares as a 13th month 
additional payment and consequently it became another source of 
conflict in public enterprises. Thus, workers protested against the 
inequalities in the distribution of profits. Workers of the Oued-Smar 
Complex went on strike "because their share in profit this year was 
lower than last year's” (24). The same argument was put forward by 
the workers at the Draa-Ben Khadda Complex. Similar conflicts also 
emerged in the automobile complex at Rouiba between 1979 and 1981.
In sum, there is ample evidence which shows that labour unrest in 
the public sector started to grow rapidly as from 1975. Table 4 
exhibits the rapid increase in the number of strikes in the public 
sector between 1969 and 1980.
Table 4 Gppwth in £hg number g£ stpikgs in £hg public ggc£oc between 
1269 apd 1980
Year 1969 1971 1974 1975 1977 1978 1979 1980
Number of 
strikes 2 23 107 189 88 260 420
Soupcg: Chikhi, S, "Gpgyg g£ Spgigtg gp Alggpig", in la Revue du
CREAD, no 2, 1986, Algiers, p 92.
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It is clear from the Table that the number of strikes rose sharply 
from 2 in 1969 to 420 in 1980. It should be finally noted that wage 
and wage-related claims were the primary cause of these strikes (25).
4 CONCLUSION
This Chapter has attempted to show that the Algerian authorities, 
because they lacked an appropriate control framework, failed in the 
1970’s to regulate the wages and incentive distributed in the public 
sector. This failure led to the emergence of serious economic, social 
and political problems which accelerated the need for economic reforms.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
FINANCIAL PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
The previous Chapters have examined in depth various aspects of 
the operations of public sector enterprises, the environment in which 
they operate and highlighted the structural, economic and management 
problems they were facing. It is clear that these problems and 
distortions are ultimately reflected on their finances. This is one 
of the reasons why the financial problems of public sector enterprises 
have been left until the end of Part Two. To understand the causes of 
the financial problems of Algerian public sector industry, it is 
necessary to consider the various factors, internal and external, which 
affect their operations. This Chapter can thus be considered as a 
conclusion to Part Two. It summarises the financial problems of 
public enterprises and examines the different interpretations 
concerning their causes. The Chapter is divided into two main 
sections. The first section provides some empirical evidence about 
the financial problems of public industrial enterprises in the pre- 
reform period. The objective of the second section is to examine the 
various interpretations put forward by the main segments of the larger 
public sector system to explain the real causes underlying these 
problems.
1 THE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS OF THE PUBLIC ENTERPRISE
The financial problems of public sector enterprises in Algeria 
can be summarised under three main headings: heavy operating deficits,
high debt portfolios and a deteriorating working capital position.
1.2 IbS fCQbl§m of Deficits
It must be noted from the outset that the financial indicators,
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and in general all value magnitudes, should be interpreted with 
particular care and always with reference to the Algerian economic 
context. In Algeria the market is highly imperfect and the prices in 
which these financial indicators are expressed depart considerably from 
equilibrium conditions. Accounting documents are, therefore, 
unreliable indicators of real enterprise performance. However, an 
examination of their profit and loss accounts may be useful in giving a 
rough picture of the problems involved and may allow some inferences to 
be drawn.
All public industrial enterprises in Algeria, excluding the 
petroleum company, SONATRACH, reported considerable operating deficits 
in the 1970's. The Ministry of Planning estimated the total losses in 
industry to have risen from 408 AD million in 1973 to over 1.88 AD 
billion in 1978, reflecting a clear deterioration in their finances(1).
This deteriorating financial position of the public sector in 
Algeria is illustrated in Table 1. The level of losses in all five
Table 1 Deficits of selected public enterprises H9Z3=12Z8).
Enterprise Deficit as 
1973
percentage of turnover 
1978
SNS (Steel works) 25.9 16.1
SNMC (Building materials) 16.3 25.8
SONELGAZ (Gas & electricity) 2.7 11.4
S0NAC0ME (Mechanical engineering) 0.94 11.4
SONIC (Paper & cellulosis) 0.30 33.0
Source Ministry of Planning, "Synfhgsg dS BilSD Ecpnomigug g£ Social 
d§ Is Decgnpig 196Z=19Z8n, May 1980, Algiers, p 269.
enterprises was significantly high in relation to the level of their 
activities in 1978. It is also important to note that with the 
exception of the steel industry, where the ratio of losses to turnover
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remained stable, though at a high level, there was a systematic 
worsening of the financial position of the enterprises.
A feature of the financial performance of public enterprises is 
their minimal net contribution to capital formation. A report 
published by the Ministry of Planning noted that Algerian public 
enterprises were engaged in the consumption of available assets instead 
of producing income. It commented " ... while the state could recover 
some 16 per cent of industrial depreciation charges in 1973, ••• no 
depreciation funds could be generated in industry in 1978” (2). The 
same document remarked that most public enterprises were not even able 
to generate enough funds to cover the costs of their production.
Empirical studies suggest that this situation is not so much a 
function of the costs of gestation or of a temporary slump in their 
business conditions. It is the result of such basic handicaps as 
wrong investment decisions, chronic underutilisation of capacity, low 
productivity, managerial inefficiency compounded by state intervention 
and defective financial structures which aggravated their cash 
problems. This is why the Algerian official documents frequently use 
the phrase 'financial destruction to suggest not only that the 
financial problems of the public sector firms are both acute and 
chronic but that their underlying causes are very complex and related 
to the structure of the Algerian economy (3).
1.2 The Debt Problem
Heavy indebtedness is another manifestation of the 'financial 
destruction' process which most public industrial enterprises had been 
undergoing in the 1970's. The adoption of an extensive growth 
strategy, excessive investment and operating costs combined with the 
inability to exercise a genuine control over many aspects of their
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operations damaged their financial structures and considerably 
increased their financial needs. Normally, if a private enterprise is 
in serious financial trouble and reaches the point where it becomes 
unable to reimburse its contracted loans it is declared bankrupt and 
liquidated. However, this solution did not apply to public sector 
enterprises in Algeria. Since their activities could not be 
interrupted simply because they failed to generate enough cash and 
since the Algerian financial regulations reject the principle of 
financing by subsidies, this problem was partially solved by offering 
the enterprises an easy access to centralised funds in the form of bank 
loans or overdrafts. Indeed, the government used its control over the 
banking sector to channel credits to the public sector on a continuing 
basis.
The result was that the total debt of public sector industry, 
excluding the hydrocarbon sector, rose sharply from 14 AD billion in 
1973 to a staggering figure of 80 AD billion in 1978, an amount which 
is equivalent to approximately 92 per cent of the country's gross 
national product in the same year. A breakdown of the total 
enterprise debt into its various components is shown in Table 2.
It is clear from the Table that although the level of short-term 
loans and bank overdrafts is considerably high in absolute terms (15 
per cent), it is in fact the medium and long-term investment loans 
which had the largest share of the overall debt portfolio of public 
sector industry (50 per cent). The Table also shows that public 
enterprises were becoming heavily indebted to foreign suppliers and 
financial institutions (24 per cent). It is interesting to note that 
what is in fact worrying the Algerian financial authorities is not so 
much the overall level of credit as the ever increasing inability of 
public sector enterprises to pay back their contracted credits with
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overseas and local funding institutions. The Minister of Finance
Table 2 Sizg gnd §t£uctu£§ of pyblic gggtgr iodust^ry debt (end 
12182
Type of loan Debt (billion AD) %
1 Investment
long-term 39.4583 49.25
medium term 4.1534 5.19
external (foreign) 19*6182 24.49
Subtotal 63.2308 78.93
2 Loans for financial rehabilitation 4.7428 5.92
3 Overdraft 12*136 15*15
Grand total 80.1096 100
Source: Ministry of Planning, "Synthese du Bilan Ecgnoraigue et Social
de la Decennie 1961=1978", May 1980, Algiers, p 275.
remarked in 1981 that ,fIn the majority of cases; long-term investment 
loans are not reimbursed and medium-term credits are transferred from 
an investment account to an overdraft or short-term credit account"(4).
A last, but not insignificant, aspect of the debt problem is the 
increase in unpaid overdue debts between enterprises. In effect, 
delays and failures to pay their suppliers, the acquiring of additional 
working capital to finance above normal requirements, was a strongly 
developed and universal process. A large number of public enterprises 
are reported to have been facing serious difficulties in collecting 
their overdue debts from their customers (ie. other public enterprises 
and/or state buyer organisations) either because the latter have 
serious financial problems or because of disputes over quality, 
delivery dates and non-conformity with the required specifications of 
the goods supplied. In some cases the recipient enterprise refuses to 
pay for its purchases simply because it itself has failed to recover
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its overdue debts from its customers. Unfortunately, there are no 
data concerning the size of the non-recoveries at the national level. 
However, it is estimated that the accumulated liabilities of the five 
enterprises mentioned previously represented seven times their 
accumulated turnover in 1980 while their credit to other enterprises 
was only twice their turnover in the same year (5). This simply meant 
that the customer enterprises were getting a free credit equivalent to 
five times their turnover since the supplier enterprises, if they were 
to remain in operation, would turn to the bank for further interest- 
bearing loans. In this way, the bank loses control over the firm’s 
activity. It finances indirectly what it refuses to finance directly.
1.3 Deteriorating Working Capital Position
The financial problems in most public enterprises have reduced 
their ability to self-finance not only fixed capital formation but also 
their working capital needs. Table 3 provides some data about working 
capital shortages in selected public sector industries. The Table
Table 3 Working capital and bank overdrafts of five public 
enterprises in 19Z3 and 19Z8 (in billions of AD)
Enterprise Working capital Bank overdraft
1973 1976 1973 1978
SONIC 127.784 ( 756.422)* 15.000 85.000
SONACOME 399.886 337.091 880.000 2,335.000
SONELGAZ 197.000 ( 290.000) 92.000 107.000
SNMC 63.515 ( 385.810) 140.000 1,850.000
SNS fiZ9*131 1*216*309 1*950*000 3*229.000
Total sample 1,266.816 157.168 3,077.000 8,371.500
Soupcg: Ministry of Planning, "Sypthesg dy Bilan EcgQomigug gt SQcial
dg la Dgcgnnig 196Zrl9Z8", May 1980, Algiers, p 80.
* Brackets indicate a negative figure.
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also shows a strong inverse relationship between the shortage of 
working capital in the industries under consideration and the rapid 
increase in their short-term debts with the commercial banks (in the 
form of overdrafts).
Management frequently complained that their enterprises were 
undercapitalised and badly affected by a shortage of working capital. 
The thrust of the argument is that debt financing presupposes that the 
enterprises are endowed with an initial ’cushion’ of working capital 
appropriate to the nature and scale of their operations. It also 
assumes that enterprises have some autonomy in the fixing of their 
prices, in the choice of their product-mix and in the choice of the 
markets which they serve. These requirements which are necessary for 
any autonomous and responsible management were seldom, if ever, met in 
practice in the Algerian economic and institutional context. In the 
absence of such prerequisites, the managers argued, the enterprises had 
no other option but to revert to the primary banks for more overdrafts 
if they were to remain in operation.
Although there is considerable truth in these claims, they do not 
explain the whole issue. The difficulty with this type of complaint 
is to disentangle cause from effect. Undercapitalisation can be a 
cause of poor performance, but poor performance can be a cause of 
undercapitalisation, in the sense of inadequate stocks of capital. 
The increasing appetite of most public enterprises for additional 
working capital needs is caused partly by the general and informal 
practice of hoarding large stocks of material inputs and partly due to 
the stockpiling of unsaleable finished products. As mentioned on 
various occasions in this study, the first of these two distorting 
factors follows from the general conditions of shortage characterising 
the domestic market for these goods and the difficulties faced by
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enterprises in establishing reliable and regular supply links. These 
conditions have created a built-in safety-first mentality on the part 
of management who tended to hold large stock of materials and spare 
parts well in excess of their real needs.
The other distorting factor is the failure of the public
enterprise to dispose of its output once produced. Reasons for this
are numerous but intimately linked with the type of teller's market1
which had been institutionalised in Algeria over the last two decades. 
With no appropriate incentive system, public enterprises were not under 
any pressure to introduce high quality products; nor to adjust quickly 
to market demand. They thus favoured production for its own sake 
irrespective of users* preferences. According to the Minister of 
Finance the ratio of inventory to turnover reached in the most 
favourable cases more than six months of the value of turnover achieved 
by enterprises; a normal figure would be around three months (6).
The shortage of working capital in public sector enterprises is 
also due to the low productivity of their investments*, to delays in 
getting projects into normal product cycles and to the problem of bad 
debts mentioned above.
2 THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS
While it may be possible to identify the main factors that have 
contributed to the financial problems of public enterprises, it is 
extremely difficult to try to determine the relative weights attached 
to each one of them separately. In fact, the precise causes of the 
financial problems of the public enterprises in Algeria are intimately 
linked with the ambiguity in the definition of their role and 
functions, with the dilution of responsibility and complexity of the 
administrative management system in which they operate, and with the
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absence of clearly defined criteria for measuring their performance. 
Consequently, while there seems to be general agreement among various 
interest groups within the wider public sector system (te. various 
central administrations and enterprise managements, trade unions) as to 
the gravity and long term implications of the ’financial destruction’ 
of the public enterprise, these groups do not agree on its underlying 
causes. This is currently the subject of controversy in Algeria.
Two major opposing tendencies emerged at the end of the 1970’s 
within the public sector, each with its own reading and interpretation 
of the causes underlying the continuing deficits and the financial 
destruction of the nationalised industries. The first tendency, 
headed by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning, favours 
a thorough reorganisation of public sector enterprises and the 
introduction of profit as the main criteria for the evaluation of their 
performance. In particular, this group, which can be called the 
‘financiers’, or the ’economic bureaucracy’ has been highly critical of 
the extensive investment strategy adopted by public enterprises and 
their sponsoring ministries. They maintain that the financial
destruction of the public firms is basically due to their 
’autonomistic’ policies and to inefficient management.
The other group is led by enterprise managers, the sectoral 
ministries and a section of the trade unions. They all stand in 
defence of the public sector and the industrialisation strategy adopted 
in the 1970’s claiming that the financial problems of the public 
enterprises are mainly due to external constraints imposed on them by 
the social, economic and institutional environment in which they 
operate. This group may be called the ’technocrats’, 
’industrialists’, or the ’real-terms1 men (7). This section will 
review some of the arguments put forward by these two groups and
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conclude with a brief examination of the official position.
2.1 The Bureaucratic View
The bureaucrats* maintained that the inability of public 
enterprises to generate surpluses was due to their pursuit of 
undisciplined policies and to the absence of adequate financial 
obligations to force them to rationalise their actions and reduce 
costs. The assessment of the development effort made by the Ministry 
of Planning in 1980 and the speech made by the Minister of Finance in 
1981 contain the main arguments put forward by this group to explain 
the financial problems of nationalised industries (8). Broadly 
speaking, their claims can be summarised under three main headings:
2.1.1 Excessive investment costs
The ’financiers’ argued that the financial problems of public 
sector enterprises were due to wrong investment decisions. The costs 
of wrong investment include the costs of excess capacity, inefficient 
technology, uneconomic location and inappropriate product mix. It may 
be recalled from Chapter Four that in general the actual costs of 
investment projects undertaken in the 1970’s turned out to be two or 
three times higher than the initial planned costs. Delays had a 
disastrous impact on the finances of the public firms. Indeed, one of 
the forms of waste during this period was the increasing incidence of 
delay in the construction of new capacity. This tied up considerable 
resources without yielding a return either to the enterprise or the 
national economy. Moreover, the high investment targets and the 
extensive expenditure programmes adopted by most public industrial 
enterprises overstretched their modest cash flows while failing to 
produce any returns either to themselves or to the economy.
It has been alleged that the easy access of most public
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enterprises to centralised funds through ‘bureaucratic competition1 
meant that many expensive new projects escaped the discipline of tough- 
minded economic and financial appraisal. A quotation from the speech 
by the Minister of Finance illustrates this position well: "In
reality, it is often the conditions under which these investments were 
designed and realised that limit their efficiency. ... How can we 
assess the financial efficiency of this production unit which costs the 
country more than 500 AD million in order to produce the equivalent of 
an annual turnover of 70 AD million, and whose activity is the 
assembling of (imported) components?" (9).
2.1.2 Excgssive operating costs
According to the financiers, if public enterprises were making 
heavy financial losses and running into heavy debts this is due to 
inefficient management, the consequences of which are reflected in 
their excessive operating costs. The data presented in Table 4 gives
Table 4 Running expenses ip five public enterprises as a percentage 
of turnover (Dec 19Z81
Enterprise SNS SONIC SONELGAZ SONACOME SNMC
1 Materials and
intermediate inputs 87 82 21 81 40
2 Expenditures on
personnel 25 41 13 13 36
Subtotal (1+2) 112 129 34 94 76
3 Depreciation charges 13 15 23 6 15
4 Debt servicing 28 20 20 11 16
Subtotal (3+4) 41 34 • 43 19 31
5 Taxes and levies 2 1 1 11 13
Sourcg: Ministry of Planning, "SyQ£h§§g &u Bilan EconpQiiflyg SQQiil
1§ Dgcgnpie 1267=1978", May 1980, Algiers, p 278
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a breakdown of the cost structure of selected public enterprises. It 
is clear from the Table that none of the five enterprises studied was 
able to cover its running expenses from its sales receipts. 
Unfortunately, this situation is not limited to a small number of 
public enterprises; it is common to all nationalised industries. 
According to the advocates of this approach, several factors are 
responsible for the excessive operating costs.
First, the costs of materials, energy and maintenance work are 
very high. As Table 4 shows, expenditures on these cost components 
are considerable in all five enterprises. Expressed as a percentage 
of turnover, expenditures on materials and intermediate inputs reached 
87 per cent in SNS (iron and steel works), 82 per cent in SONIC (paper 
and polygraphics), 81 per cent in SONACOME (mechanical engineering) and 
40 per cent in SNMC (building materials). There is evidence that 
expenditures on these items are increasing faster than output.
Enterprises attribute this to frequent price rises in world 
market upon which they depend for the large bulk of their supplies of 
spare parts and raw materials. It is also the case that enterprises 
bear the cost effect of price adjustments of locally produced raw 
materials. However, there is evidence which suggests that high 
expenditures on intermediate inputs are also the result of an excessive 
use of materials and the absence of an adequate maintenance policy 
within the production units. Much is written in the Algerian press 
about the rapid obsolescence and scrapping of equipment and machinery 
in Algerian industry. A study carried out in the early 1970's in the 
industrial sector revealed that the utilisation of raw materials and 
intermediate inputs per unit of output was on average 10 per cent 
higher in Algerian public enterprises than in the European firms (10).
Secondly, the share of wages and salaries in total expenditures
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are also significant in all Algerian public enterprises. In some 
cases, these may represent as high as 50 per cent of their turnover, 
but as a rule they vary around an average figure of 25 per cent. One 
reason for the inflation of the wage bill in public enterprises is 
overmanning. That an inflated labour force is a serious problem in 
Algeria is suggested by a number of reports complaining that 
overstaffing was a major problem of public enterprises; hardly any 
enterprise was not overloaded with redundant workers, especially 
administrative staff. Various examples of specific manufacturing 
public enterprises that have suffered from this problem can be cited, 
including the extreme example of a public enterprise that was found to 
have increased the number of its administrative staff by 5600 between 
1977 and 1979, while the number of technical and directly productive 
workers increased by only 3400 workers over the same period (11). 
Another example of the abusive and inefficient recruitment of redundant 
administrative staff, quoted by the Minister of Finance, is an unnamed 
industrial complex located in the Oran region, where indirect labour 
represented 60 per cent of the total work force of the complex (12). 
It should be noted that the worst cases of overmanning occur in 
factories where the projected personnel required is deliberately 
inflated in relation to the level of output which is very often far 
below full capacity (13). It should finally be noted that the 
financial effects of overmanning are compounded by the pursuit of a 
high wage policy in the public sector industry.
One final source of high costs frequently noted by the central 
bureaucrats is the excessive expenditures on social and cultural 
activities offered by public enterprises to their workers and 
employees. The enterprises are accused of "leading an easy life 
incompatible with the country’s economic and social reality" (14).
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2.1.3 The impact on the exchequer;
Public enterprises have been accused by the Minister of Finance 
of neglecting financial viability elements in their decisions, a fact 
which is apparent in their indifference to the need for reductions on 
cost, their failure to balance their accounts and their inability to 
generate net revenue (15). It is held that whatever the explanation 
the continuing deficits of public enterprises represent a substantial 
loss of capital. The Minister of Finance expressed his concern over 
the ’'serious and widening gap between the high rate of investment and 
the low returns yielded by these investments”, suggesting that public 
enterprises were far from contributing to the national pool of savings.
The relationship between the size of the public debtand public 
enterprise investments and its implications for the public exchequer 
were closely examined by the Ministry of Planning (16). The Minister 
of Finance also pointed to the aggravating impact of public enterprise 
deficits and debts on budgetary deficits. To illustrate the scale of 
the problem, he estimated that current transfers from the public 
treasury and the banking sector to public firms amounted to 110 AD 
billion and 40 AD billion respectively at the end of 1979, a figure 
which is equivalent to the country’s gross national product in the same 
year (17). Thus, the central bureaucrats consider that it was the 
uncontrolled policies of the public sector enterprises, and not the 
alleged external constraints placed upon them, which lay at the root of 
the country’s financial difficulties and the ensuing inflationary 
pressures (18).
In response to the industrialists' claims that public enterprises 
lacked working capital and that the funds made available to them by the 
bank were inadequate, leading to curtailed operations and under­
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utilisation of capacity, the Minister of Finance warned that the "bank 
would not be the cashier of the enterprise executing all its payments 
orders” (19).
2.2 The Industrialists! View
The main arguments expressed by this group are to be found in a 
series of reports published by the Ministry of Industry and Energy 
in the early 1970’s and in a voluminous study prepared by the Ministry 
of the Light Industries in August 1978 under the title, ”A report on 
the financial problems of socialist enterprises”. They are also 
expressed in various reports prepared by the enterprises themselves 
(20). Of course, the ’technocrats’ refute the arguments put forward 
by the ’bureaucrats’ to explain the financial destruction of the public 
firms. In their view, any evaluation of public enterprise performance 
in Algeria must go beyond their financial results to take into 
consideration a number of external factors which affect their 
operations. A central argument has evolved around the idea that if 
the enterprise does not have genuine financial autonomy in its 
operations then the notion of financial profitability is meaningless. 
Their arguments can be summarised under five heads.
2.2.1 Cost of national gestation (21)
The firstidea defended by the industrialists is that public 
enterprises could not be held responsible for failing to make a profit, 
because the missions and duties assigned to them within the framework 
of the long-term growth strategy cannot simply be reduced to make a 
financial profit. They insisted that public enterprises should be 
judged in relation to the development objectives assigned to them by 
the national plan arguing that the financial profitability of an 
industrial project does not necessarily express its economic
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profitability.
Public enterprises in Algeria had been assigned the task of 
creating and developing new industrial activities. However, if these 
new industries - which often involve the transfer of complex 
technologies from abroad - were to grow and develop appropriately in 
the new environment, public enterprises had to create themselves a 
whole industrial ’environment*. In doing so public firms incurred 
heavy costs of national development, eg. technology development and the 
development of domestic substitutes for imported technology? research 
and development of a basic character? and technological training on a 
large scale. In Algeria, these extra-enterprise costs, which are in 
the nature of overheads relating to a wider spectrum of industry, were 
not distinguished and accounted for separately? and no mechanism had 
been designed so as to transfer them to the government budget. In 
fact, although the purpose and benefits of these activities lie outside 
their domain, their financial consequences were borne directly by the 
public enterprises.
2.2.2 Price fixing procedures
Chapter Six has shown that the prices charged by most public 
industrial enterprises in Algeria were administratively fixed and kept 
unchanged for many years. They reflected mostly political and social 
priorities, mainly to fight inflation and to subsidise some priority 
production or a social group. Most public enterprises contend that 
their prices are frozen at uneconomic levels. In their view, the 
administrative fixing of pricing below unit costs is a major cause of 
the public enterprises’ continuing deficits. An interesting and 
recent instance may be cited in the paper and cellolusis enterprise, 
SONIC, where the fixing of prices below production costs was found to 
have been responsible for half of its deficit figure of 210 AD million
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in 1979 (22). Another example is the SNMC (construction materials). 
In this enterprise, the average prices paid to the enterprise were 
estimated to have covered on average only 66.6 and 73.5 per cent of the 
cost per ton of output in 1977 and 1980 (23).
2.2.3 Taxes and levies
It should be noted that Algerian public sector enterprises are 
subjected to various taxes and are treated on the same footing as 
private firms. Up to the end of 1978, public enterprises were 
subjected to more than five types of direct and indirect taxes and 
fiscal levies, which according to management and workers contributed to 
the worsening of enterprise finances. Table 4 above shows that taxes 
are important cost components in the overall cost structure of all 
enterprises in the sample. In the area of mechanical engineering 
(S0NAC0ME) and the construction materials industries (SNMC), for 
instance, taxes reached 11 and 13 per cent of their respective 
turnovers at the end of 1978. These taxes most of which are 
calculated on the basis of the financial accounts of the component 
operating units (and not the enterprise) are levied on the investment, 
production and trading activities of the public enterprises (24).
Public enterprises have also complained about the 'conservative1 
nature of the Algerian system, arguing that it was much more concerned 
with how to provide the state budget with regular revenues than with 
the specific activities of the public enterprises,- the difficult 
conditions in which they operate and the requirement that they should 
balance their accounts. Finally, reservations have also been 
expressed about the complexity of the tax system and the burden of the 
administrative procedures involved in the computation and collection of 
taxes by the enterprises on behalf of the Treasury.
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2.2.4 Costs of inadequate financing patterns
According to the industrialists, if public enterprises are making 
losses and incurring heavy debts this is not their fault. They argue 
in particular that the financing scheme introduced in 1970 was held to 
be inadequate for an autonomous and responsible management. As far as 
investments are concerned, the enterprises attribute the ’financial 
destruction’ to the debt financing scheme introduced in 1970. It 
failed to endow the enterprises with an adequate equity capital to 
match their rapid growth. The financing of all enterprise activities 
exclusively by credit meant in practice that public enterprises were 
burdened v/ith high interest charges. In the view of the 
industrialists, financing enterprise operations exclusively by credit 
reinforces their dependence upon the financial institutions and 
increases their high financial gearing thus adding to their already 
high operating costs.
As for current operations, it has been argued that debt financing 
presupposes that enterprises are provided with an initial ’cushion1 of 
working capital appropriate to the nature and size of their activities. 
To illustrate this point, the enterprises often refer to the high share 
of expenditures going to depreciation and debt servicing in their total 
operating costs or turnover. Indeed, as shown in Table 4, capital 
charges and debt servicing were major cost elements that had for many 
years been disturbing the financial equilibrium of the public 
enterprises. Their relative share in total operating expenditures is 
by any reasonable standards extremely high. Expressed as a percentage 
of total operating costs, expenditures on depreciation and debt 
servicing reached their highest level in the gas and electricity 
enterprise (SONELGAZ) with 40 per cent and the lowest in mechanical 
engineering (S0NAC0ME) with 15 per cent.
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It is important to note that what is at issue here is not so much 
the mode of financing enterprises’ operations as the latitude left to 
them in disposing of the funds made available to them. Thus, the 
technocrats simply did not understand why public enterprises should 
reimburse the interest-bearing investment loans when the investment 
projects are decided entirely by the central administration mainly on 
the basis of macroeconomic, social and regional policy considerations 
(Le. to build an industrial base, fight unemployment, promote 
intersectoral integration, reduce regional disparities ... etc). The 
proponents of this approach argue that the centralisation measures and 
the financial system introduced in 1970 introduced disorder into the 
working of the public enterprises which led to absurd situations. 
They point to the fact that public enterprises had no other alternative 
but to ’’borrow funds from the banks to pay their depreciation 
allowances to the Treasury” (25). They also argued that "financial 
profitability ... will never be achieved if public enterprises are 
made to bear the excessive costs of debt servicing which may lead, 
through accumulated interest charges, to an intolerable degree of 
indebtedness" (26).
One final criticism made of the 1970 financial system relates to 
the suppression of all forms of subsidies to public enterprises when 
the latter are facing serious financial problems. Since the financial 
position of an ailing enterprise is usually redressed through the 
injection of fresh new interest-bearing funds into it, the managements 
complained that "the enterprises had to pay an interest on their losses 
regardless of who is responsible for these losses" (27).
2.2.5 Cq§£2 q£ buceaycrraey in§titutiQD2l iosrlia
Of all the factors considered in this section, the technocrats
2M9
would place the greatest weight on politics as a factor undermining 
public enterprise performance. It has been shown in previous Chapters 
that there was a ”trivialisation of political control” meaning a lack 
of interest of governments in matters of general policy combined with 
frequent interference in the everyday operation of the enterprises.
There is also a different, but pervasive, problem, which is the 
difficulty public enterprises often encounter in developing 
satisfactory working relationships with the civil service. Quite 
apart from the problem of detailed interference, there is a frequent 
complaint that civil service procedures are too cumbersome to meet the 
needs of commercial operations, particularly budgetary procedures - 
an important matter because public enterprises in Algeria depend on 
budgetary support for investment financing and for obtaining working 
capital. It may be sufficient to recall the complex and deadly-slow 
administrative procedures involved in the planning and control of 
enterprise investment, the stringent import regulations and the 
financing of their current operations to realise how serious the impact 
of these delays may be for the finances of the public enterprises. In 
fact, public enterprises see the large number of visas, approvals and 
authorisation procedures which they have to obtain from a large number 
of central agencies (banks, Treasury, sponsoring Ministry, Ministry of 
Planning, Ministry of Trade) before any decision is taken as not only 
an intrusion in their internal affairs; but also too cumbersome to meet 
the needs of commercial operations. In their view, the central 
agencies which affect their operations, through direct or indirect 
action, should bear part of the responsibility for the poor performance 
of public enterprises.
Furthermore, according to enterprise managers, the absence of 
genuine financial autonomy, the multitude of g PCiQCi controls and the
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quantity of information which their enterprises had to report to 
external supervisors all have adverse effects on the style of 
management within them. They create a style of management which gives 
priority to paper work and the solution of day-to-day problems facing 
the enterprise instead of concentrating on strategic issues and long­
term policies. This state of affairs made the Ministry of the Light 
Industries draw the following picture of the style of management within 
the public enterprises: ”il n’y a ni strategie, ni tactique, on est
conduit a ffaire le coup de feu*” (28).
2.3 The Official Position
The 4th Party Congress (1979) decided to make an assessment of 
the economic and social situation over the period 1967-1978. The two 
approaches analysed above served as benchmarks for the work of the 
special Party Congress meeting held in June, 1980.
It should be noted that, up to 1978, the arguments presented by 
industrialists were acceptable to a large audience within the state- 
party apparatus. More important, perhaps, is the fact that this group 
benefited from the support of the political leadership. Their 
arguments were also supported by a large section of party members, the 
trade unionists, the army and other mass organisations. Consequently, 
their view was in fact the official view. However, as time went by 
and the problems of the public sector were growing in complexity and 
becoming more apparent and chronic in character, their position in the 
party, army and the administration weakened. By the end of 1979 this 
group had lost much of its previous popularity and the advantage had 
swung to the bureaucrats’ group.
The major shift in the balance of power within the state-party 
machinery is reflected in the findings of the ’Commission Ad-Hoc 
Chargee de la Restructuration des Enterprises’ (CNRE), the resolutions
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of the extraordinary meeting of the Party Congress held on June 15-19, 
1980 and the report of the Commission Ad-Hoc Chargee de la 
Restructuration Financiere des Entreprises PubliquesT, (CRFE).
After a brief account of the positive results achieved during the 
previous planning periods (1967-1978), le. regaining control over the 
country's natural resources and building a large public sector, the 
resolutions of the Party Congress pointed to the following 
'distortions' in the economy:
underutilisation of productive capacity,* 
weak intersectoral integration,'
inefficiency of the economic and social agencies, :Le. enterprises 
and administrations,
the inability of the public sector enterprises to generate enough 
cash to replace and extend their capital stock.
The resolutions attributed these distortions to the following 
factors:
the conditions under which investment was carried out; 
inadequate planning and control /
the utilisation of oil and gas resources at an accelerated rate; 
the development of independent sectoral policies at the expense 
of the overall cohesion of the national economy; 
the absence of adequate control and evaluation of performance at 
all levels of the economic system.
The resolutions of the Party Congress made it very clear that the 
above ’negative aspects' were in the main the result of the excessively 
autonomous policies of the public enterprises which they saw as 
weakening the national planning system.
The CRFE Commission which was entrusted with the task of 
investigating the causes of the financial destruction of the public
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enterprises; and to put forward reform recommendations, identified two 
broad sets of causes: those that are attributable to the enterprises
themselves (internal causes) and those which result from external 
factors which are mainly attributable to the deficiency of the 
macroeconomic regulations under which enterprises have to operate 
covering matters such as prices, financing methods, taxation and inter- 
enterprise relationships. However, the Commission did not mention the 
negative impact of the civil service planning and control procedures 
involved in the allocation of centralised investment funds, import 
licencing and financing on the finances of the public enterprises. 
Neither did it recognise the effects of the central administration's 
frequent interventions in their day-to-day management.
3 CONCLUSION
This Chapter has attempted to provide some evidence on the poor 
financial performance of the public enterprises in Algeria. It has 
shown that the majority of public industrial enterprises were making 
continuing financial losses and running heavy debts in spite of various 
relief operations. Studies suggest that this is not so much a 
function of the costs of gestation or of a temporary slump in business 
conditions. It is the result of such basic problems as wrong 
investment decisions; chronic under-utilisation of capacity; low 
productivity; managerial inefficiency; all these are compounded by 
government interventions and a defective financial system which 
aggravated the cash problems of the enterprises.
The real causes of the financial destruction of the public 
enterprises lie at the centre of a heated debate between two major 
tendencies within the state-party apparatus. On the one hand, the 
industrialists, led by the sponsoring ministries and managers, argue
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that the enterprises cannot be held responsible for their poor 
financial performance because they had no control over many aspects of 
their operations. The centralisation of investment decisions, price 
fixing methods, financing patterns, stringent import regulations, and 
excessive taxation are often evoked by this group to justify the 
financial difficulties of the public enterprise. On the other, the 
bureaucrats, headed by the Ministry of Finance, claim that it is the 
uncontrolled policies of the enterprises, their excessive autonomy, and 
management inefficiency which are at the root of not only their own 
financial problems but also partly responsible for the inflationary 
pressures and the country's economic difficulties.
While the arguments of the former group had up to 1979 the strong 
support of various interests within the larger public sector system, 
this group lost much of its vitality and credibility after the 
assessment made by the Party Congress of the economic and social 
situation. The reforms of public enterprises introduced in 1980 
illustrate this change.
This issue will be dealt with further in the next three Chapters, 
which will be devoted to a thorough examination of the reform measures 
and will assess the chances of their successful implementation.
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PART THREE
THE 1980 REFORMS OF THE PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
CHAPTER NINE
THE REORGANISATION OF THE NATIONAL PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
1 INTRODUCTION
The restructuring of the national public enterprises is the first 
strand of the economic reform introduced in 1980. It is a key 
component of a comprehensive, drastic reorganisation of the 
administration and management of the public sector economy, emphasising 
decentralisation in decision making and the financial autonomy of 
public enterprises. According to the reform proposals, public 
enterprises were broken up into smaller and more manageable units. The 
1980 reforms mark the end of a whole era in which the large, 
diversified and multi-function firm played a predominant role in the 
organisation of Algerian industry. The primary goal of the 
restructuring of the public enterprises is to foster more rational use 
of resources and combat inefficiency. The evident preference of the 
central planners for a reduction in the scale of the public enterprises 
stems from the economic, managerial and social distortions associated 
with the large nation-wide enterprises (1).
If an increasing differentiation of structure leads to a large 
number of diverse sub-units within an organisation and, as a result, to 
greater problems of decision-making, coordination and control, then a 
reduction in their size should lead to more effective functioning of 
the organisation. Centralised control may be also enhanced as the 
reforms create the technical possibilities for a more effective 
allocation of tasks within the public enterprises and more monitoring 
of performance. This is so because officials can now evaluate 
performance in terms of financial results rather than by controlling 
the process of decision-making.
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This Chapter will attempt to examine these structural changes and 
assess their implications.
2 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE REORGANISATION SCHEME
The objectives of the reorganisation of public enterprises involve 
both macro and micro-economic considerations. Seven basic objectives 
may be identified:
1 To counter the over-centralised and bureaucratic structures of
the economy and to make its administration more flexible and more 
efficient. Central authorities are attempting to build up a more 
efficient information system and an improved model of planning and 
control. The aim here is to improve and shorten information flows 
and to introduce a more flexible planning process (2).
2 The central planners’ preference for small and medium sized
enterprises must be understood as a response to the geographical 
concentration of industry in and around the big urban centres of 
the north of the country. This has produced a massive rural 
exodus towards these centres and aggravated the problem of 
regional disparities. The spreading of public enterprise 
production activities more evenly across the country is viewed as 
an appropriate way of dealing with this problem. This policy is 
also in line with the objective sought by the new leadership to 
give regional and local authorities more powers in economic 
affairs (3).
3 The systematic reorganisation of the large public enterprises is
also linked with the shift in emphasis away from the development
of large scale industries and towards the creation of small and 
medium industries as a means of combating unemployment and 
encouraging subcontracting. The experience of the large pubic
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enterprises has indicated a lack of development of small 
industries, subcontracting and specialisation (4). It is hoped 
that the redeployment of enterprise activities, which were in the 
past concentrated in the north of the country, will help create 
more job opportunities in the regions of the interior and south.
4 The reform of enterprise structures aims to give a greater 
autonomy to the operating units so as to stimulate greater 
efficiency in production. This was a counter measure to the 
’excessive centralism1 in the operation of public undertakings. 
The central planners are hoping to achieve considerable gains in 
productivity through the reduction and redeployment of the 
administrative personnel in the general offices of public 
enterprises. It is deemed that the reallocation of the large, but 
under-utilised, number of qualified technical and managerial 
personnel in enterprise headquarters among the component 
production units will improve their performance (5).
5 The ’disassembling’ of the public enterprises is seen as a means 
of encouraging specialisation in Algerian industry with a 
consequent increase in productivity through the reduction of 
costs and the more efficient utilisation of capacity. 
Specialisation is also expected to lead to a sharper focusing of 
managerial responsibilities and tasks by reducing the spread of 
the management effort over a wide range of unrelated operations. 
The smaller, more specialised enterprises will have clearly 
defined tasks appropriate to their scale and competence (6).
6 The creation of a larger number of small and medium sized 
organisations is intended to streamline management and improve the 
internal organisation of the enterprises. Decision making 
processes will be speeded up through shorter information channels
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and internal control mechanisms (ije. measurement of performance, 
cost accounting methods) improved. Centralised control may be 
also be made more effective through a more rapid and effective 
allocation of tasks and monitoring of performance; and the 
evaluation of performance in terms of results rather than by § 
priori administrative controls (7).
7 A final implicit objective of the reforms is to reduce the 
growing influence of a managerial elite in the public enterprises 
and in the sectoral ministries. With the rapid growth of public 
enterprises, managers have tended to develop their own spheres of 
influence within the state-party apparatus which is regarded with 
suspicion by other central administrations (Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Planning etc). The reformers' emphasis on the 
transfer of some of the activities formerly under the authority of 
the sectoral ministries to regional and local enterprises; and the 
measures aimed at bringing enterprise control managements closer 
to the production units illustrate this concern. In this sense, 
the reform proposals are aiming to establish a new balance between 
the various segments of the wider public sector system.
3 guidelines for the restructuring operation
In order to achieve the rationalisation objectives mentioned 
above, the Ad-Hoc Commission fixed a set of rules and guidelines for 
the reorganisation scheme. Five main criteria were set by the Ad-Hoc 
Commission for the industrial sector (8):
1 Separation of distribution (i.e. trade) from production 
operations whenever technically possible and economically 
advantageous (9).
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2 Separation of R & D and capital investment operations from 
production operations.
3 The manufacturing activities themselves were expected to be 
broken down into smaller and more specialised segments. The main 
idea here was to create what is called ’basic cores* of similar 
final products (or product lines) and/or homogeneous production 
processes. These *basic cores* of manufacturing operations could 
then eventually be devolved, whenever technically possible, to new 
independent firms.
4 In accordance with the general policy of territorial 
decentralisation pursued by the Algerian policymakers, the 
Commission recommended the definition of new boundary lines 
between the national and regional and local industrial activities. 
It proposed the transfer of some branches or segments of industry 
from the national public enterprises to local and regional 
enterprises.
5 The identification of the ’annexed* social, cultural and training 
services and their separation from the normal business operations 
of enterprises. The financing of these activities is to be 
secured from other sources.
It should be clear from these guidelines that the aim was to narrow 
and simplify the range of enterprise operations and consequently to 
achieve a sharper focusing of their obligations. The integration of 
two or more activities within the same public enterprise would be kept 
to a strict minimum and maintained only in those cases where there is 
clear-cut evidence of an economic advantage or where technological 
factors in production render it necessary.
But how far can the partitioning process go? The Ad-Hoc 
Commission was quite flexible in its approach. It was in favour of a
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case-by-case approach. It has even noted that the task of the 
Commission was not to act as Consultancy agency’ in organisation (10). 
This task was left to special work committees which would be involved 
in the details of the actual implementation of the scheme taking into 
account the specific conditions and the variety and complexity of the 
production processes involved.
In fact, the guidelines mentioned above were meant to serve only 
as benchmarks for the work of the central committees. In all cases, 
the separated functions and production segments were expected to be 
entrusted either to existing small enterprises or to entirely new 
public entities. The restructuring scheme was scheduled to take place 
gradually over the period of the First Five-Year Plan (1980 - 84). The 
requirement that the operation should be implemented only gradually aim 
to avoid any disruptions in production activities.
4 THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES IN PRACTICE
The Decree 80-242 set the legal and procedural framework within 
which the reorganisation scheme was to be carried out. Two central 
bodies were created to put into practice and supervise the details of 
the reorganisation operation: the National Committee for the
Restructuring of Enterprises (CNRE) and the Ministerial Committees 
(CM) (12).
The CNRE under the chairmanship of the Minister of Planning was 
made responsible for translating the recommendations of the Ad-Hoc 
Commission and the directives of the First Five-Year Plan (1980-1984) 
into action. It drew up specific action plans for the reorganisation of 
each industry. It fixed the priorities and supervised the work of the 
Ministerial Committees. It was also responsible for coordinating and 
solving the practical problems which might arise during the
264
implementation process.
The Ministerial Committees, on the other hand, were designed to 
assist the CNRE In the preparation and implementation of the 
reorganisation programme. Because of their closeness to the 
enterprises and their knowledge of the specific conditions in which 
these are operating, they were involved in making specific proposals 
for the reorganisation of each individal enterprise. These proposals 
were then scrutinised by the National Committee (CNRE) and discussed 
with the Ministerial Committees in closed sessions. The final draft of 
the proposed structure was then transmitted to the Government for 
approval by the Council of Ministers.
The large bulk of the reorganisation scheme took place between 
1981 and 1984. A national conference, held on the 29th November 1980 
comprising enterprise managers, party officials, senior civil servants 
and chaired by the Minister of Planning, marked the start of the 
operation. The public industrial enterprises were given first 
priority.
The basis on which these enterprises were actually dis-assembled 
did not depart very significantly from the principles laid down by the 
PartyTs Ad-Hoc Commission. The following principles can be singled 
out:
1 Strict adherence to the principles of separating distribution from 
production operations with the exception of a few enterprises in 
the heavy industries (iron and steel, metal structures, petroleum, 
automobiles, public works equipment) (13). The distribution 
functions were transferred to new enterprises under the authority 
of either the Ministry of Trade or regional agencies.
2 Separation of industrial design and engineering services from 
production. These research and development facilities were
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assigned to new independent national or regional firms.
3 The segregation of capital investment operations and manufacturing
operations. The operations concerning the installation of 
investment projects and construction of plants were transferred to 
specialised independent regional and/or national contruction 
enterprises.
4 The disassembly of the production activities which were formerly 
run by divisions or departments within the same organisation into 
smaller, more specialised and autonomous undertakings. Thus, the 
reorganisation of the production operations of the National Steel 
Enterprise (SNS), for example, gave birth.to five independent 
national enterprises. In the same way, the breaking up of the 
manufacturing activities of the conglomerate SONACOME (Mechanical 
constructions) resulted in the creation of seven distinct 
production enterprises (14).
5 Finally, several segments of industry which were previously 
organised on a national basis (ie, under the authority of a 
sectoral ministry) are now organised along regional lines (under 
the administrative authority of local authorities). This rule is 
particularly applicable to investment construction operations and 
to several branches of light industries, eg. food processing, 
construction materials, tooling, crafts and arts etc.
Annexe Mo 2 summarises the aforementioned changes. It 
illustrates the basis on which the reorgnisation scheme was carried out 
and the pattern of the new public enterprises together with the 
location of their head offices.
5 THE NEW NATIONAL ENTERPRISES
The reorganisation of the public enterprises has greatly changed
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the organisational structure of Algerian industry. It should be noted 
that the operation is still underway although it was initially intended 
to complete it by the end of 1985. The major changes brought about are 
summarised below.
First, the reorganisation has resulted in the creation of a large 
number of small and medium size entities. This increase in the number 
of public firms is common to all types of enterprises be they national, 
regional or local. In particular, the number of national enterprises 
has risen considerably from about 80 in 1979 to 460 in 1984.
Secondly, despite the decentralisation of some activities to 
regional and local authorities, the national enterprise is still by far
Table 1 The sectoral distribution of the public industrial 
enterprises in 1984
Industrial sector Number of national 
enterprises
%
Heavy industries 44 33.85
Energy & petrochemical 
industries 28 21.54
Light & agro-based 
industries 68 52.31
TOTAL 130 100
Soupcg: Table constructed on the basis of data in ’Stgtistigues1,
ONS, No 6, May 1985.
the dominant form of organisation in industry. The partitioning of the 
former twenty or so industrial enterprises has produced some 130 new 
national undertakings. The sectoral distribution of these firms is 
shown in Table 1. In fact, several sectors of industry, although they 
have been organised along regional lines (eg. many segments of
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activities previously run by SNS, SN, SEMPAC, SNIC, SNERI etc) are 
still under the administrative authority of the relevant sectoral 
ministries and have not been delegated to regional or local 
authorities.
The new national enterprises are certainly smaller in absolute 
size and less diversified than their previous counterparts. They also 
control fewer operating units or plants. Unfortunately, information 
about the size distribution of these firms in industry is not 
available. There are some general indications, however, which suggest 
that the national public enterprise still occupies a dominant position 
in the Algerian economy. Table 2 shows the distribution of public 
enterprises according to their share in total employment after the 
reorganisation scheme. In contrast to the regional and local
Table 2 Size distribution of public enterprises in terms of their 
contribution to employment in 1284
No. of employees 
per enterprise
Number of public enterprises
National Regional Local Total
Less than 99 53 216 578 347
100-299 68 139 429 636
300-499 42 45 46 133
500-999 62 32 11 105
1000-1999 86 10 1 97
2000 and over 119 2 0 121
Unclassified 30 60 0 100
460 504 1075 2039
Source: ONS 'Stafistigygs1) No. 6, May 1985, p.20.
enterprises, the large bulk of the national enterprises are found in 
the range (1000-1999) workers. The national enterprises employing one 
thousand workers and over represent just over 94$ of total public 
enterprises in this category.
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Thirdly, the reorganisation of the public enterprises has also 
been accompanied by a systematic relocation of their headquarters in 
accordance with the regionalisation policy of the Government. These 
have been moved out of Algiers and relocated in the town nearest to the 
most important production unit. Table 3 below indicates the 
magnitude of these transfers. In sharp contrast to the situation 
prior to the reform where the large bulk of enterprise headquarters was 
located in and around Algiers, 66.37 per cent of the central offices 
were moved out of Algiers in 1983.
Table 3 The location of public industrial enterprises!
headguarters 11283)
Industrial Sector Number of enterprises Outside
In Algiers Outside Algiers Total Algiers %
Heavy industries 18 29 47 38.30
Light & agro-based
industries 18 35 52 60.31
Energy & petro­
chemical industries 5 15 20 75.00
TOTAL 41 79 11.9 66.37
Source: Table constructed by the author on the basis of data in
"MiSS en Oeuvre de la Restructuration des Entreprises", 
Ministry of Light Industries, 1983? and in !!Algerier 
Developpementi la Restructuration des Entreprises”, Ministry 
of Planning, 1983^  p 10
One final important aspect of the reorganisation of public
enterprises is the simplification of their internal structures and the
reduction in the number of administrative tiers between the head office
of the enterprise and the component operating units. This measure is
in line with the central authorities’ wish to remove intermediate
links, superfluous departments and positions in the higher and medium
levels of administration and to bring high management closer to actual
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production. The end result of this policy is that the previous 
influential enterprise headquarters were broken up and their personnel 
reallocated either to the head offices of the emerging enterprises or 
to their component production units. Table 4 shows how the 6865 
management staff previously employed in the headquarters of nine 
public enterprise under the control of the Ministry of the Light 
Industries were relocated. Thus, out of a total 6865 employees in 
the head offices, over 56 per cent were transferred to the headquarters 
of new enterprises, over 36 per cent to the production units and 
approximately 8 per cent transferred altogether to other sectors of the 
economy. The formal justification for this is the search for a higher 
productivity through more efficient use of capacity and a better 
allocation of manpower resources within the enterprises and the 
production units. It is also a move to reduce the concentration of the 
specialised manpower in the central offices.
In fact, the new enterprise structures, which were worked out by 
the Sectoral Committees in close liaison with the CNRE, set strict 
limits on the number of workers and employees of various skill- 
categories in enterprises and production units (15). Wage payments 
made to these workers are also monitored by the central administration 
and kept well within defined limits. The number of management 
personnel in the head offices of the new enterprises was severely 
reduced. It has been reported that this number varied between 50 to 
150 in public enterprises subordinate to the Ministry of the Light 
Industries (16). The norm set for the other industrial enterprises is 
not too far from this figure. In the new iron and steel enterprise 
(SIDER), with its 20,000 strong workforce, for instance, the size of 
the management staff in the head office was fixed at 107 employees in 
1984 (17).
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6 IMPLICATIONS OF THE RATIONALISATION OF ENTERPRISE STRUCTURES
The breaking up of the previous branch-wide, multi-function 
enterprises and their central managements raised serious questions. 
Broadly speaking these relate to the nature of the relationships 
between the newly created enterprises, to relationships between the 
state administration and these enterprises, and relations between the 
production units within an enterprise.
6.1 InterrEnterprise Coordination
Prior to the reform, a typical branch-wide industrial enterprise 
was composed of groupings of production units, research and design 
departments and a supply and sales base. The general office, through 
its various central directorates, operated as a coordinating body 
between the various segments of the activity of the branch. Now that 
the branch-wide enterprises are split into numerous smaller and more 
specialised independent units, the issue of how to coordinate them or 
who does the coordinating comes to the fore.
The increase in the number of public enterprises as a result of 
their restructuring and their functional specialisation increases the 
number of horizontal links and contacts which may prove very costly if 
not appropriately organised. The new enterprises may be confronted 
with coordination problems with new external suppliers and buyers. 
Since the suppliers themselves are changing sectors, branches or 
regional agencies, this may cause both temporary friction and serious 
planning and supply problems. Moreover, as is rightly pointed out by 
A Bouzidi "if the reorganisation of enterprises is not accompanied by 
a new mode of regulation of the public economy it will lead to a 
duplication of effort and a substantial waste of resources, since each 
of the new independent enterprises will endeavour to acquire its own 
means and services which were previously shared with other production
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units” (18).
In theory, there are two possible solutions to this problem. The 
first is to leave the enterprise alone to operate in a competitive 
system of completely autonomous enterprises aiming at maximum profit. 
In this model, central intervention in inter-enterprise relationships 
is effectively non-existent and this makes it quite consistent with 
the operational and financial autonomy of the enterprise. The 
disadvantage of this solution, however, remains that the decisions and 
choices made at the micro-economic level may diverge from the macro- 
economic and social objectives sought by the state.
Inter-enterprise coordination can also be achieved through the 
establishment of direct medium and long term contracts between the 
seller and the buyer firms. This would be consistent with 
decentralisation if, and only if, these contracts are freely worked out 
by enterprises themselves on the basis of their own perceived interests 
without central intervention.
In Algeria these contractual relationships are in practice 
mediated by the central authorities, mainly through the sectoral 
ministries. The conflicting interests of all the parties concerned 
(that is, the seller, the buyer and the state) are harmonised and 
differences between them hammered out through negotiations and 
bargaining. When the details of business terms are agreed upon 
(prices, products and specifications, delivery schedules etc) and 
endorsed by the central authorities, they become part of their 
respective annual plans. The main advantage of this solution, 
however, is that it allows a greater integration of Algerian industry. 
In particular, since the state is actively involved in this process, 
the changes of enterprises pursuing policies which are not consistent 
with national objectives (eg. creating backward or forward linkages in
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industry) may be minimised. The main weakness of this solution, 
however, lies in the fact that it may not be compatible with the 
operational efficiency and the financial autonomy of the public firm. 
It may lead to slow and inflexible decision-making processes. There 
is also the danger, particularly when it is practised on a large scale 
in all branches of industry, of the central authorities becoming 
involved in the internal affairs of enterprises in the name of the 
national interest. Past experience is full of examples which show 
quite clearly that under conditions of a sellers’ market, characterised 
by chronic and persistent shortages of a large number of goods and 
services, inter-enterprise contracts are extremely difficult to 
establish and enforce by administrative means. In the absence of 
external pressures on enterprises to produce goods according to users’ 
requirements and to deliver them on schedule, inter-enterprise 
contractual relationships will suffer as a consequence. The 
building up of inter-enterprise unpaid debts is an illustration of this 
problem (19).
Judging by the various declarations and by the reform measures 
enacted in this particular area in the early years of the reform, the 
Algerian authorities do not seem to be prepared to introduce extensive 
market relationships in the economy. Their main concern seems to lie 
elsewhere: to restore the sectoral and regional imbalances, to fight 
inflation, to reduce imports and dependency on world markets through 
the enforcement of inter-branch and inter-sectoral integration, and to 
introduce more discipline in enterprise management through tighter 
planning and control. A particular fear was that market relationships 
would undermine the role of the plan and the all embracing concept of 
the ’unitary vision' of socio-economic development.
For all these reasons the reform blueprint opted for the
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reactivation and reinforcement of contractual relationships between the 
newly created enterprises. The implication of this is of course that 
the central administrations intend to get actively involved in this 
coordination. Constraints on the role of the market as an instrument 
for promoting efficiency and organisational equilibrium proved decisive 
in maintaining the traditional hegemony of administrative and political 
methods of influencing managerial choice (20).
The reorganisation of enterprise structures may, therefore, be 
regarded as a search for an improved system of management of the 
economy and an attempt to introduce some kind of financial discipline 
and transparency rather than relying on market forces. The breaking 
up of the public enterprises may result in several possible changes in 
industrial organisation in the future given the sellers1 market in 
which they operate.
First, the separation of production and distribution functions 
may lead to compartmentalisation of industry. Each individual 
enterprise may be under pressure to develop its own sources of supply 
to face the shortages and uncertainties inherent in the rigid domestic 
supply system.
Secondly, the separation of production and trading activities 
may lead to a lengthening of the distribution channels. The 
introduction of intermediate trade links between production enterprises 
may lead to additional distribution costs and supply difficulties. The 
trade enterprises may well be tempted to regulate the flow of goods in 
relation to their own objectives and management constraints which may 
not be compatible with the specific supply requirements of the 
production enterprises.
Thirdly, the introduction of separate trading entities may 
reinforce even further the widespread practice of neglecting user or
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consumer demand. The production enterprise will be under no pressure 
to adjust its production to market demand and to produce high quality 
goods. The trading enterprises may become simple depots involved in 
the ’distribution1 of what is proposed to them by the production 
enterprises.
Another implication of the reorganisation of enterprises is the 
centralisation of some of their decisions and the transfer to the 
central authorities of some of their former coordinational functions.
6.2 Relationships with the Central Administrations
The issues involved here are not too dissimilar from the ones just 
mentioned above. The former public enterprises had been frequently 
responsible for the administration of a whole branch of industry (and 
sometimes more than one). Their general management had been actively 
involved in coordinating the various segments of their branch through 
internal management and resource allocation procedures. The general 
offices also acted as intermediate links between the operating units 
below them and the central administrations above them (sectoral 
ministries, functional ministries, banks, etc )
The reorganisation of public enterprises, that is the emergence of 
several independent undertakings previously under the authority of one 
organisation, together with the official reassertion of the role of the 
plan as the instrument of coordination and control has two 
consequences:
1 The transfer of considerable decision-making authority from the 
public enterprises to the sectoral ministries which take over the 
functions of intra and inter-branch coordination formerly carried out 
by the general management of the enterprises. This is particularly 
true for research and development activities which have been
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transferred to the sectoral ministries.
2 The increase in the number of the public enterprises as a result 
of their reorganisation has meant that the number of contacts they will 
establish with the central control agencies (banks, Ministry of Trade, 
Ministry of Planning) also increases. The decentralisation of decision 
making authority and the increase in the number of public enterprises 
which the central authorities have now to regulate and control raise 
two types of problems.
First, it makes the task of the intermediate links of the central 
administrations formally responsible for the coordination and control 
of enterprise operations intricate and complex. It is quite clear that 
the regulation by these bodies of several hundred enterprises is much 
more complex than regulating only few large firms. The Ad-Hoc 
Commission for the reorganisation of enterprises was aware of this 
problem when it wrote that ’’The problems of organising the economic 
coordination will be much more complex and consequently requires 
intervention of central administration to secure inter-enterprise and 
inter-sectoral coordination’1 (21). Several measures were adopted in 
practice to deal with this problem such as the reorganisation of 
these intermediate agencies and the recruitment of more qualified 
personnel. Thus, most industrial ministries have reorganised their 
internal structures along more specialised lines and introduced special 
departments for ’planning and development’ (22). The banks have also 
been reorganised. New branches have been created and brought closer to 
major production areas.
The reinforcement of the state apparatus with new skills and the 
alterations in the structural configurations of these agencies, however 
beneficial they may be to central control, will have little to 
contribute to decentralised initiative and enterprise autonomy. One
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may even wonder if these central agencies can ever acquire the ability, 
the information and especially the required,skills to engage in 
integrating and controlling complex industrial processes.
Secondly, the centralisation of some of the decisions formerly 
taken within the public enterprises (ije. research and development 
operations,' intra-branch and inter-branch coordination) together with 
the reinforcement of imperative planning is certainly not conducive to 
enterprise autonomy. It runs counter to the stated aim of giving more 
autonomy to public enterprises and the operating units. In fact the 
position of the reform programme is still not clear in so far as the 
relationships of these public enterprises with the central 
administrations are concerned. What is lacking, in fact, is a new 
statute which defines the character of the activities of these 
enterprises and their rights and obligations in such a way as to 
protect them from the central administrations. As it is, the 1975 
regulations governing the relationships of the public enterprises with 
the central administration have still not been abolished and remain in 
force. But it is a well-known fact that these regulations grant large 
powers to the central supervisory bodies and only obligations to 
enterprises. Past experience has clearly shown that under the 
regulations public enterprises tended to lose too easily their 
autonomy and become simple executants of the ’ministries’ programmes.
Some writers have argued that the existing ’tutelary’ system was 
incompatible with enterprise autonomy (23). Enterprise managers and 
workers have pointed out that the search for operational efficiency in 
public enterprises solely through alterations in their internal 
structures would fail if not accompanied by major changes in the 
institutional ’environment* in which they operate and which are at the 
root of their problems (24).
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The crucial point here is how to reconcile the interests of two 
decision-making blocks: a macro-economic sector dominated by 
administrative methods and assigned functions of strategic planning and 
control and a micro-economic sector operating under different rules. 
The complexity and interdependence of the industrial economy rules out 
any simple division of function between plan and market. The struggle 
of public enterprises to establish an autonomous functional sphere of 
influence within the Algerian institutional context gives way to the 
traditional system of micro-administrative controls.
It may be interesting to note in this respect that the breaking up 
of the large public enterprises in Algeria contrasts sharply with an 
observed trend towards the formation of larger organisations (Centrale, 
Combine, Union) in Eastern European countries in the 1960s to deal with 
similar problems, mainly to improve central planning and control. 
Thus, the formation of large branch-wide organisations each comprising 
several enterprises engaging in similar or complimentary activities are 
designed to replace the industrial directorates within the industrial 
ministries. With an obligation to operate on a commercial basis, these 
combines are designed to act as transmission belts between the central 
administration above them and the enterprises below them. The 
individual enterprises are deemed to be efficient in their operations 
because they are under the aegis of the Combine or Union and also 
because they operate as legally and financially autonomous units within 
these combines (25).
6.3 The Autonomy of the Operating Units
It has been pointed out. at the beginning of this Chapter that the 
theme of giving more autonomy to the operating units within the public 
enterprises was central to the thinking of the reform advocates. The
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motive for this is twofold. First, Algerian leaders need them as a 
buffer against the position of the director-generals of public 
enterprises. They are also aware that decentralisation at the 
production level is a precondition for operational efficiency. Any 
improvements in production and productivity levels must come from a 
better organisation of work and a fuller use of capacity at the level 
of the production unit.
These two factors explain the reforms’ concern to establish the 
operating unit as an economically and financially autonomous entity. 
The dismantling of the former over-populated enterprise headquarters 
and the reduction in their management personnel together with the 
subsequent transfer of some of this personnel to the operating units 
are all cases in point which illustrate these decentralisation drives. 
These measures reflect a marked changed in attitude in recent years in 
favour of the operating unit which tends to be regarded as the true 
’enterprise’, that is the basic cell for organising industry. Given 
this emphasis, one would have expected a clearer view on the part of 
the reformers about the relationships of the enterprise (general 
management) with the operating units. Unfortunately, they are far from 
clear on this point.
Unlike the economic reforms carried out in Hungary and Yugoslavia, 
where the large branch-wide organisations were abolished, the Algerian 
planners preserved the two-tier system, that is the general office at 
the national level and the production unit at the operating level (26). 
The new enterprises could have been organised so that, in a manner 
similar to holding companies, they have a controlling and supervisory 
role but with little opportunity directly to influence the actual 
running of the production units. This, however, would have 
contradicted the intention of the Algerian economic leaders to employ
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the operating units to carry out state aims (ie through imperative 
planning). This alone may explain why each individual component 
production unit has not been turned into an independent Enterprise1.
The objective of expanding the operational authority of the 
production unit could not be separated from the problems of functional 
reform (ie. planning, pricing, resource allocation within public 
enterprises etc). Enterprise-production units’ relationships are part 
and parcel of the state enterprise relationships. The heart of the 
problem here is how to reconcile the financial autonomy of the 
operating unit, one of the principles of structural rationalisation, 
and the planned vertical relationships of these units with the general 
office of the enterprise.
The corporate structure of the new public enterprises is in fact 
not dissimilar to that of their predecessors. In the two-tier system, 
the general office is viewed as having only ’strategic’ functions such 
as planning, coordination and control, while the component production 
units having large powers in ’operational’ management.
Unfortunately, the reform programme seems to carry over the same 
ambiguities characteristic of the previous regulations governing the 
relationships between the general office of the enterprise and the 
component production units (27). It offers no clear guidelines as to 
how to draw a line between ’strategic' and ’operational’ management, or 
how to translate such vague terms as the general office’s role in 
’planning, coordination and control’ into useful operational terms. The 
division of authority between the enterprise and its component units is 
not clear and is open to various interpretations.
It is not clear, therefore, to what extent operational 
responsibilities are going to be delegated to the operating units and 
whether appropriate rules have been made for harmonising production
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unit-enterprise interactions. Several obstacles are still in the way 
of decentralised initiative.
The independence of the individual production unit is limited by 
the power granted to enterprise heads to alter the functions and tasks 
of the unit and to transfer functions, tasks, machinery and production 
from one unit to another. The degree of autonomy depends on how 
integrated the production unit is within the enterprise, some units may 
be very dependent while others are relatively free.
The general office also plays a major role in planning. The 1980 
reform measures insisted on the need for the reinforcement of planning 
at enterprise level. The unit is given tasks and plan figures from the 
enterprise and is fully responsible for the realisation of these 
targets (28).
Very broadly speaking, there is a two-tier accounting system in 
the enterprise: for the enterprise as a whole and for the operating 
unit. The solution of problems important to the enterprise as whole 
(investments, R & D, mode of financing, supply etc) requires the 
centralisation of enterprise funds. The production unit’s incomes from 
sales are transferred weekly to the central fund of the enterprise. 
These funds are then redistributed between the component units in 
relation to preferences and priorities set by the general management. 
The implication of this is, of course, that the production units are 
not allowed to practice self-financing.
The procurement, sales and export-import operations are also 
worked out and coordinated by the general office. The advantages to 
the production units of bulk purchases and the reduction in 
transportation costs are often evoked to justify such practices. The 
prices charged for the production units’ inputs and paid for their 
outputs are also monitored by the general office. Thus, the operating
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units dispose of their products at a uniform price determined by the 
general office (29).
The aforementioned constraints imposed on the production units and 
in particular the centralisation of their financial resources suggests 
that they are part of the enterprise rather than independent business 
entities. Not only is the degree of autonomy of the production unit 
determined by the enterprise management, so also is its profit 
situation. This may have serious consequences. There exists the 
danger that the units will not be interested in reducing costs. The 
power of the general office to redistribute centralised financial 
resources can have a powerful effect on the profit situation of the 
individual production units. If the enterprise serves as a collection 
agency for centralised funds and uses these to shore up the ailing 
parts of the enterprise, the resulting protection may encourage 
systematic distortions in production and costs among the units. 
Shielded from the effects of a loss-making performance in their 
individual markets, the unit managers may become slack and inefficient.
It is for these very reasons that some Algerian observers have 
questioned the character and role of the general offices and called for 
the introduction of a ’federal decentralised* system in which these 
’bureaucratic* general offices would be replaced with voluntary groups 
or associations (30). Under such a system, the various operating units 
are left free to establish their own associations or groups which will 
undertake marketing and supply operations for their members. The 
relations of these groups with their member units would be on a purely 
commercial basis.
7 CONCLUSION
The reorganisation of the public enterprises is the central part
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of the 1980 economic reform. According to this reform, the former 
branch-wide public enterprises have been broken up into smaller, more 
specialised and more manageable units. The management staff in their 
headquarters was sharply reduced and brought closer to production 
areas. The main micro-economic objective of this operation was to 
ensure a more effective functioning of these organisations and to solve 
the various economic problems within them (eg. the building up of an 
effective organisation structure, raising the quality of management, 
harmonising the interests of the production units and enterprises, 
increasing the degree and efficiency of capacity utilisation reduction 
costs through using resources in an optimal fashion and the development 
of arnore effective measurement of performance). The reformers were 
also seeking to achieve macro- economic objectives, mainly to improve 
central planning and control, to overcome the distortions and 
imbalances in the economy and to reduce regional disparities.
The assessment of these latter structural alterations, ie. changes 
in the methods of planning, coordination and control, will be made in 
more detail in Chapters Ten and Eleven. However, the reorganisation of 
public enterprises structures has brought to the fore several 
theoretical and practical problems, which if not appropriately tackled, 
will stand in the way of achieving these objectives.
First, the breaking up of the public enterprises and the 
separation of the various functions formerly carried out within the 
same organisation poses the problem of how to coordinate them. These 
internal transactions are now either carried out through the market or 
coordinated by the sectoral ministries. However, given the rigidity of 
the Algerian supply system and the small management staff in the 
sectoral ministries, the splitting up of the former conglomerates and 
disaggregation of their functions may result in supply and distribution
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problems. Moreover, the upward shift of decision-making authority from 
enterprises to the sectoral ministries, which are now involved in 
intra-branch and inter-branch coordination, is not conducive to 
enterprise autonomy and runs counter to the central planners1 attempt 
to separate the administrative tasks of the centre from the business 
functions of the enterprise.
Secondly, the reform of enterprise structures has not been 
accompanied by a ..precise definition of the relationships between the 
various central administrations and control agencies which regulate 
their resources and supervise their activities. Obviously, the tasks 
of these agencies become more complex as a result of the increase in 
the number of enterprises which they have to deal with. The absence of 
appropriate control mechanisms may result in friction and conflicts 
between the two levels which are managed on the basis of completely 
different rules.
Thirdly, the reorganisation of public enterprises has resulted in 
the simplification of their internal structures. They now control 
fewer production units but the reform blueprint did not come up with 
any new arrangements for organising the relationships between the head 
office and the component production units. It simply carried over the 
previous ambiguities inherent in the two-tier system.
With these preliminary conclusions in mind it is now time to 
examine the management and control mechanisms envisaged by the reform. 
These will be dealt within the next two Chapters.
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CHAPTER TEN
MEASURES AIMING AT INCREASING THE FINANCIAL 
AUTONOMY OF THE PUBLIC ENTERPRISE
A number of measures have been taken which indicate that the 
Algerian planners are increasingly concerned about improving the 
economic efficiency at the enterprise and production unit levels by 
granting their workers and employees some authority in decision making. 
The report of the First Five-Year Plan (1980-1984) noted that the 
objective of the reform was to !,make the enterprise the basic cell of 
theeconomy guided by a system of pecuniary interest and endowed with a 
statute which gives it a large scope of autonomy” (1). The same 
document insisted that, in supervising and regulating the activities of 
enterprises and production units, the central authorities should in the 
future give precedence to the use of indirect instruments such as 
prices, credit, interest rates etc (2). In fact, all official 
documents dealing with enterprise reforms contain several declaration 
of liberal intentions: (3)
- abolition of unnecessary controls and administrative prescriptions
- separation of enterprise finances from those of the central 
administration
- enhancement of the role of economic incentives
- leaving more funds at the disposal of enterprises for their free 
use
- consolidation of direct horizontal links between enterprises
- construction of plans on the basis of norms and calculations 
scientifically determined and differentiated by branches of 
activity
These declarations are interesting in the sense that they indicate
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the frame of mind and intentions of the Algerian economic leaders and
illustrate the economic issues which appear to be most popular in
Algeria.
Several important changes have been introduced between 1980 and 
1986, all of which aim to increase the financial independence of the 
enterprise. In this Chapter four sets of reforms are investigated:
1 The financial rehabilitation scheme
2 Reform of the price system
3 Changes in the patterns of investment financing
4 Tax reform
It should be noted from the start, however, that the reform 
programme was planned to be carried out gradually. Indeed, several 
aspects of the reform proposals are still under discussion and 
therefore the outcomes remain uncertain. The main objective of this 
Chapter is to examine these reform proposals and assess the extent to 
which they can deal with the problems encountered in the period prior 
to the reform.
1 the financial rehabilitation SCHEME
The financial rehabilitation scheme is one major component of the 
reforms of planning and management methods. The National Committee 
for the Reorganisation of Enterprises (CNRE) assigned the task of 
reorganising the finances of the public enterprises to an ad-hoc 
commission called the Commission Ad-Hoc de Restructuration Financiere 
des Entreprises1, or CRFE. It was created in 1981. Its task was 
to investigate the causes of the ’financial destruction* of public 
enterprises and to put forward recommendations aimed at an ’’autonomous, 
responsible and transparent” financial management (4). Chapter Seven 
made reference to the work of this Commission and gave a detailed
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account of the financial problems involved.
As noted in Chapter Seven, the financial difficulties of most 
public enterprises in the pre-reform period were caused by a number of 
complex and interacting factors. On the basis of a close examination 
of the finances of a small sample of enterprises from the different 
sectors of the economy the CRFE identified two broad sets of causes: 
those that are attributable mainly to the public enterprises themselves 
(internal causes) and those which result from external factors which 
are mainly attributable to the deficiency of the macro-economic 
regulations under which enterprises have to operate: prices, financing
patterns, taxation, inter-enterprise relationships etc.
The internal causes involve both the investment and production 
operations of enterprises. Investment projects were generally poorly 
planned resulting in long delays in the installation of projects and 
consequently increased investment costs. Moreover, expenditures on 
infrastructure surrounding the site of the new project (roads, water 
supplies, etc) and on training of workers and employees were financed 
from the enterprises1 own funds or from ordinary bank loans despite the 
fact that these facilities yielded a benefit to a wider community.
At the production level, delays in the completion of investment 
projects led to longer gestation periods. Enterprises faced many 
difficulties in bringing the newly installed production capacity into 
full operation. These delays gave rise to excessive operating costs 
which were also inflated by overmanning and high overhead costs. 
Enterprises’ liquidity was reduced by high inventory levels and by 
their inability to recover debts from their customers.
The financial haemorrage from which most public enterprises 
suffered in the 1970s was due also to the adverse effects of the macro- 
economic regulations such as the price fixing procedures, investment
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financing patterns and the subjecting of enterprises to heavy taxation.
It is in the light of these findings that the CRFE came up in 1981 
with a reform blueprint aimed at redressing enterprise finances. Each 
public enterprise had to go through a process of financial 
rehabilitation which the Algerian authorities call the ’financial 
restructuring* of public enterprises. This operation is seen as an 
essential complement to the reorganisation of enterprise structures. 
The Algerian authorities are anxious to ensure that the new, 
restructured public firms will start with sound financial structures.
1•1 The Objectives of the Financial Rehabilitation Scheme
The financial reorganisation (or restructuring) of the public 
enterprises is defined by the CRFE as ”the set of measures to be taken 
by the state and the enterprise in the immediate future and in all 
domains (not only in financial matters) and also the actions which the 
enterprise must implement to establish its financial autonomy and bring 
to an end the practice of resorting regularly to state aid” (5). The 
scheme will thus tackle the external and internal factors which were at 
the root of the enterprises’ financial difficulties (6).
The reorganisation scheme seeks to introduce financial discipline 
and profit criteria directly into enterprise decision-making. The 
report of the CRFE noted that the financial rehabilitation scheme ’’must 
work out specific rules which give profit a role in stimulating 
management efficiency ...” (7). The First Five-Year Plan (1980-1984) 
also stressed the primacy of profits in measuring the quality of work 
done within enterprises when it noted that the ”... financial 
parameters must be given preference in appraising the performance of 
the public enterprises so as to make them more responsible for their 
activities (8).
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Another objective of the financial rehabilitation scheme is to 
separate the finances of enterprises from those of the state. In 
fact, ”... the rules set by the Commission are designed to allow a 
clarification of the responsibilities of the enterprise, the banks and 
the central administration” (9).
The intention to introduce profit as an important performance 
criterion and the rehabilitation of economic calculation in enterprise 
decision-making marks a clear departure from the pre-reform conception 
of the role and functions of the public enterprise in the economy. 
According to the reform blueprint the public enterprise is not merely a 
direct instrument for bringing about rapid economic growth and social 
reproduction, but also a source for the generation of economic surplus.
Why this renewed interest in the 'financial balance' of the public 
firm? There are several reasons.
First, the confusion in the financial structures of the public 
sector enterprises has, in the past, produced huge operating financial 
deficits. Public enterprises could be maintained in operation only at 
the expense of considerable state support in the form of bank 
overdrafts and budgetary grants and subsidies. This in turn resulted 
in severe inflationary pressures, a rise in external debt and the use 
of oil resources at an accelerated rate. The CRFE emphasised the 
close link between the financial disequilibrium at the national level 
and the financial deficits and bank overdrafts made of the public 
enterprises (10).
Secondly, the Algerian policy makers are hoping to improve the 
capacity of the public firms to generate sufficient funds to finance 
not only their own growth but also to contribute to capital 
accumulation at the national level. This objective is in line with 
the strategy of the 1979 leadership to do away with the inflationary
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financing and the excessive reliance on oil and gas revenues to finance 
economic growth and development. All the reform documents and 
official declarations have emphasised that all forms of state subsidies 
to public enterprises must be abolished in the future.
Thirdly, the Algerian authorities are interested in profit because 
it performs other functions. The introduction of the profit criterion 
in enterprise decision making is intended to stimulate and measure 
efficiency in production. Past experience has shown that the use of 
several partial indicators, expressed mainly in physical terms has led 
to widespread waste and has provided no incentive to enterprise 
managers to use resources efficiently. It is hoped that the profit 
criterion will cause them to adopt a more 'businesslike* approach to 
costs (11).
Finally, with the decentralisation of planning and management, 
risk-bearing and responsibility are expected to be shifted from the 
state budget to individual enterprises. The profit criterion is the 
only indicator which is congruent with the highest degree of enterprise 
independence and initiative.
However, the Algerian planners realise that the profit motive can 
be introduced only gradually in public enterprises due to the 
imperfections which exist in the Algerian market and because of the 
special obligations and functions which the enterprises have to fulfil. 
Moreover, changes in the 'environment* in which these firms operate and 
improvements in their internal work arrangements can be brought about 
only gradually.
1.2 Mgssyres laksy withiy thg EcarostfQck q £ tbs Financial 
Rsbabiiitatien Scheme
Measures in four main areas were recommended and implemented by 
the CRFE. They are all designed to strengthen the financial viability
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of the new public enterprises and establish their financial stability.
1.2.1 Strystural rnayagerngnt QhgoggS
The reorganisation of enterprise structures is expected to 
improve internal control procedures and to render the accounting system 
more transparent. These changes are designed to improve the financial 
position of enterprises by permitting a better allocation of resources 
with a consequent reduction in operating costs.
•'V;.
1.2.2 Financial measures
Three main financial measures have been introduced. First, 
public enterprises have been provided with complementary capital funds 
to finance some of their fixed and working capital. This followed 
complaints made by managements and workers during the reform debate 
that the financing of enterprise operations exclusively by interest- 
bearing bank loans was costing the enterprises too much in the form of 
accumulated interest charges. In the past most investment projects 
were financed from bank loans and were not endowed with adequate 
capital funds to start production. This placed the public enterprises 
in a position of complete dependence on the banking system for the 
financing of their activities. The size of the capital donations lfare 
fixed in relation to the type and level of activity of the 
enterprise” (12). The move away from debt financing to equity 
financing is designed to reinforce the financial autonomy of the public 
enterprises and to limit their demands for further bank loans and 
overdrafts.
Secondly, the debts contracted in the past by the parent 
enterprise have been distributed between the new enterprises. In 
order to alleviate the debt burden on enterprises many of these debts 
were rescheduled and will be paid according to the new repayment
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conditions (13). In some other cases these debts were either written 
off altogether or simply transformed into capital endowments. Funds 
earmarked by the 1983 Budget for the financial rehabilitation scheme 
were fixed at 100 AD billion (14).
The third financial measure decided by the reformers was the 
identification and separation of capital expenditures on infrastructure 
surrounding the site of investment projects. These operations are now 
financed from budgetary funds. The 1983 Budget, for instance, 
earmarked 500 AD million for the financing of the pre-investment 
operations and worker training schemes. In contrast to the pre-reform 
period, the social and cultural activities are now accounted for 
separately and financed from a special national social fund.
1.2.3 Settlement of inter-enterprise debts
The size and significance of inter-enterprise debts was deemed to 
be "one of the constraints which placed a heavy burden on enterprise 
finances" (15). The participants of a seminar held in Algiers in 1983 
on the financial restructuring of enterprises came to the conclusion 
that the liquidation and recovery of all inter-enterprise outstanding 
debts was a pre-requisite for the implementation of the financial 
rehabilitation scheme (16).
Indeed, most inter-enterprise debts had been settled over the 
period 1982-1986. Moreover, the CRFE put forward an administrative 
procedure for the settlement of all future inter-enterprise 
transactions. Since the financial resources of a public enterprise 
are kept in one single bank account, the bank acts as an intermediary 
link between the seller and buyer enterprises. However, it would 
appear that this procedure was more concerned about ensuring a full 
control over financial flows in the economy rather than about offering 
a solution to the more serious problem of inter-enterprise disputes and
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conflicts which are at the root of these unpaid debts. Past 
experience has shown that the arbitration commissions set for this 
purpose failed to deal with these problems.
1.2.4 Reactivation of the indirect economic and financial levers
The proposals of the CRFE comprised also a series of 
recommendations dealing with the reactivation of the role of credit, 
prices and taxes in the regulation and control of public enterprises. 
Because of the particular significance of these measures and their 
pertinence to this study, they will be examined in more detail in the 
following sections.
1»3 The Implementation of the Financial Rehabilitation Scheme
The financial rehabilitation scheme started officially in the 
early months of 1983, and was expected to be completed by the end of 
1984. Each new public enterprise had to go through a process of 
financial rehabilitation. The operation was to be carried out 
according to a ’plan de redressement* worked out by the CNRE and 
approved by the Government.
Each enterprise was required to construct a financial 
rehabilitation programme over the period of the Second Five-Year-Plan 
(1985-1989) on the basis of an assessment of their performance over the 
last four years. This is a simulated projection of their financial 
situation on the basis of different scenarios and hypotheses regarding 
changes in their major management variables (cost structures, changes 
in prices, sales, procurement, financing schemes, etc). A uniform 
procedure for the construction of these plans and the presentation of 
data was provided by the CRFE.
In practice, this operation has proved very complex. The work 
involved in the distribution of the assets of the parent enterprise
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among the new firms was reported to have taken much longer than 
expected (17). The public enterprises have in addition faced 
tremendous difficulties in constructing accurate plans which extend 
over several years in the future.
These two factors alone may explain why the financial 
rehabilitation scheme could not be carried out on schedule. The 
operations extended well into 1985 (18).
2 REFORM OF THE PRICE SYSTEM
The most important and politically sensitive aspect of the reform 
involved the activation of prices as levers for regulating decision 
making. It had become increasingly evident in the decade prior to the 
reform that the old system of inflexible prices, serving mainly as 
accounting devices and instruments of social and political policy 
produced serious misallocations and distortions.
1 Prices had been administratively fixed and kept constant for 
several years. The consequence of this is that prices paid to 
producers for their output were fixed at levels much lower than 
the costs actually incurred in their production and distribution. 
This led to operating deficits which could be covered only by 
state subsidies. More important perhaps than the scale of these 
deficits is the dilution of responsibility for the financial 
results of the enterprises which they produced. Prices lost 
their function as instruments for the control and appraisal of the 
system of production.
2 In the period before the reform, prices were poor indicators of 
relative scarcities, that is, they could not communicate 
information on demand and supply. The report of the CRFE noted 
that "The administrative freezing of prices over a long period
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renders them devoid of any economic sense, they have been 
transformed into passive constraints” and as a result they could 
not be used to serve as "instruments to guide planners in the 
allocation of resources, in the distribution of goods and services 
and in the distribution of incomes" (19).
3 The existing price system was also criticised on the grounds that 
it failed to stimulate an interest in efficient resource 
utilisation, improved quality and technical progress. Thus, the 
CRFE pointed out that the "chaos in the process of price formation 
disorganises economic activity and lowers the general level of 
efficiency in the economy by acting as an incentive to waste 
resources" (20).
Consequently, the 1980 reform called for a basic change in the 
existing price system. The Five-Year Plan (1985-1989) stressed that 
"flexible mechanisms for the formation and revision of prices must be 
worked out so as to reduce, if not to remove, the distortions which 
have arisen in previous periods" (21). A price reform was also 
considered as a necessary prelude to the rationalisation objectives 
sought by the reorganisation of public enterprises. It was recognised 
that the financial rehabilitation scheme "will have little impact if it 
is not backed up by a new, rational price system which takes into 
account two fundamental elements: the protection of purchasing power
of the low-income families and the need for enterprises to balance 
their accounts" (22).
An Inter-ministerial Committee was set up in 1982 and assigned the 
task of constructing a new price system, and steps were taken to 
reorganise and revitalise the "Institut National des Prix" to provide a 
logistical base to the work of the National Price Committee (23).
Given the political sensitivity of the price issue and its wider
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implications, it was officially stated that change in this area could 
be brought about only gradually. The introduction of an adequate 
price system will take several years to work out and implement so as 
to allow all producers to adjust their production structures.
The Inter-ministerial Committee put forward in 1982 a set of 
economic rules to serve as a guide for future price fixing policies. 
Unfortunately, this study could not be made available to the author. 
However, the main recommendations and the rules proposed have been the 
subject of comment in the press and have been summarised in official 
documents.
The fundamental idea of the new pricing procedures is to relate 
producer prices to production costs. The Algerian authorities regard 
prices which are properly linked to full costs as important for 
rational decisions within enterprises and for the efficient allocation 
of resources at the national level. In the absence of shadow prices, 
the cost-based prices are certainly better than prices which are not 
related to costs at all.
The Algerian planners make a distinction between producer and 
consumer prices. Broadly speaking, a producer price is the price at 
which manufacturers supply their products to one another, to 
construction organisations and to supply and sales establishments. 
Consumer prices, in contrast, are those prices at which goods and 
services are sold to final consumers and users.
The move towards cost-based prices is motivated by the central 
planners* desire to eliminate state subsidies to production enterprises 
and to make prices more reflective of relative scarcities. The prices 
paid to producers are expected to lead, in conjunction with the 
measures aimed at rationalising enterprise finances and decision 
processes, to the adoption by managers of tighter measures to control
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and lower costs. This rationalisation policy is planned to take place 
in two stages. In the first stage the price fixing policy will seek 
to restore the financial balance of the public enterprise. The basic 
principle here is that producer prices are fixed so as to cover fully 
the socially justified costs involved in their production. In a later 
stage, when enterprise activities are stabilised and on the basis of 
prices more accurately related to costs, producer prices will be 
expected to cover not only production expenses but also to allow 
enterprises to make a profit on a rational cost basis (24). This 
latter requirement is particularly needed for the achievement of the 
stated aim of enterprise reforms to encourage self-financing in public 
enterprises.
The implication of the adoption of cost-based prices is that if 
the state wishes, for one reason or another, to keep the prices of 
certain products at a level lower than the actual costs incurred in 
their production then a subsidy should be paid to the producer of those 
products. These subsidies may come from either the state budget or 
from a National Compensation Fund established in 1932 (25). As a 
rule, when the need for such a practice arises, subsidies are to be 
made preferably outside the production spheres. In other words, 
subsidies will be granted to trade enterprises or to distribution 
activities carried out by production enterprises. The Second Five- 
Year Plan (1985-1989) noted in this respect that !lin order to comply 
with the principle of financial profitability, it is necessary that the 
financing of the difference between the actual cost and the price at 
which the product(s) is sold must be calculated and accounted for 
separately and that any subsidies will be granted as a rule outside the 
production spheres” (26).
As far as the prices charged to consumer are concerned, the new
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price system is seeking to keep the prices of mass consumption products 
within the reach of low income families. At the same time the pricing 
policy aims to stimulate rational behaviour among consumers and to 
provide a means of influencing the level and structure of consumer 
demand (27).
To put these reform measures into practice the Government 
introduced a series of price increases between 1983 and 1985 for almost 
all basic industrial goods, construction materials, fuels and consumer 
goods (28).
Despite all these good intentions and the rationalisation of the 
pricing system, it should be noted that public enterprises are still 
not free to fix the prices of their products. The Five-Year Plan 
(1985—1989) distinguishes between two types of prices. This 
classification replaces the former four-category system (29).
Prices which are centrally fixed. These include strategic 
products and basic food products which have a significant impact on the 
national economy and on the purchasing power of low-income groups. 
This category of prices includes those products which are subject to 
state budget subsidy or to compensation from the National Compensation 
Fund.
Controlled prices. These include all remaining products. 
Unfortunately, the price classification does not give a detailed list 
of the goods and services involved in each product category. However, 
the distinction seems to be only formal since enterprises are not free 
to set the prices of their products. Any price increases must get the 
prior approval of central authorities; the prices of the first 
category of products are fixed by decree in the Council of Ministers, 
while the prices of the second category are negotiated with the 
sponsoring ministry of the enterprise concerned. Price increases are
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much harder to obtain for the first category of products than for the 
second.
The linkage of prices to costs makes sense only to the extent that 
costs are computed accurately. This raises the problem of allocating 
costs in enterprises producing a variety of products. This problem of 
dost allocation is a major obstacle to the implementation of an 
effective pricing policy in Algerian industry. The reorganisation of 
public enterprises and the reduction in the range of their products and 
activities is intended to encourage and expediate the introduction of 
modern cost accounting methods to deal with the problem.
It is argued by many Algerian economists that effective 
decentralisation can be based only upon a price system which reflects 
economic realities, ie. scarcities and social costs and priorities. 
The reforms have introduced certain improvements. Prices have been 
raised to eliminate losses in several branches of industry and adjusted 
to reflect social costs more accurately. However, it is clear that 
prices are to be kept under strict central control. They are fixed 
for a period of six months. Any requests for price rises must 
normally be justified by managements on the basis of changes in their 
cost structures or changes in productivity. However, since most 
public enterprises retain considerable monopoly powers and given the 
desire of the central planners to maintain considerable control over 
the product-mix decisions in enterprises, it is very unlikely that 
central authorities will succeed in exercising pressures on enterprises 
to reduce costs and operate efficiently.
3 CHANGES IN THE PATTERNS QF FINANCING ENTERPRISE INVESTMENTS
The revision of the financing patterns of enterprise investments 
is another important element in the enterprise reforms. The basic aim
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here is to do away with the type of problems which have emerged in the 
past under the centralised system of financing investments. In 
contrast to the previous system of allocating centralised funds on the 
basis of mainly macro-economic and social considerations, the new 
measures are intended to increase the role of credit and the banking 
system in the allocation of investment resources. Under the new 
regulations, public enterprises are also expected to rely more heavily 
on retained earnings in the financing of their investments.
It should be noted, however, that the reform measures in this area 
are formulated only in general terms. Detailed measures have still to 
be decided. This section will attempt to examine these new proposals 
and to assess the possibilities of their implementation. The first 
part examines the measures aimed at reinforcing the role of credit. 
The second part deals with the new proposals of self-financing.
The CRFE laid down four basic principles which are to govern the 
financing of enterprise investments in the future (30).
1 Borrowing to finance investments will take the form of long-term 
loans. The object here is to relate the financing patterns to 
the ability of the investment projects to generate returns. Past 
experience has shown the large discrepancies which existed between 
the physical planning and installation of investment projects and 
the financial planning of the projects. Frequently the loans 
contracted to finance the investment expired before the project 
was completed. In many cases, too, the time lag between the 
installation of the project and full production working was 
lengthy. To deal with these problems the time limits set for the 
reimbursement of the investment loans were extended to take 
account of these delays and difficulties. Financing of 
investments by medium-term loans was abolished.
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2 Variable and differentiated interest rates which will vary from 
one branch of industry to another to reflect central planners' 
preferences were introduced. Interest rates are expected to vary 
from as low as 2 per cent to a level reflecting the current 
inflation rate.
3 The automatic financing of investments is to be abolished. Banks 
and financial institutions will have a say in investment 
decisions.
4 The financing of enterprise investments will be secured through 
three main sources:
- Bank loans (local and foreign)
- Budgetary allowances
- Self-financing
5 A new system of depreciation rates adjusted to the life cycle of 
the project was proposed.
3.1 The Reactivation of Crgdit
It may be recalled that prior to the reform the primary banks had 
almost no say in investment decisions. Their role was reduced to 
channelling centrally determined investment funds to enterprises. 
Although credit was retained as the main source of financing this was 
slowly transformed into a formalised system of budgetary allocations. 
The excessive centralisation of investment resources together with the 
administrative procedures involved in their allocations produced 
distortions, delays in project construction, high investment costs, and 
the absence of clearly defined locus of responsibility for failure to 
implement the investments. Moreover, the practice whereby public 
enterprises started investment projects but could not complete them 
according to plan seriously disrupted their financial structures. The
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effects of this competition on over-centralised investment resources 
produced severe inflationary pressures and led to a drastic fall in the 
productivity of capital as the central planners lost effective control 
over the amount and planning of investment projects undertaken by 
enterprises.
It is against this overall background that the reform measures 
were introduced. Changes were introduced in the operation of the 
banking and monetary system. The aim was to give more powers to the 
banks in financing investments in the productive sector. In 
particular, the banks are expected to play a major role in the 
appraisal and selection of investment projects (31). The revitalisation 
of the role of banks had three main objectives.
The first was to relieve the pressures on the state budget. 
Banks will be empowered to use normal credit and interest mechanisms to 
intensify their search for savings in both public and private sectors. 
This new task assigned to the banks is quite in line with central 
authorities’ policy of gradually replacing inflationary financing and 
the use of oil revenues by internal sources, mainly private savings and 
enterprise profits. The Five-Year Plan (1985-1989) noted that 
"savings of the various economic agents (eg public and private 
enterprises, households, etc) must be mobilised, and then selectively 
channelled and allocated to alleviate the state contribution to the 
financing of development” (32).
The second objective was to make the existing system of 
investment financing, with its bureaucratic delays and distortions, 
more flexible (33). The use of credit, it is argued, will offer the 
state the possibility, without becoming involved in individual 
investment decisions, indirectly to influence the direction and rate 
of utilisation of enterprise development funds.
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The third objective is to encourage enterprises through the 
discipline of interest rates to use investment funds more effectively, 
thus reducing their demands for central funds and leading to 
improvements in their finances (3*0.
To achieve these objectives, the advocates of an active credit 
policy suggested that the financial viability of investments must be 
accorded priority in the selection of new investment projects and 
called for increased autonomy of the banking system from the political 
authorities. The official position is that particular attention will 
be given to the conditions of project preparation and to the necessity 
to improve the efficiency of capital and in particular to yield quicker 
returns on capital (35).
The arguments in favour of banks ‘taking over1 the investment 
decisions recognised implicitly the creation of a direct relationship 
between investment expenditure and the profits realised from it (36). 
This means that the banks would be actively involved in the analysis of 
enterprise investment requests and assessment of the risks involved in 
the estimation of their expected future returns. They would be free 
to grant (or refuse to grant) loans to enterprises if the project is 
judged to be not credit worthy.
One of the innovations of the 1980 economic reform is the 
identificon of two types of investments: ‘centralised* and
‘decentralised* investments. The new financing procedures vary with 
the type of investment.
Centralised investment includes ‘structure-determining’ or 
strategic projects which involve new capital formation of particular 
importance to the economy or industries. They are termed strategic 
because they affect the basic proportions of the national economic 
plan. Unfortunately, there is no detailed list of the projects
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included in this category. But their most characteristic feature is 
that they involve the introduction of new industrial capacity (eg. 
establishing new plants and new industries). This category of 
investments is decided by central authorities. The final decision 
whether to invest or not formally rests with the Ministry of Planning. 
The Algerian Bank for Development (BAD) is responsible for the 
financing of these investments. Centralised investments are financed 
exclusively by long-term state loans granted on favourable conditions. 
The Second Five-Year Plan (1985-1989) noted that ,fThe BAD will appraise 
and finance investments in strategic sectors of the economy which, 
owing to either their scale or their impact on the rest of the economy, 
require special financing conditions by the state” (37).
These state loans may be complemented with non-repayable 
allocations from the budget to cover expenditures on worker training 
schemes and on surrounding infrastructure involved in the installation 
of investment projects.
Decentralised investments are all those investments which remain 
outside the scope of the first category. They include capital 
expenditure connected with the expansion of the existing production 
units* with retooling*, replacement and minor reinvestments aimed at 
adjusting production to market demand. In theory, these investments 
are carried out by enterprise directors and supervised only broadly by 
the annual and pluri-annual plans (38).
The financing of such investments is expected to come from two 
main sources: bank loans and enterprises’ own funds. According to
the reform blueprint the primary banks will be involved in the 
analysis, appraisal and financing of modernisation and replacement 
operations from their own resources. The CRFE noted that ”this 
category of investment (i-e. decentralised) will be left to the joint
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assessment of the enterprise and its bank since the latter is in a 
better position to judge the performance of the former” (39).
This new form of guided decentralisation of some investments is 
motivated by two factors. The first of these is to make sure that 
public enterprises would request only those investments which are 
economically and financially sound since it would be these which would 
have the funds for expansion. The second reason is to provide 
enterprise managements with the incentive to expand as a means of 
earning higher profits.
How serious are the Algerian authorities about using credit and 
interest as levers in the allocation of investment funds? The answer 
to this question is not easy. Although the need for change is real 
and genuine, this change can be brought about only gradually because of 
social resistance and institutional inertia. This has meant that the 
reform proposals must be seen from within a long-term perspective. 
However, there are several obstacles in the way of implementing an 
active credit policy in Algeria in the immediate and medium-term 
future.
First, the proposals about the reactivation of the role of credit 
in the allocation of investment resources have been worked out within 
the framework of the national economic plan. The Ad-Hoc Commission 
noted in this respect that "the objective here is not at all to 
question the principle of centralisation of the financial resources but 
rather to make more flexible and more efficient the mechanisms whereby 
these centralised funds are put at the disposal of the public 
enterprises” (40). Up until 1986 all enterprise investments in 
industry including those that are labelled ’decentralised1 investments, 
have in practice been planned in detail well in advance and approved by 
central authorities in much the same way as they were before the
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reform.
This means that the central planners intend to maintain strict 
control over all investment decision powers vested theoretically in the 
enterprise directors. Under these circumstances, the distinction made 
between ‘centralised* and ‘decentralised* investments becomes 
superfluous. The reform initiators seem to equate the financial 
autonomy of the enterprise with the method of financing. In fact, the 
financial autonomy of an enterprise does not depend on the source of 
their funds but on the latitude allowed in disposing of them. 
Financing through credit would be quite in line with decentralisation 
if, and only if, bank loans could be obtained without the bank, or any 
other central authority, designating the purpose to which the loans are 
to be applied (41). In Algeria the banking system is still founded on 
extending credits for specific expenditures which is, in a sense, 
empowering the bank to take investment and production decisions for the _ 
enterprise (42).
Secondly, the success of the reform proposals depends very much on 
the progress made in the reform of the price system. If prices, 
including the price of capital, are to reflect social opportunity 
costs, they must be fixed so as to reflect not only production costs 
but also relative scarcities. The Algerian price system is still 
highly distorted and it will be several years before a genuine price 
reform is actually introduced.
Thirdly, the public enterprises still operate in a highly rigid 
market. The smooth circulation of resources in an enterprise depends 
to a large extent on the conditions of supply of material inputs, while 
the conditions of supply reflect the current market conditions. In a 
buyers* market the only constraint on supply is the amount of financial 
resources available; in a sellers’ market, availability of material
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resources (equipment, raw materials, spare parts) becomes of prime 
importance. Lack of materials can make it impossible for an 
enterprise to carry out an investment even though it has been provided 
with the appropriate financial resources. All these constraints 
restrict severely the enterprise’s authority in financial decisions.
Fourthly, the neglect of the banking system for more than two 
decades has meant that it has become inadequately staffed. If the 
banks are to be extensively involved in the selection of investments 
and complex financial analysis, they need a large number of qualified 
and skilled personnel which is in short supply in Algeria.
Fifthly, the active use of credit and financial levers depends to 
a large extent on the financial Independence of the public enterprises 
and the changes to be brought about in their financial structures. 
The financial rehabilitation scheme, which is still underway, will take 
several years before it is accomplished. The use of indirect economic 
and financial parameters requires also the revision of the legal and 
economic status of the public enterprise and its mode of operation. 
Without drastic economic sanctions such as bankruptcy, economic levers 
would be less than effective. The powers of the enterprise managers 
and their rights to hire and fire workers and employees are severely 
restricted by the state’s commitment to full employment.
3.2 Self-Financing in Public Enterprises
The reform proposals have also stressed the importance of, and the 
need for, self-financing in public enterprises as a means of enhancing 
their financial autonomy and stimulating management initiative and 
authority. Self-financing, in the sense of an enterprise expanding 
through its own internal sources, is now allowed and even encouraged by 
central authorities. In effect, the various financial measures 
legislated by the reform, ije. the financial rehabilitation scheme,
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changes in the financing patterns and price revisions, are intended to 
improve the self-financing capacity of the public enterprises (43)- 
The aim is to increase the funds left in enterprises.
Although the reform programme is still not clear in so far as the 
financial system of the public enterprise is concerned, it has been 
established that self-financing will be secured through several 
sources: depreciation charges, retained profits, capital endowments
from budgetary sources, reserves and sale of unused fixed assets etc. 
All these form what is called the Development Fund of the Enterprise.
Prior to 1976, all depreciation charges were siphoned into the 
state budget in payment of the contracted investment loans. Public 
enterprises are now allowed to retain part of their depreciation 
allowances to finance renovation and replacement investments. These 
are expected to play a major role in the financing of investments in 
branches of industry which use capital intensive technologies such as 
petrochemicals, electronics, machine tools and metal manufacturing 
industries. There have been talks about reforming the depreciation 
rates to be used in industry. The new rates would allow, in addition 
to physical wear and tear, for inflation and technical progress. 
However, the reform proposals are not clear about how much discretion 
will be left to enterprise managers in disposing of these depreciation 
charges.
Retained profits are another source of financing 'decentralised* 
investments. The amount of profits that an enterprise can make 
depends not only on the costs but also on its financial structure. An 
important element here is the prices paid to producers for their 
products. The recent adjustments of many producers prices are 
precisely designed to allow enterprises to earn satisfactory profits, a 
proportion of which will be used to feed their development funds. The
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financing capacity of a public enterprise depends also on the degree of 
autonomy left to its management to determine the level of profits to 
remain within the enterprise and to designate the different uses to 
which these profits may be put. In Algeria the authority of 
management in the use of financial resources is determined by the 
regulations governing enterprise funds. According to the 1975 
financial system, net profit is measured by the residual of an 
enterprise's sales revenues after deduction of the following costs: 
expenditures on labour and material inputs; depreciation charges; 
rental payments; interest charges on loans and credits-, tax charges and 
a special allowance to cover losses carried over from previous 
accounting periods. These net profits are, when they exist at all, 
then allocated by the central administration to three main uses: the
development fund, the profit-sharing fund and the state budget. 
However, due to the financial difficulties of most Algerian public 
enterprises and to the excessive centralisation of their resources, 
these regulations were not implemented and consequently self-financing 
possibilities were not realised.
Given the central planners’ emphasis on decentralised initiative 
and the financial autonomy of the reformed enterprises, one would have 
expected a clearer division of authority between the enterprise and 
the centre in this particular area. The function of enterprise funds 
is to define the degrees of freedom of the enterprises in the use of 
the financial resources at their disposal. Unfortunately, the reform 
initiators do not offer any clear guidance about the projected 
financial system of the public firm and its close link with self- 
financing.
Self-financing may be hindered in practice by several obstacles 
many of which are the same as those which constrain the use of credit
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and rates of interest as economic levers. Three more constraints can 
be added. The first of these is that profit is still not the lynchpin 
of the enterprise plan (44). The second obstacle is the slow progress 
made in the implementation of the financial rehabilitation scheme. 
The Five-Year Plan (1985-1989) noted that flat the enterprise level 
their capacity to generate funds will in general depend on their 
working, conditions, on the success of the rehabilitation scheme and the 
introduction of a new price system11 (45). In fact, some of the causes 
of the financial destruction1 of public enterprise do still persist 
and will certainly extend well into the future. This is due to 
several constraints imposed by the institutional setting in which these 
enterprises operate and which remain untouched by the reform (market 
structures and supply conditions, state monopoly over imports, 
administrative interventions in enterprise affairs etc). Despite 
these constraints central authorities seem to be determined to push 
ahead with self-financing. The Minister of Finance declared in 1984 
that public enterprises will be expected to finance 25 per cent of 
total investment expenditures during the (1985-1989) Plan (46).
The third obstacle is that enterprise investments, including those 
which are financed from its development fund, are subject to detailed 
central planning and control procedures. Annual investment plans are 
constructed by enterprises and approved by central authorities. This 
has meant that managements are not allowed to dispose freely of their 
development funds. The very fact of the existence of several 
enterprise funds indicates the constraints on the allocation of 
financial resources among different uses. Confirmation by the central 
planning office of plans for the use of these funds frequently turns 
into direct allocation of funds by the higher authorities.
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4 REFORMS IN ENTERPRISE TAXATION
Enterprise reforms have also promised changes in the position of 
the Algerian public enterprises vis-a-vis the tax authorities. The 
aim is to alleviate the tax burden on their finances and to enhance 
their financial independence.
The debate on whether to subject public enterprises to the same 
tax obligations applied to private firms is not new in Algeria. The 
analysis made of the worker participation scheme introduced in 1971 and 
the subsequent conflicts which emerged in connection with the 
calculation of enterprise profits illustrate the nature of this debate.
Relationships between the state and the public sector enterprises 
have in practice been notoriously ambiguous with respect to taxes. 
This ambiguity stems mainly from the contradictory position of the 
state in its relationship with the public enterprise, that is its 
position as a Shareholder1 and owner of public enterprises and at the 
same time as a Regulator and tax collector1. Thus, as the owner of 
its assets, the state employs public enterprises directly to carry out 
its aims, which are not always compatible with financial viability, but 
as a tax collector the state treats them as though they were profit- 
seeking private firms.
It may be recalled from Chapter Eight that public enterprises have 
been subjected to several direct and indirect taxes. These were 
imposed on both investment and production operations. Moreover, many 
of these taxes have been calculated on the basis of the financial 
accounts of the component production units and not on the basis of the 
consolidated accounts of the parent enterprise. Since taxes are 
considered in Algeria as cost items this has meant that excessive 
taxation does have a direct bearing on the profit (or loss) situation 
of enterprises. The report of the CRFE showed the close link between
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the level of taxation and the financial ’destruction1 of public 
enterprises (47). It was estimated, for instance, that tax charges 
accounted for about 30 per cent of investment loans granted to public 
enterprises in the late 1970’s (48). Complaints have also been made 
about the complex administrative procedures involved in the calculation 
and collection of these taxes. In particular it was pointed out that 
the procedure for claiming tax reliefs and exemptions was very 
inflexible and ineffective.
The earliest attempts made to remedy the situation and reform 
enterprise relationships with the tax authorities go back to 1973 and 
1979 when a series of measures was introduced in favour of the public 
enterprises. These consist of the following (49):
1 The newly installed production units were granted exemption from 
paying turnover tax (TAIC) and the lump-sum tax (TF) during the 
first five years of operation. At the same time the rate of the 
TF was brought down from 15 per cent in mid-1970 to 4 per cent in 
1979 and 6 per cent in 1985 for old production units.
2 The elimination of the TUGP tax charged on imports of equipment 
and machinery intended for investment purposes and the reduction 
of the import duty to only 3 per cent.
3 A new tax system was introduced in 1979 whereby enterprises were 
combined in one single tax called CUGO (Contribution Unique 
Globale Obligatoire) (50).
In fact these measures did not question the principle of 
subjecting public enterprises to the same tax burdens imposed on the 
private firms. They were rather designed to lift some of the tax 
burden on the production units during their early years of operations. 
It has been observed that most new plants could not be installed on 
schedule and therefore needed longer periods before they came to
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operate at full capacity. The older and well established production 
units did not benefit from these special tax reliefs.
It seems that the 1977 and 1979 tax changes had little positive 
impact on the finances of enterprises and production units since, three 
years later, CRFE was still calling for the abolition of all the 
regulations and procedures leading to double taxation and for the 
simplification of the tax relief and exemption procedures.
As far as the taxes relating to current operations are concerned, 
the CRFE urged the modification of the Algerian existing system so as 
to:
- alleviate the tax burden on public enterprises
- to allow them to generate positive cash flows
- to give incentive to profit making
These objectives, however, were to be achieved without 
’endangering* the revenues to the Treasury (51). Again, three years 
later, the Five-Year Plan (1985-1989) called for the introduction of 
tax changes f,to allow public enterprises to make profits11, which is a 
precondition for promoting decentralised investments and management 
responsibility, but also ”to provide the state budget with adequate 
revenues” (52). This ambiguous situation suggests that the Algerian 
authorities are concerned about this question but, at the same time, 
that the problem is still unsettled.
5 CONCLUSION
The reforms of public enterprises* internal structures have been 
accompanied by a reorganisation of their finances. Each public 
enterprise had to go through a process of financial rehabilitation. 
The stated aim was to redress their ailing finances and to endow the 
new firms with sound financial structures. The Algerian authorities
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are hoping to end budget subsidies to enterprises, to liquidate bank 
overdrafts and to separate enterprise finances from those of the state. 
The reorganisation of public enterprises is also part of an overall 
strategy aiming at passing to a new stage of economic growth based 
mainly on more rational and intensive use of resources. According to 
this conception, the main tasks and functions assigned to public 
enterprises have been signficantly altered. The 1980 economic reforms 
want to make the public enterprise a source for the generation of 
economic surpluses. It is not only expected to generate funds to 
maintain its steady growth but also to contribute to accumulation at 
the national level.
To achieve these objectives several measures have been introduced. 
A first set of measures has been the consolidation of enterprise 
finances through the injection of more funds into the new enterprises, 
the liquidation of the accumulated bank overdrafts and the settlement 
of inter-enterprise debts. The second set of measures includes the 
reactivation of some economic and financial levers. Thus, the reform 
programme enacted a new system of interest charges on bank loans and 
for the financing of small investments, set new pricing procedures and 
put forward proposals for reforming the tax system.
Despite the central planners* emphasis on decentralised management 
initiative and enterprise autonomy, the reform proposals and in 
particular those pertaining to the credit, price and self-financing 
policies, had not been implemented in 1986.
The reason for this is mainly due to the fact that the 
preconditions for the proper functioning of the economic and financial 
regulations have not been met. In fact, the reforms did not 
restructure the environment in which the public enterprise operates. 
But as Chapter Eleven will show, these measures in fact created more
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obstacles to a genuine decentralisation.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
THE CENTRALISATION MEASURES INTRODUCED 
BY THE 1980 ECONOMIC REFORM
1 INTRODUCTION
The previous Chapter has shown that the 1980 reforms placed a 
heavy emphasis on decentralisation and the extensive use of financial 
criteria in decision-making in public industrial enterprises. The 
rationalisation of enterprise structures, the financial rehabilitation 
scheme and the greater use of indirect economic and financial levers 
are an illustration of this emphasis and of the wish of the Algerian 
authorities to substitute the profit motive and other economic 
incentives for administrative directives. At the same time, there are 
several provisions in the reform programme, and certain measures 
actually implemented in subsequent years, which show that the Algerian 
authority may be moving in quite the opposite direction, that is in the 
direction of greater centralisation.
Unlike some of the economic reforms carried out in Eastern 
Europe, notably in Hungary and Yugoslavia, where directive planning at 
the enterprise level was abolished altogether, the Algerian reforms 
placed a heavy emphasis on increasing the scope of plan directives. 
The Five-Year Plan (1980-1984) firmly stated that "the national plan is 
the only framework within which the development actions and the 
economic policies related to them are elaborated and carried out" (1). 
The central planning office, which up to 1979, had the political status 
of a state secretary was elevated to a Ministry and given large 
decision and control powers, over the other sectoral and functional 
ministries. It now stands at the top of the Algerian economic system. 
The 1980 economic reforms called also for the reinforcement of
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central planners1 control over the economy and particularly for the 
insertion of the public enterprises activities into the planning 
system. Another important innovation introduced by the reforms was the 
introduction of formalised planning structures, procedures and detailed 
plan indicators at all levels of the planning hierarchy.
These measures which were aimed at enhancing central control over 
the economy through direct instruments (te. plans, plan indicators) 
suggest that the 1980 economic leaders were more concerned to correct 
the structural imbalances in the economy rather than to improve the 
micro-economic efficiency of the public enterprises. This is a 
continuing manifestation of the conservative illusion that the national 
economy can be managed as though it were a large firm; and its sub­
units as bodies strictly obeying central orders and instructions.
In fact,"the public enterprise has become, since 1980, tightly 
integrated into a complex administrative machinery which reserves the 
right to define its objectives and control its operations and 
resources. This section will examine some of these institutional 
measures and show how they restrict enterprise autonomy and impede the 
achievement of the objectives sought by the reorganisation of public 
enterprises. Four decision making areas will be investigated:
1 Planning of production activities.
2 Planning of enterprise investment.
3 Planning of enterprise imports.
4 Regulation of wages and incentives.
2 planning OF PRODUCTION activities
2.1 Thg Objec£iygs Qf the RgfQCm
It may be recalled from Chapter Six that, prior to 1980 there was 
no planning of production activities above the level of the enterprise.
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Decisions relating to the choice of the product mix, sources of supply 
and sales policies were made by managements of enterprises through 
direct horizontal links with suppliers and buyers. Attempts had been 
made in the 1970*s to regulate and control enterprise production 
activities through a system of 'enterprise plans1. According to this 
procedure, major enterprise decisions had to be negotiated with, and 
approved by, the central administration before they were actually 
implemented. Despite the cumbersome and detailed a priori controls and 
checks on their production decision, several distortions and 
deficiencies resulted:
under utilisation of production capacity.
excessive operating costs and high operating deficits.
holding of large stocks of materials, spare parts and hoarding of
labour.
expansion of output through the introduction of new capacity 
rather than through a fuller and more efficient use of existing 
productive capacity.
stock-piling of unsaleable output due to non-conformity with 
consumer or user demand and to poor quality.
compartmentalisation of Algerian industry due to lack of inter­
enterprise cooperation and subcontracting.
Central planners effectively lost control over production and 
supply operations in the domestic market. The distortions listed above 
were the product of the deficiencies in the management mechanisms used 
to regulate decision-making in the public enterprises. In particular, 
they were the result of the deficient success indicator system applied 
to the enterprises. The market was eroded and distorted because it 
did not produce the results desired by ideologists. However, nothing 
has replaced it since planning at enterprise level was recognised to
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have been a dismal failure (2). Linder these circumstances the central 
planners were unable to bring pressure on enterprise managers to 
operate efficiently and to pursue policies which were optimal from the 
national standpoint. Advocates of a stronger role for central planning 
and control often argued that the inability of public enterprises to 
construct consistent plans was partly due to the absence of production 
and supply planning at a national level. Without this, they maintained, 
public enterprises could not produce coherent production plans.
It is against this background that the 1980 reforms called for 
the reinforcement of planning of production activities within public 
enterprises and for the incorporation of their plans into the national 
economic plan. The Five-Year Plan (1980-1985) fixed several objectives 
for the planning of production (3).
The first of these was to bring enterprise operations under 
greater central control. The aim was to force enterprise managers to 
construct more coherent and tighter plans which would go beyond the 
usual practice of fixing production targets with no reckoning of the 
means and measures necessary for their implementation. The production 
plan was to become the lynchpin of the enterprise plan; the other 
facets of the plan, le. investment, supplies, financial resources 
were to be closely linked with the production targets.
Secondly, the central planners wish to construct appropriate plan 
targets for each enterprise which, once negotiated with and approved 
by the central authorities, would be implemented by the enterprise 
and become the basis for assessing its performance. The wages and 
bonuses earned by workers and employees were to be determined on the 
basis of the degree of fulfilment of these plan targets.
In addition, the national economic plan would fix on an annual 
basis the operations to be carried out by enterprises and the resources
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required for their implementation. The national economic plan would 
determine the order of priorities in meeting the *needs* of the 
population (ie. product-mix, goods to be imported). In addition to the 
above mentioned functions, the production plans and the supply 
programmes built into them were to be used as instruments for 
consolidating inter-enterprise cooperation and local subcontracting.
The final objective was to improve the quality of national plans. 
The articulation of the enterprise plan with the national economic plan 
was intended to ensure the continuous flow of information to central 
planners necessary for the direction of the national economy.
It is clear from this brief outline of the objectives fixed for 
production planning that the central planners intend to get directly 
involved in production and supply decisions. Indeed, several measures 
designed to strengthen production planning have been introduced by the 
Ministry of Planning since 1980. Thus, the Circular No 107/CAB/1980 
introduced the system of production plans in industry. It set out the 
basic plan indices to be used for the evaluation of management 
performance in public sector enterprises. The circulars for 1982, 1983 
and 1984 plans fixed the procedures, timetables and the detail contents 
of the production plans. They defined the statute of the production 
plan and the role and function of the ministries in the planning, 
coordination and control processes.
The incorporation of the productive activities of enterprises 
into national planning processes has serious implications for 
enterprise independence and its right of decision making. It runs 
counter to the stated aim of giving large decision making powers to 
enterprises and making them accountable for their financial results. A 
close examination of the planning processes involved and the contents 
of the production plans as they were operated in the early 1980s show
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that public enterprises have become less and less autonomous in the 
running of their production operations.
It should be noted that the planning of production is still 
decentralised, that is, the central planners are not directly involved 
in the detailed physical distribution of material inputs to the public 
enterprise to achieve their planned targets. Attempts have been made, 
however, since 1982 to construct balances for a small range of products 
of significant importance to the national economy (steel 
products} construction materials} basic food stuffs). What is new in 
the 1980s regulations, however, is that in constructing their 
production plans, the public enterprises and the production units are 
required to work out in detail the means necessary for the achievement 
of planned production targets one year in advance. The various central 
administrations and control agencies are expected to help them in 
constructing consistent plans.
2.2 The Construction of the Production Plan
The planning hierarchy comprises four distinct levels: the
Ministry of Planning, the sectoral ministry, the enterprise and the 
production unit (4). In the early 1980s the time and sequence of the 
annual planning process were as follows. In the first phase, the 
Ministry of Planning fixes in the early spring of the year preceding 
the period of the plan the rates of growth for the major branches of 
industry and the output targets for a small range of products. These 
targets are then passed on to the sectoral ministries which in turn 
disaggreate them into more specific objectives for enterprises. On 
the basis of these directives, the general management of the enterprise 
issues instructions about the product mix to be produced by the 
component production units over the next year. The task of the 
production units is to implement these directives.
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In the second phase, the operating unit initiates the process by 
establishing the supply plan in the form of requests for specific 
quantities of resources. The responsibility for balancing inputs and 
outputs lies with the central management of the enterprise. The 
general office will attempt to balance and integrate the production, 
financial, labour, supply and other elements of the plan into a 
coherent whole. On the basis of the input-output balances of the 
production units and the supply requests addressed to it by the other 
public sector enterprises and private firms, the general office of the 
enterprise works out a material balance for the most important products 
which fall within the scope of the enterprises. It must draw up an 
import programme which will be submitted to the Ministry of Trade for 
scrutiny and approval. These output and input plans are then discussed 
and amended as necessary by the sponsoring sectoral ministry. These 
plans are then aggregated by the ministries which must represent them 
to the Ministry of Planning by mid-September. There may well be further 
interactions of the plan, when the Ministry of Planning receiving the 
aggregate output-input requirements of enterprises finds that the 
overall macro-balance of resources is likely to meet bottlenecks, 
shortages or if there are inconsistencies. When a final draft of the 
plan is arrived at and approved by the Government, the implementation 
of these plans by the enterprise becomes compulsory.
2.3 The Contents of the Production Plgn
The production plan is the central part of the annual plan of the 
enterprise which normally defines, limits and determines its actual 
operation. The layout of the production plan, its main sub-plans and 
the various indices related to them are constructed by the Ministry of 
Planning and addressed to all plan executants early in the year. The
328
production plan has become since 1982, a detailed and complex document 
which is scores of pages in length. Broadly speaking, the production 
plan fixes the targets to be achieved by enterprises and production 
units in the coming year and determines the financial, supply, labour 
and investment resources necessary to achieved them. Table 1 
represents a simplified structure of an enterprise plan.
The operations to be carried out are formulated in terms of plan 
targets of which the output target is the most important. Output 
indices, which may be output-mix, quantity in physical terms* 
production capacity in tons* metres, are used as a basis for planning 
labour and wages and for working out plans for supplies and financial 
resources. These sub-plans are also expressed as indices each covering 
a particular aspect of the enterprise plan. The plan targets are 
constructed by enterprises for a period of three years. Thus, the 
output indices, for instance, include last year’s achieved output 
level; the targeted output for the current year and the level to be 
achieved over the next year. This applies to all other targets and 
variables of the plan.
The plan targets are therefore the basic information carriers 
used by the central planners to direct plan executants towards the 
achievement of given ends. They also serve as information carriers 
from the lower echelons of planning to the higher levels of planning. 
These indices are also important for control functions since they will 
be referred to by central supervisory bodies in evaluating the work of 
the enterprise during the implementation of the plan. In theory, all 
the plan targets enumerated in the set of yearly plan directives are 
obligatory. In practice, however, the way in which they are 
treated varies and their legal character is far from clear. The most 
important targets are output* labour productivity* rates of capacity
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utilisation (5). The characteristic feature of the enterprise plan is 
the priority given to its production targets.
Table 1 A simplified structure of an enterprise Plan
I Production Plan
II Supply EliD
III Manpower & Wages 
Elen
IV Financing Elan
V Inygstment Plan
vi CQ§f/Prpfit Elen
Main production in physical terms 
Marketed production in current prices 
Production in stock in physical terms 
Exports
Domestic sales 
Subcontracting
Production capacity and its utilisation
Raw material requirements
Imported goods broken down to final
destinations
Stocks of inputs and semi-finished goods
No of personnel employed in head office 
& in operating units
Proportion of productive workers in total 
work force
Size of workforce by skill-categories 
Wage fund together with wages by main 
skill categories
Deficit in skilled labour: head office, 
units
Breakdown of wages according to minimum
wage ceilings
No of women employed
Size of foreign personnel employed
Increases in labour productivity
Classification of qualifications and
skills of labour force
Working capital/broken down into monthly
and quarterly
Bank credits or overdrafts
Inventory norms
Debts and liability
Capital construction/under construction 
Introduction of new production capacity 
Minor investments to improve production 
Repairs and retooling ... etc.
Costs of production
Cost per unit of a range of products
Turnover
Valued added
Net operating result
Souccg: A summary constructed on the basis of the 1984 Annual Plan
of the National Steel Enterprise (ENS). August 1984.
The above outline of the mechanisms of the system and how it 
works are very revealing in so far as the degree of autonomy of public 
enterprises is concerned.
First, public enterprises1 production operations are inserted 
into the national economic plan. The contents of the enterprise plan 
are determined by the latter. Since the reform, the planning 
directives emanating from higher administration levels have become very 
detailed. This severely restricts the enterprises1 freedom of choice. 
The planning of the resources to be secured for the implementation of 
the planned production targets is intended to serve as a means of 
rationalising and controlling the flow of inputs to enterprises. The 
information about resources at their disposal is usually supplemented 
by a list of specific planning tasks. The central planners do no only 
determine part of the product-mix to be produced by the enterprise but 
also exercise tight control over its wage bill and through the banks, 
its utilisation of the financial resources.
Secondly, it is not clear from the reform documents how to 
reconcile the broadening of the scope of plan directives with the use 
of economic parameters and incentives and the increased accountability 
of enterprises which are the basic premises of the reforms (6). In 
fact, it is generally the case that the plan directives clash with 
incentives. The need for plan directives is a recognition of the fact 
that the economic parameters do not induce enterprises and production 
units to observe the central planners preferences. If they did -plan 
directives would not be needed. The plan directives do not, however, 
eliminate the contradiction between the interests of enterprises and 
the central planners’ preferences; they merely enforce the latter at 
the expense of the former. The fact that all enterprise decisions 
have to be discussed in advance and approved by the central authorities
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restricts the enterprise autonomy.
In spite of the short time which has elapsed since this type of 
planning was introduced, there is already evidence that the planning of 
production as described above has encountered fundamental difficulties. 
It has indeed been officially recognised that most public enterprises 
were unable to construct consistent production plans <7).
The weakest aspect of the planning process is the inadequacy of 
the supply system. The supply plans of the production units and 
enterprises are constructed on the basis of direct contracts with 
public and private suppliers in the local market and/or on the basis of 
the import quotas granted to them by the Ministry of Trade. A basic 
weakness in the Algerian supply system is the lack of balance between 
the quantities supplied and demanded in the domestic market. The most 
familiar problem of horizontal coordination has been the chronic 
failure of enterprises under one ministry to meet contractual supply 
obligations to enterprises under another ministry. This problem of 
coordination becomes even more complex when the public enterprise 
depends for the large bulk of its supplies on private sector firms. 
There are no penalties for breaches of the supply contracts such as 
fines for non-delivery; delays,- breaches of product-mix or quality. The 
same is true for enterprise relationships with the Ministry of Trade, 
which, as a result of balance of payment constraints, may reduce 
unilaterally its import quota. These difficiencies have a chain 
reaction effect on enterprises* costs and on their ability to fulfil 
their planned targets.
The central administrations also contribute to the imbalances in 
the plans. They may issue late plans; order unauthorised production 
and change production plans without altering the plan indicators,- 
particularly for supply. The process of working out consistent and
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integrated enterprise plans, therefore, involves compromises to resolve 
numerous conflicts of interest at each level of the hierarchy. The 
crucial question is how to make the various central administrations 
which regulate and control enterprise resources (imports, finances, 
investments) responsible for the impact of their interventions. (8).
There is also ample evidence that the particular character of 
certain indicators continue create distortions and deviations from 
plan targets. Planning and bonus indicators which are set mostly in 
physical terms have failed to stimulate production to satisfy consumer 
demand or to encourage technical innovation or risk. Low quality 
output? inefficiencies in product-mixes and the use of labour and 
materials and indifference to costs have also resulted from this system 
of physical planning (9).
The design of information systems is directed essentially towards 
external reporting to supervisors. The basic sub-plans of the 
enterprise plan are elaborated in a form which is completely useless 
for enterprise management. The plan for material balances, for 
example, is elaborated for a few planned* inputs only and at the level 
of aggregation at which they appear on the yearly list of centrally 
planned supplies. What the enterprise requires is a purchasing plan 
which covers all its inputs - centrally planned or not - and 
disaggregates it to the level of individual specifications. As a 
result, the supply plan is absolutely useless for the enterprise which 
elaborates it. This perhaps explains why plan executants view the 
production plan more as a medium for the transmission of data to the 
higher supervisory bodies rather than as a basic management document 
to be used for decision-making purposes within enterprises (10). 
Moreover, enterprise managers have often complained about the massive 
quantities of data which they have to prepare and transmit at regular
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intervals (monthly* quarterly,- six monthly and annual reports and 
control figures) to the various central control agencies. The heavy 
reporting requirements cause a considerable economic disadvantage to 
the enterprise since it will be obliged to recruit additional 
administrative personnel to do the job of reporting without noticeable 
benefits accruing to the enterprise from this activity (11).
Finally, the attempts aimed at reinforcing planning of production 
has not solved the problems involved in enterprise relationships with 
the banks. These are still characterised by severe tensions and 
conflict. The reason is that public enterprises continue to rely on 
bank overdrafts for the financing of their production operations. 
Fundamentally, there are two reasons for this. The first is that under 
a system of planning in physical terms, priority is given to 
production targets. Very frequently enterprise financial plans are 
elaborated when all other parts of the enterprise plan have been 
already decided. The balances of revenue and expenditure represent a 
financial summary of other parts of enterprise plans elaborated 
earlier. Under these conditions enterprises financial planning has a 
purely technical character and does not constitute ’planning* sen§u 
stricto. Moreover, the determination of the financial results of 
production targets cannot at present be used as a basis for requesting 
changes in physical terms. Secondly, in granting short and medium 
loans to enterprises, the primary banks refer to their financial plans. 
They must make sure that the requests for funds are kept well within 
the limits prescribed by the plan. However, it often happens that the 
actual financial needs exceed the estimate. The estimates are usually 
wide approximations. The degree of uncertainty involved in 
forecasting the financial flows one year in advance is very high and is 
a major obstacle to a successful articulation of the various facets of
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the plan (12). It is these discrepancies between physical and 
financial flows which are at the root of the frictions and conflicts 
between the banks and enterprises (13).
3 PLANNING OF ENTERPRISE INVESTMENTS
The Five-Year Plan (1980-1984) introduced several interesting 
changes in the system of planning and control of public enterprise 
investments. These changes were all designed to deal with the economic 
distortions and financial imbalances which emerged during the pre­
reform period. The declared objective in this area was to bring 
investment costs under control with a view of reducing them and to 
shorten the construction time of investment projects. The changes 
brought about can be summarised under five heads.
The first point to note is the relative decline in the investment 
effort. The propensity to invest, te. is the ratio of investment 
expenditures to gross national product, fell from 48.8 per cent in 1979 
to 34.5 per cent in 1981 and 38.5 per cent in 1982. The share of
Table 2 Share of industry in public sector investment expenditures
iI9Z2rI2842 in billion ad
Total public 
sector & 
investment 
expenditures
Investment 
expenditures in 
industry
Share of industry 
in (%)
1979 55.265 34.628 63%
1980 54.058 28.463 53%
1981 57.585 22.827 U0%
1982 70.682 21.705 29%
1983 107.787 35.000 32%
1984 101.421 33.600 33%
Spurcg: Hakiki, f "Determinants et lieux de manifestation du pQUYQir
(DQnefaire eo Algeria 19ZSbl98^tf* In les Cahiers du CREA, No
6, 1986, p 20
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investment by public industrial enterprises fell particulary sharply 
from 63 per cent in 1979 to about 33 per cent in 1984.
This relative fall of investments in industry is in line with the 
economic directives of the Five Year Plan (1980-1984) and the shift in 
emphasis since 1980 from industry to other sectors of the economy which 
had been lagging behind for many years such as housing; agriculture; 
basic infrastructure,* irrigation and dam construction.
A second point to note is that the directives of the Five-Year 
Plan (1980-1984) also stressed the need for a better preparation of 
investment projects before they are actually undertaken. It called for 
a greater planning discipline and warned against any future ’fuite en 
avant1 through the launching of investment programmes which were not 
urgently needed, ill-prepared or carried out only at a very high cost. 
It may be recalled that prior to the reform the planning of investments 
consisted in the main of the centralised allocation of investment funds 
among enterprises. The actual implementation of these projects fell 
within the competence of the public enterprises themselves subject of 
course to central regulations concerning the allocations of foreign 
exchange; imports and finance. However, the intensification of the 
investment effort and the bureaucratic competition for centralised 
funds create severe distortions and shortages in the supply of all 
types of inputs: construction materials, machinery and equipment,
qualified manpower etc. This in return had a negative impact on the 
rate of implementing investment projects resulting in excessive 
investment costs, long delays and the absence of clearly defined 
responsibilities for the installation of equipment.
The reform proposals aimed to restore the central planners’ 
control over enterprise investments. All investment decisions must now 
involve consideration of the conditions of their implementation. The
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objective is to bring down investment costs and reduce the construction 
periods. No investment can be carried out until all the resourcing 
conditions necessary for its implementation are met. Better project 
preparation will involve ensuring that the location of the new project 
is adequate in terms of availability and energy supplies, labour 
supply, infrastructure and road links. This requires coordination with 
regional and local authorities.
The Algerian authorities are also hoping to improve the quality 
of costing and rate-of-return calculations by means of more detailed 
feasibility studies and more accurate financing plans.
Moreover, with balance of payments considerations in mind, the 
central planners are now more concerned about the need for inter­
sectoral coordination in the elaboration and execution of investment 
projects as a means of intensifying local subcontracting and material 
resourcing. The sectoral ministries are now actively involved in this 
coordination. This is established as a necessary accompaniment to the 
restructuring of industry.
It has also been proposed that the financial and banking 
institutions should be involved in the preparation of investment 
decisions so that they can exercise more effectively their control 
functions during the installation of the investment project (14).
In short, the preparation of investment projects has now become a 
crucial stage in the planning process. The expenses incurred in this 
operation are financed from the state budget. The stated aim of this 
new procedure is to introduce more discipline in the planning of 
investment with approval of projects taking place only after all the 
necessary preparations for their launching have been satisfactorily 
completed.
A third element in the 1980 reforms was the transfer of some of
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the decision making powers from the national budgetary authorities to 
the primary banks. These concern the financing of replacement 
investment , retooling and minor investments. These are now to be 
financed by the primary banks from their own resources and at their 
risk. This aspect of investment planning has been dealt with in a 
previous section and need not be repeated here. It is sufficient to 
note that the primary banks are expected to be actively involved in the 
appraisal and selection of these categories of investment projects on 
the basis of national economic and financial criteria.
Fourthly, it has been decided that the decision whether to 
invest, which formerly rested with the Ministry of Planning and the 
decision to finance, which rested with the Ministry of Finance, should 
now be taken simultaneously at the time when the investment project is 
approved by the Ministry of Planning (15). It is deemed that this 
would speed up the decision making process. It has also been 
suggested that the participation of the banks in the evaluation and 
financing of projects would have a positive effect since they would 
have a vested interest in the construction of optimal financing plans 
for these projects.
A fifth and last change concerns the procedure for adjusting the 
costs of an investment project under construction to allow for 
inflation. To prevent an investment project travelling once again 
along the various stages involved in the planning of investments, the 
new regulations introduced a simpler procedure for reviewing the 
initial costs. The changes in the initial cost structure of a project 
due to increases in wages; prices of raw materials; machinery and other 
related services are taken care of directly by the Algerian Bank for 
Development (BAD), without the prior approval of the Ministry of 
Planning.
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Attention has so far been focused only on the changes announced 
in the various reform documents. It is now necessary to consider two 
issues. Do these reforms represent a major departure from former 
planning practices? How relevant are these modifications to the 
autonomy promised to enterprise managers? Are these changes in line 
with the decentralisation drives and the search for the introduction of 
financial discipline into enterprise decision-making? First, all 
investment projects will continue to be decided within the framework of 
the national economic plan, including those so-called ’decentralised’ 
investments. The national economic plan sets credit quotas separately 
for each branch of industry. As noted in Chapter Ten, the centralised 
system of planning investments remained unaltered. It is deemed that 
investment decisions (rates of growth, the size, type and location of 
project, the time and conditions of installation) lie outside the 
competence of socialist enterprises. The enterprises may be required 
to make investment requests, but the major decisions still have to be 
taken within a wider organisational context. Public enterprises are 
required (by law) to carry out these investments (16).
Secondly, the planning hierarchy, procedures and timetables 
remain unchanged. The investment decisions are still made within the 
framework of a complex administrative structure on the basis of civil 
service rules. Although the public enterprises participate in the 
elaboration of investment plans, the decision whether to invest; the 
financing scheme and the mode of realising these investments are all 
made within the central administration (17). Thus, in making an 
investment request, including these so called ’decentralised’ 
investments, public enterprises must consult several central agencies: 
the relevant sectoral ministry (for technical aspects of the project), 
the Ministry of Planning (cost analysis, appraisal, approval and
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inclusion in economic plans) and finally the primary bank (signature of 
the credit agreement) (18).
At the implementation phase, the public enterprise must wait 
until a series of administrative procedures is carried out: the 
approval of the Central (or Enterprise) Subcontracting Commission; the 
AGI or the foreign exchange allowance procedure; negotiation with 
foreign contractors of the financing conditions; the approval of the 
construction contract by the BAD,- the authorisation granted by the 
primary bank to transfer funds abroad in payment of imported machinery 
... etc (19).
This list of the various administrative procedures and the 
administrative bodies involved in the elaboration and execution of 
investment decisions suggest that public enterprises are still inserted 
into a complex system of macro-management (which is run on the basis of 
administrative decision rules) in which the state speaks with many 
voices. The central problem here is how to reconcile such a system of 
planning and control with the aim sought by the state to change the 
style of management within public enterprises by introducing financial 
discipline in their decisions and to make them responsible for their 
financial results.
The multiplicity of the various forms of checks, approvals, 
quotas, visas, allocation of funds on routine basis, direct orders and 
instructions are not conducive to enterprise autonomy and management 
initiative. They result in long delays in the implementation of 
investment projects which in turn result in higher costs and lower 
profit margins. To illustrate this point, it may be sufficient to note 
that a planned investment proposal takes between six and sixteen months 
before it is actually approved by the Ministry of Planning; and there 
are further delays involved in the application for an import quota
340
(AGI) (20).
Thirdly, the proposed changes make no concession to public 
industrial enterprises in the matter of investment decisions. They 
consist in fact of a transfer of decision making authority from one 
central agency to another and to the banks rather than to public 
enterprises (21). One cannot see, for instance, how the large powers 
promised to the banking system in the appraisal, financing and conduct 
of investments is conducive to enterprise autonomy. True, the reform 
blue-print provided for the decentralisation of some investments and 
called for the encouragement of self-financing in public enterprises. 
However, and up to 1936 all investments, including those which are 
financed from decentralised sources, remain subject to detailed central 
planning and control. The banking system is still fundamentally 
engaged in extending credits for specific expenditure. This has meant 
that the enterprises cannot dispose freely of the funds designated for 
decentralised investments.
The enterprise investment activity is rigourously controlled by 
the Ministry of Planning, the BAD and the primary bank. Not only are 
the financial aspects of the investment project scrutinised, but also 
the adherence to the investment limits prescribed by the plan; the 
types of investments and their conformity to regulations. Due to the 
persisting excess of actual costs over the estimates, great stress has 
been laid on the control of investment costs by the bank. During the 
course of the investment project the primary bank must verify that the 
payments are in accordance with the estimates. Just as before, this 
bank control has proved to be ineffective in preventing the excess of 
the actual costs over the estimates. In fact, it has resulted in the 
development of serious conflicts between the enterprise and banks.
Fourthly, the reform programme has also called for an
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improvement in the preparation of investment projects as a means not 
only of reducing the construction delays and costs but also of 
achieving greater inter-sectoral coordination. While it is true that 
the success of an investment project depends very much on how well it 
has been worked out and prepared, this requirement may lead in the 
Algerian setting, to even longer construction delays and higher 
investment costs. Thus the decision ,for instance, to make the primary 
bank participate in the evaluation and preparation of a new industrial 
project may improve its control over the investment project during the 
course of its implementation. But it may also mean that an additional 
link is added to the already heavy control machinery which the 
enterprise has to consult. This constraint applies also to the 
coordination functions, entrusted to the various central agencies 
(imports, contracts with construction firms etc ).
It may be concluded that the 1980 reforms did not question the 
principle of centralisation of investment decisions. The distinction 
made between fdecentralised! and 'centralised1 investment is 
superficial and useless in so far as enterprise's right of decision is 
concerned since all investments have to be planned in detail and 
approved by central authorities. The reform proposals do not, in 
short, introduce significant changes in the former system of investment 
planning and control.
n PLANNING and CONTROL OF ENTERPRISE IMPORTS
It has been shown in Chapter Five that the administrative system 
of planning and controlling public enterprise imports produced serious 
economic distortions. In particular, it failed to deter public 
enterprises from pursuing policies which are non-optimal from the 
national standpoint. At the macro-economic level, it increased the
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country’s dependency on external markets, and led to external debt 
problems, and a lack of internal subcontracting and national 
resourcing. At the micro-economic level, the cumbersome and deadly- 
slow procedures produced delays in the installation of plant and 
machinery, high investment costs and frequent work stoppages due to 
shortages of raw materials and spare parts. Moreover, faced with 
supply uncertainties and chronic shortages, enterprise managers have 
tended to over bid for all sorts of goods in short supply. These 
practises in turn distorted their finances and inflated their working 
capital needs.
The response of the Algerian planners to these problems, despite 
their emphasis on alleviating the unnecessary bureaucratic procedures, 
has been to reinforce the system by the introduction of even tighter 
control devices and detailed planning procedures. Their prime target 
is to restore the foreign trade balance.
Two other constraints have provided the central authorities with 
further grounds for reinforcing central intervention in this strategic 
area: the increase in the number of public enterprises operating in
foreign markets as a result of their reorganisation and the fall in oil 
prices in world markets. The abrupt fall in the oil price in 1985 has 
led to tighter and more rigorous handling of this external constraint; 
and the rise in the number of public enterprises has also meant that 
more central coordination is needed.
However, as with investment, the reform measures aiming to 
enhance the central authority’s control over foreign trade operations 
through use of administrative methods may be inconsistent with one of 
the very basic aims underlying the restructuring of public enterprises, 
that is the search for higher operational efficiency and the 
introduction of financial discipline in their decision processes.
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The reforms did not alter significantly the previous system of 
planning and control. The most salient features of the import planning 
system can be described as follows.
1 The state monopoly over imports was reasserted in 1978 (22). The 
1986 National Charter also stated explicitly clear that the state 
monopoly over foreign trade transactions is a major instrument 
for regulating the economy.
2 The number of public enterprises endowed with a state monopoly 
over imports increased from about 30 in 1980 to 96 in 1984 as a 
result of their resturcturing. The Decree No. 84-390, 1984, 
fixed the product groups attributed to each public industrial 
enterprise. As a rule, the import rights were granted to 
production enterprises. However, this right is shared with trade 
enterprises under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Trade in 
the case of major consumer goods and some segments of the light
industries. These products are still classified into two broad 
categories: list *A* includes those products which can be imported 
only by the relevant enterprise, except in special cases. List 
’B* includes those products which are under the authority of the 
relevant enterprises, but which it can delegate to other customer 
enterprises where they are necessary for their investment and 
production operations. It should be noted that the list TBf was 
extended in the early 1980s. The objective was to make the 
import system more flexible by allowing public enterprises to 
obtain directly the imports necessary for their investment and 
production operations (23).
3 The principle of incorporating foreign trade into 
centralised planning and control was reasserted and legislated
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for in 1983 (24). The overall import programme (PGI) is now 
elaborated within the framework of the national economic plan. 
This has meant that the volume and structure of imports are 
determined centrally in liaison with the investment, production 
and consumption priorities of the country. The allocation of 
foreign exchange quotas to various branches of industry is made 
on the basis of several considerations: balance of payment 
constraints, encouragement of local production and 
subcontracting, planned investment and production objectives, 
priorities centrally fixed for consumer goods, political 
considerations (e.g. trade arrangements with particular 
countries).
Enterprise imports are still planned one year in advance. The 
AGI procedure remains the basic method for the planning and control of 
enterprise imports. In making their import requests public enterprises 
are required to produce in detail their investment and production 
plans. Obviously the objective of linking enterprise imports to their 
planned objectives is intended to reduce and rationalise import 
operations. This marks a considerable departure from the previous 
practices where central administrations were involved only in setting 
limits on the allocations of foreign exchange to enterprises. The 
planning and control of imports has now become extremely complex with 
the reinforcement of annual planning at the enterprise level and the 
increase in the number of enterprises involved in foreign trade 
operations. The planning process can be broken down into two main 
stages: the elaboration and execution of import plans.
The planning process starts at the production unit level. In 
constructing their annual plans the units make an estimate of their 
procurement needs. These are then addressed to the ‘monopoly
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enterprise1, that is the public enterprise which has a state monopoly 
over the imports of a particular product (or group of products). It in 
turn will see if it can meet the order from local sources, mainly from 
other producing units subordinate to it or from other subcontractors. 
If the products are not produced locally or are in short supply then it 
will include them in its annual import programme (AGI). The annual 
import plan is constructed on the basis of the various import requests 
made by the lower echelons of the planning system.
The items included in the AGI are classified under 3 types of 
products: intermediate goods, planned investments (equipment) and 
goods for final consumers or users. When these plans are completed and 
approved by the relevant sectoral ministries, they are transmitted to 
the Ministry of Trade. On the basis of these plans the National Import 
plan (PGI) is drawn up. Adjustments can be made to the import requests 
made by enterprises to take account of balance of payments constraints. 
This may involve further negotiations with enterprises and the 
amendment of production and investment targets until a final plan 
emerges. When a final import programme is arrived at and included in 
the national economic plan, it is disaggregated and individual import 
quotas are granted to the enterprises and the production units.
At the implementation stage, public enterprises are generally 
free to choose their foreign suppliers. Since the early 1980s attempts 
have been made to introduce some flexibility in the control exercised 
by banks. In particular the famous 1979 Directive No 1 was 
abolished (25). Despite these measures, however, the import 
operations, and in particular the procedures involved in the control of 
the supply contracts concluded by the importing enterprise are still 
very slow and cumbersome. Eight stages have to be gone through.
1 Invitation to tender published in local paper.
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2 Processing and screening of tenders.
3 Negotiations with the chosen suppliers/subcontractors.
4 Examination and approval of the contract by the Enterprise
Tender Committee (CME) (26).
5 Confirmation of the contract by the bank which authorises the
enterprise to obtain credit and controls and makes the transfer
of funds.
6 Submission of the contract to the Central Tender Committee
(CCM) (27).
7 Arrangements made with the national shipping company (CNAN) for
the transportation of the goods.
8 Control exercised by the customs authorities.
The above mentioned features of the import system indicate that 
broadly speaking the former system of planning imports remain 
unchanged. The new measures, if anything, have been designed to 
strengthen the central planners' control over import transactions 
rather than to give more independence to enterprise managements in 
import decisions. Prior to 1982, for instance, the supply contracts 
concluded by public enterprises with foreign firms were not examined by 
the CCM. With the fall in oil prices and the additional constraints on 
the balance of payments, imports are now not at all easy to obtain.
Viewed exclusively from the central planners standpoint, it may 
be argued that the tight control over imports and their rationing by 
administrative means have had some positive macro-economic effects. 
Central authorities have been able to bring down the country's 
propensity to import from 48 per cent in the second half of the 1970s 
down to 29 per cent in 1984 (28). They may have also helped the state 
to absorb, at least in part., some of the effects of the fall in oil 
prices on the national economy. But viewed from the enterprise's
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viewpoint, the implications of these centralised measures are adverse. 
They have resulted in serious bottlenecks, severe shortages of 
materials and spare parts leading to disruption of production and 
excessive operating costs (29). Administrative planning and control of 
imports has proved particularly hard to reconcile with the basic aims 
underlying the reorganisation of these enterprises, mainly to 
rationalise their operations and to introduce discipline and more 
effective financial criteria into their decision-making.
First, the import decisions are made outside the public 
enterprise. The planning process has involved compromises to reconcile 
numerous conflicts at each level of the hierarchy. The officials at 
the Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Finance are usually concerned 
about balance of payments problems and therefore have a vested interest 
in keeping imports as low as possible. Their strategy has frequently 
been to extract the largest output possible from the enterprises and 
the production units with the least possible imports. The response of 
enterprises to the structural and decision-making problems of macro­
management is a familiar one. Managers attempt to cope with an 
uncertain and risky environment by inflating their import requests and 
holding large inventories. Bureaucratic controls developed to prevent 
or to uncover managerial deviance have been traditionally weak, largely 
because these practices are a natural result of the regulation process 
itself.
The practice followed by central authorities of fixing foreign 
exchange quotas well below the levels requested by the enterprise has 
become widespread in recent years (30). Given their specific role and 
functions in the planning hierarchy, the central planning agencies 
(Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Finance) are simply not concerned with 
the impact which these cuts might have on the finances of public
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enterprises. The central authorities reserve the right to make, in 
case of necessity, changes in the national import plan during the 
course of its implementation without any prior warning to enterprises. 
These emergency revisions may cause considerable financial and economic 
disadvantages to the public enterprises and production units. The 
latter cannot claim compensation for such disadvantages.
Secondly, the import procedures are complex and cumbersome 
resulting in long delays in the delivery of the required goods. For 
instance, it has been estimated that in the case of imports of plant 
and machinery the time periods involved range on average between 16 to 
20 months (31). The excessive centralisation of foreign exchange 
funds, the dispersion of import decisions over a large number of 
central control agencies (Ministry of Trade, CMC, banks etc) together 
with the lack of coordination of their actions are responsible for 
the inflexibility of the import system and for the long delays in 
deliveries. In fact, faced with this maze of control procedures and 
agencies, the public enterprises Responsible1 for foreign trade 
operations are simply unable to plan and carry out effectively their 
import operations (32).
Thirdly, the cumbersome planning procedures and delivery 
schedules imposed on enterprises and the production units have serious 
consequences on their liquidity positions. The fact that imports are 
planned for one year only, and not for several years, has often meant 
in practice that supply contracts are concluded once a year. Supply 
deliveries are also made once or twice a year. From the production 
unit’s viewpoint, the arrival of a whole order once a year creates 
serious storage and transportation problems. The implication of this 
is that the production units are forced into purchasing large stocks 
well in excess of their actual needs which are often spread evenly
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over the year. This system also requires that the production units 
have considerable financial resources at their disposal to pay for a 
whole consignment before the goods are sold or transformed into 
saleable products. The production units cannot benefit from favourable 
credit terms offered by suppliers. It has also been reported that the 
production units are often asked to pay in advance for their supplies, 
when they place their orders (33)* The practice of holding large 
stocks is both economically and financialy irrational. It is a waste of 
scarce resources which could be put to more productive uses. In 
financial terms, excessive stocks to which tie up considerable capital 
resources creates additional working capital needs, which in turn 
worsens the liquidity position of the production units. It can be 
argued, therefore, that viewed from the inflexible import planning 
system is contributing to economic waste and to the financial 
’destruction* of the micro-economic units.
It may be concluded that as regards the import planning the 1980 
economic reforms brought no advantages to public enterprises. Import 
decisions are still made outside the enterprise. Enterprise 
procurements are incorporated into a larger import system which is run 
on the basis of macro-economic considerations and administrative rules. 
The regulations and the a priori controls and checks on enterprise 
imports greatly restrict their operational autonomy. They create 
serious bottlenecks the effects of which are long delays in decision 
making, increases in costs and the removal of responsibility for 
imports from managers.
5 IHE REGULATION OF WAGES AND INCENTIVES WITHIN PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
The reorganisation of public sector enterprises in Algeria has 
been followed by tightening state control over the employment and wage
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decisions in these enterprises. The national salary grid, the work on 
which lasted several years (from 1978 to 1984), was finally implemented 
in 1985. As in Eastern European countries, employment, wages and 
incentives in all sections of the public sector are now under strict 
state control. Article 128 of the national salary grid, or SGT, makes 
it clear that wages and income policies must not be delegated to 
enterprises. They have become an instrument for the .implementation of 
the economic plan. Wage increases are related to improvements in 
production and productivity levels. The prime target of the central 
authorities is to control inflation, reduce wage differentiation 
between the various sectors of the economy and consequently reduce the 
high level of worker mobility.
Three formal restrictions are placed on the hiring powers of the 
production units and enterprises. The first is quantitative setting a 
limit on the average number of full time workers and employees 
permitted during the year. The other two restrictions place limits on 
the ability of the production unit to attract labour. These consist of 
the wage and salary rates determined nationally for all jobs and the 
total wage fund available to the enterprise. Labour regulations leave 
the production units free to substitute one type of labour for another. 
They are not free, however, to increase total expenditures on labour in 
order to economise expenditure on material costs; nor are they free to 
increase total retained earnings as a reward for productivity 
improvements.
The maximum number of employees permitted is fixed in the annual 
plan of the enterprise and of the production units. Limits are set for 
major skill categories. The recruitment of new skilled personnel has 
become a serious constraint on enterprise managment in recent years. 
Public enterprises and production units have come under serious
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pressure following the reform to utilise fully and rationally labour 
resources and to cut down redundant workers. Regional labour 
committees have been installed to scrutinise and approve new 
recruitments, and to construct, in consultation with the personnel 
directorate of the relevant production unit, action plans for the 
redeployment of the redundant workers (34). The central authorities 
seem to be determined to deal with the problem of overmanning in public 
enterprises. A number of measures have been taken: transfers to 
other units, non-replacement of retired workers and reconversion of 
workforce (35).
The central authorities also set a limit on the total wage fund 
of the enterprise and the units. The various wage and salary rates are 
centrally fixed for each sector of the economy and the earnings for 
different jobs are kept in strict proportions to the national wage 
rates. An enterprise’s earning structure is subject to supervision and 
approval by the central administration, and is bound by the wage fund 
established for the year in question. The wage fund in an enterprise 
or production unit is linked the planned increase in production and 
productivity levels (36).
These measures clearly reduce the freedom of managers to respond 
to labour market pressures for different labour skills by varying the 
composition of its labour force and the earnings for different grades. 
In order to stimulate more effort on the part of workers and employees, 
a new bonus scheme was introduced in 1980 in most public sector 
enterprises (37). The aim was to link the bonus payments to the degree 
of fulfilment of planned production and productivity targets. Two 
types of bonuses have been paid to workers in public enterprises since 
1980: the first is paid to each worker for his individual effort
(work-piece) and the second is a collective bonus calculated on the
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basis of the degree of achievement of the planned production targets in 
a production unit. While the former varies between 0 and 10 percent of 
the workers basic salary fund, the latter is much higher and may be as 
much as 30 percent of the total basic salaries paid to the collective 
of workers.
This bonus system has, however, failed to produce the expected 
results (38). The bonuses were often interpreted as standard 
additional payments to all workers, and consequently their value as 
incentives has been lost. The reasons for this failure are the absence 
of standard work norms, the difficulty of assessing the performance of 
the non-productive workers, (ie, maintenance and administrative staff) 
and calculating accurately the productivity gains.
The above discussion of the changes in the planning arrangements 
for production, investment, imports and wages indicates that, despite 
the reforms1 promises to introduce a greater degree of decentralistion 
into the planning system and to foster greater initiative by 
enterprise managers, powerful centralising forces have in fact been 
strengthened. As a result, enterprises are now operating within an 
institutional environment where centrally imposed constraints are 
tighter than before. This clearly runs counter to the efforts to give 
more autonomy to enterprises and creates a fundamental and serious 
conflict, not to say confusion, in the whole reform package. This will 
now be examined in the final concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
CONCLUSIONS
The Algerian public enterprise, the backbone of the Algerian 
economy for more than fifteen years, has come under close scrutiny 
since 1980. For many years the public enterprise was considered to be 
an instrument for achieving the social and economic policies of the 
Algerian state. For many years also, little was known about the 
operation of the Algerian public enterprises. At a time when a rapid 
and turbulent policy of industrialisation and priority planning reigned 
supreme, the central planners paid little attention to the rational 
allocation of resources or to micro-economic processes and adjustments. 
The enterprises1 efficiency and performance were measured essentially 
in terms of their ability to augment productive capacity and the 
quantity of output. Their heavy losses were tolerated because of the 
special tasks assigned to them by the central planners; and their 
operations, despite their manifest inefficiencies and the waste of 
resources financed from the considerable economic rent provided by oil 
and gas revenues. A major characteristic of the management system of 
the public enterprises during this period was the lack of a clear 
dividing line between macro and micro-management processes, between the 
state administration and the enterprises. This system produced 
serious distortions in the economy and conflicts of interests between 
enterprises and the central administrations.
The aim of the 1980 reforms was precisely to reverse these trends. 
Given the country's limited reserves of oil, the uncertainties 
regarding oil prices in world markets, and the high inflationary 
pressures, the Algerian authorities wished to rehabilitate the economic 
function of the public enterprises and make them responsible for their
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own growth.
In order to achieve this, the public enterprises were broken up 
into smaller, specialised and more manageable units. They had to 
divest themselves of activities not directly connected with their main 
specialisation. In addition, a financial rehabilitation scheme was 
introduced. Measures to strengthen the financial autonomy of the 
enterprises included the deregulation of many prices, the reactivation 
of the role of credit, the introduction of self-financing and the 
decentralisation of minor investment decisions to the enterprises 
themselves. The reform proposals also promised that in the future 
precedence would be given to the use of indirect economic and financial 
levers to influence management decisions.
This study has presented an exhaustive analysis of the reform 
measures. The principal conclusion is that a number of factors 
significantly reduced the impact of the reform. The marginal results 
of the reform can be attributed both to the design of the reform 
measures and the speed at which they were implemented. The reforms 
were abruptly triggered off by a political crisis which required that 
the changes were introduced without delay. As a result, there was 
insufficient time to prepare detailed blueprints for the new system. 
This led to numerous contradictions in the objectives of the reforms 
and the changes introduced in the management of the enterprises.
The reform proposals, both in their design and implementation, 
contained a number of compromises which were essentially conservative. 
The proposals contained several measures which, despite the declared 
objectives of the reform, involved an increase in centralisation. In 
fact, the reform programme did not question at all the planning system 
within which the enterprises operated and which significantly affected 
their decisions and their resources. Neither the Commission Ad-Hoc de
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la Restructuration Financiere des Entreprises CCRFE), nor the 
Commission National de la Restructuration des Entreprises (CNRE) called 
for a review of the relationships between the central administrations 
and the enterprises. On the contrary, various official documents, 
especially those issued by the Ministry of Planning and various Party 
resolutions, called for the introduction of rigorous and tight control 
measures at all levels of the planning hierarchy. Indeed, as Chapter 
Eleven has clearly shown, the public enterprises have since 1980 become 
fully integrated into a centralised planning system which leaves little 
room for maneouvre to managers. Consequently, the retention of the 
basic framework of the command economy virtually assumed the 
continuation of the functional characteristics associated with it. 
This also meant that the conditions largely responsible for the 
traditional conflicts between central and local interests were 
essentially unmodified.
The alterations in the structures of public enterprises while at 
the same time keeping the existing planning system unchanged is a clear 
manifestation of the central planners1 perceptions of the real causes 
underlying their problems. They assumed that the financial and 
economic problems of the public firms were basically the result of 
deficiencies in their internal structures and mismanagement, and not 
due to the external constraints imposed on them by the social, economic 
and institutional setting in which they operated. The question here 
is whether the problems of size and structure have not been somewhat 
exaggerated by the central authorities in relation to the problems 
associated with the methods of planning and control.
Despite the central planners emphasis on decentralised initiative 
and the extensive use of financial criteria in decision making in 
public enterprises, the reform proposals and in particular those
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pertaining to credit, prices and selrefinancing policies had not been 
implemented by 1986. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
preconditions for the proper functioning of the economic and financial 
regulations have not been met. In particular, the main focus of the 
reorganisation scheme has been the structure of enterprises and not the 
'enterprises* themselves. For instance, the reform documents remained 
silent on a number of issues which are crucial for the application of 
economic and financial levers such as the financial structure of the 
enterprise, the economic and legal status of its assets, its right of 
decision in investment, the nature of its relationships with other 
state enterprises, its internal organisation.
How are these inconsistencies to be explained? How is one to 
explain the central planners' search for efficiency and decentralised 
initiative and at the same time their adoption of tight planning and 
control measures? A number of hypotheses may be offered.
First, the ideas underlying the reform scheme and the accompanying 
implementation measures evolved within the context of political and 
ideological conflict involving the major social groups forming the 
wider public sector. Thus, while there seems to be some general 
agreement as to the seriousness of the economic crisis, its wider 
implications and the urgent need for change, it is in fact the 
direction, the speed and the extent of this change which is subject to 
debate and disagreement among various factions. The inconsistencies 
of the reform proposals can be traced in the first instance to the 
emergence of two conflicting tendencies within the central 
administrations during the preparation of the reform blueprint, each 
starting from its own perceptions of the underlying causes of the 
country's economic difficulties and the malfunction of the planning 
system in the period prior to the reform.
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The advocates of a centralised system, headed by the Ministry of 
Planning, argued that the country needed, in these difficult times, 
more centralisation and not less. They argued that the economic and 
financial distortions which emerged in the 1970*3 were inevitable under 
the former system because it was weak, incomplete and decentralised. 
To support their view they frequently referred to the comparative 
weakness of the central planning office in relation to that of the 
enterprise technocrats and the sectoral ministries, to the absence of 
production and supply planning and detailed plan realisation criteria. 
According to this view, it is these deficiencies in the planning system 
which led to the proliferation and predominance of market 
relationships, with the inevitable consequence that the central 
planners completely lost control over the decisions and behaviour of 
enterprises. It follows that any effective action to redress the 
situation must start with improving central planning and control and by 
the introduction of formalised planning structures, procedures and 
management norms and performance indicators at all levels of the 
planning hierarchy.
The other tendency, headed by the Ministry of Finance, was 
favourable to the idea of constructing a fguided market' economy. The 
supporters of this view argued that the disturbances and distortions 
observed in the past were a natural result of the directive- 
administrative management system. Under such a system it was not 
possible to draw a dividing line between the macro and micro-economic 
processes. In the past, enterprises had been regarded almost 
exclusively as agents for economic growth and social reproduction, and, 
therefore, financial viability was overlooked. In order to achieve 
the objective of greater efficiency through rationalisation sought by 
the state, the supporters of this model called for the transformation
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of the existing directive-administrative system into a seif-reguiating 
one. More self-regulation could be achieved by reducing the extent 
and the frequency of macro-management interventions by the central 
administration, with their bureaucratic civil service procedures, in 
the micro-management processes of the public enterprises. They 
defended the idea that the priority of national goals could be secured 
through a system of economic and financial controls, or levers, which 
would at once allow the achievement of national objectives and reduce 
the conflict between the enterprises and the control administrations. 
The expanded use of contracts in a market context would replace a large 
proportion of formalised administrative procedures. Both of the above 
mentioned tendencies seem to have had some impact on the formulation of 
the reform proposals and the measures to implement them. However, up 
until the end of 1985, the views of the planning authority were 
predominant and had considerable backing from various segments of the 
state-party machinery. The elevation of the political status of the 
central planning office to that of a Ministry, and the subsequent 
reinforcement of comprehensive imperative planning at all levels 
illustrate this point.
Secondly, the impact of the reform was reduced by the deepening of 
the economic crisis following the abrupt fall in the price of oil in 
world markets. The first priority of the central planners and policy 
markers confronting this situation was to regain control over the 
economy and restore its overall balance. In fact, the balance of 
payments problems, the fall in foreign currency earnings, the serious 
intersectoral distortions, the rise in the level of unemployment, the 
increase in domestic demand due to very high population growth rates, 
the state's commitment to make basic foods available to low income 
groups have all constrained the central authorities' capacity to
362
introduce major changes in the administrative system of planning and 
control.
Given these constraints, the reorganisation of public enterprises 
may be regarded as a search by the Algerian authorities for an improved 
system of management of the economy and an attempt to introduce some 
kind of financial discipline and transparency rather than granting the 
enterprises more decision-making powers. Moreover, it seems as though 
the central authorities were aware that there existed a high potential 
for improving productivity and utilisation of capacity in the 
enterprises which could be achieved through the rationalisation of 
their structures right down to the basic operating units and the 
introduction of tighter control measures, involving compulsion, if 
necessary, rather than reforming the management system as a whole.
A third explanation of the limited effect of the reform was that 
the revision of the existing decision-making processes was a 
politically sensitive issue because it struck at the roots of state 
power. Adoption of the market as the main device for integrating 
macro and micro-economic interests would mean the transfer of decision­
making power, at least in the field of micro-economics, to the 
managerial class and eventually, through the mechanism of the market to 
the population as a whole. The conservative approach to both the 
conceptualisation and the implementation of the reform measures may 
perhaps explain why the public enterprise managers viewed the reform as 
a ’political* and not an ’economic’ initiative. Indeed, many 
observers saw the reorganisation of the public enterprises as merely a 
political move aimed at counterbalancing the ascendant power of 
enterprise technocracy and restoring more effective central control 
over their operations.
The above discussion of the 1980 reforms has concentrated only on
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the limitations of the economic; and organisational changes in the snort 
term. These reforms clearly may have long-term, latent consequences 
which cannot yet be fully evaluated. There is, indeed, a sense in 
which the 1980 reforms must be seen as a long-term perspective, because 
the operation is still evolving and because decisions to introduce 
major changes in the management system are made within the framework of 
a complex institutional system and depend on changes in the power 
structure within the ruling class. The reform as implemented between 
1980 and 1986 has revealed two significant facts.
It has shown that the discussion on the public enterprise and its 
role in the national economy has only just begun. There are many 
issues and contradictions still to be resolved. The other fact is 
that to transform the public enterprise into a real Enterprise* 
requires the transformation not only of the enterprise itself but the 
whole economic and institutional system in which it operates. The 
resolutions of the National Conference on Development held at the end 
of 1986 came to this conclusion and called for a major overhaul of the 
institutional environment of the public enterprises; and for the 
separation of the finances of the enterprise from those of the state. 
This indicates that the administrative methods of planning and control 
have reached an impasse and denotes a shift in the balance of power in 
favour of the advocates of constructing a market-based system. Here 
again the future of the public enterprise is not clear at all.
How far are the Algerian authorities planning to go in their 
reforms of public enterprises? It should be noted that the debate has 
so far been limited to discussions about the most efficient methods of 
planning and control and has not questioned the public ownership of 
these enterprises. Ownership of these enterprises by the state was 
officially confirmed by the 1986 National Charter. In the medium
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term, the privatisation of the public sector enterprises is not on the 
agenda and even goes beyond the limits of political legitimacy. 
Moreover, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie will not gain a substantial 
pecuniary interest from liquidating the public sector or some segments 
of it. On the contrary, it will profit from the expansion of the 
existing private sector, in as much as the sector is dependent on 
markets created by the public sector or the incomes received by it. 
More important, perhaps, is the fact that a predominantly ffree 
economy1 would remove the political raison d*etre of the bourgeoisie.
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Annexe no 2. The reorganisation of public industrial enterprises
1. Light Industries
Parent enterprise New enterprises
Location 
of head office
SONiTEX 
( Textiles )
5
1
national enterprises specialised by Algiers, Bejaia, 
similarproduct groups (wool, cotton, Tizi-Ouzou 
textiles, silk, made-to-measure garments 
national marketing enterprise. Tlemcen, M'sila .
SONIPEC 
(Leather & skin, 
shoes )
2
1
national enterprises ( basic processes, 
manufacturing ) 
national marketing enterprise
Jijel, Mascara, 
Chrea
SN SEMPAC
(Processing of 
cereals )
5 regional enterprises Algiers, Bel Abbes 
Constantine, Tiaret
SNMC ( Construction 
materials )
11
1
regional enterprises grouped on the 
basis of similar production activities 
national enterprises for research and 
development.
Chelef, Meftah, 
Constantine, Zahana 
Batna, M. El-Kebir 
Boumerdes.
Bodouaou, Telemcen
SNIC (Chemical 
industries)
3 national enterprises specialised by 
similar group products (paint, 
detergents, glass and abbrasives )
Sour El Ghouzlan 
Maghnia, Lakhdaria 
Constantine
SOGEDIA (Food 
processing )
3 national enterprises ( sugar, oil & 
fat products, canning of fruits &
vegetables)
Chelef, Algiers, 
Boufarik
SNEMA ( Mineral 
water, soft drinks, 
beer)
3 regional enterprises Algiers, Batna, 
Saida
SNLB (Wood & 
furniture, cork)
4 national enterprises specialised by 
similar group products ( wood &
furniture, carpentary, hardware, 
cork )
Jijel, Boufarik, 
Oum Bouaghi,
El Eulma
SNERI ( Engineering 
& project
2
3
national enterprises 
regional project installation
Algiers, Blida, 
Bouira, Oran, .
construction ) enterprises Annaba
SNAT ( Arts & 
crafts )
1
3
national board for the promotion 
of arts and crafts, 
regional enterprises.
Algiers, Batna, 
Tizi Ouzo
Annexe no 2. The reorganisation of public industrial enterprises 
2. Heavy Industries
Parent enterprise New enterprises Locatio of head office
SONAREM 
( Mining )
4 national production enterprises ( iron ore & Skikda, Constantine
phosphate, salt, marble, non ferrous) TPhP«a Ainipr*
1 national enterprise for exploratoin & research
1 national enterprise for development of Boumerdes
mining industry.
SN METAL ' 5 
(Metallurgy )
national enterprises specialised by similar 
production processes ( capital goods, rail 
machinery, structural constructions, foundry 
products).
Oran, Annaba, 
Tiaret, Algiers. 
Ain Defla
SONELEC 8 
(Electrical 
engineering & 
electronics }
national enterprises ( wires, electronics, 
electro-chemistry, electro-technicals, home 
appliances, lifts, electrical appliances,
cables)
Setif, Constantine, 
Berouaghia, Oran
Ain Semara, Algiers 
Bel Abbes, Rouiba
SONACOME
(Mechanical
engineering )
nanonai enterprises specialised oy major 
segments of activity (hydraulic equipment, 
machine tools, cutlery, vehicles, bicycles & 
motobicycles, public works equipment, 
mechanical engineering, agricultural 
machinery)
national enterprise for project construction 
national marketing enterprise
Berouaghia, Setif, 
Algiers, Oran, Hamiz 
Ain Semara, Rouiba
Constantine, Oran
SNS 
(Iron & steel )
1 residual national enterprise 
5 national enterprises specialised by similar 
group products ( packaging, industrial gas, 
steel & iron processing, long steel products, 
steel plates ),
3 regional enterprises ( for reprocessing 
metals & steel waste)
4 regional project construction firms 
4 regional engineering & design firms
Annaba, Algiers,
Oran, M'sila, Jijel 
Constantine, Blida
3. Energy and Petrochemical Industries
SONEU3AZ 3 
( Electricity 
& gas)
national enterprises ( electrical works & 
installation, electrification works, project 
construction and distribution networks)
Algiers, Media, 
Bourdj-Menail.
SONATRACH 12 
( Petroleum 
& ptrochemicals)
national enterprises specialised by similar 
activities or homogenous production processes 
(refining & distribution of petrol, plastics & 
rubber, civil engineering, pipe lines, oil wells 
works, geophisics, drilling, industrial design 
and engineering, fertilizers, petrochemicals )
Setif, Algiers, Oran, 
Ain Semara, rouiba, 
Bel Abbes, Arzew,
Hassi Messaoud, 
Skikda, Hamiz
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